

To what extent have the colonial legacies and formative years shaped the contemporary Pakistan and its challenges with Islamic Extremism?

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Abstract.

Colonial rule divided nations across the continent and altered the lives of the native inhabitants drastically, sometimes irreversibly. India had been indirectly ruled by the British East India Trading Company since 1600; this power was later dissolved and transferred to Queen Victoria in 1858 meaning India was now under the direct rule of Britain and remained so until partition in 1947. During those years under colonial administration the country was subjected to the imposition of British ideals and underwent many political and social changes. India, a region roughly the size of Europe, has remained remarkably united and cohesive following partition yet Pakistan has unravelled for all to see. Why then, is there such disparity between the successes of these two countries that were formerly one under colonial rule?

Despite being only 65 years old Pakistan has undergone a difficult progression and suffered many setbacks. From political instability to repeated martial regimes the people of Pakistan have witnessed an endless array of changes and upheavals, all played out in front of a growing global audience. Its relationship with extremism is a well documented one and an area that forces the country into the

spotlight on a regular basis. It is this troubled association with extremist behaviour that has paved the way for this research. The aim has been to ascertain what role the legacy of colonial domination and the initial years of construction have had on contemporary Pakistan's fight with extremist behaviour. It is asserted that the actions and policies instigated under British rule coupled with the subsequent division of India have played a dominant role in the struggles that Pakistan has faced and its escalating relationship with Islamic extremism.

The majority of the research in this field looks at more modern historical components as causes and cites the late 1970's as the turning point for Islamic extremism within Pakistan; others focus on the wider implications of British rule such as economic turmoil and financial instability yet little attention is given to the possible relationship between British rule and extremist behaviour. This research asserts that it was the policies and actions of the British colonial administration at the time that directly underpinned the struggles faced by Pakistan post partition and that the roots of present day Islamic extremism can be traced back to the events surrounding colonial rule.

This research concludes that it is impossible for colonial leadership not to have impacted the future of Pakistan given the policies they devised and the documented response of the indigenous people. However, what this research also identifies is the simplicity of such conclusions and that it is imperative that the influence of colonial rule be examined alongside various other elements that could and did influence contemporary Pakistan. Whilst colonial rule is an active part of the conclusions drawn in this piece various other factors have come to light in dissecting Pakistan's relationship with extremism. Islam itself has been analysed and closely researched and the way in which it has been utilised as a tool for political development is a fundamental element in answering the core question within this research.

Introduction.

Pakistan, a country once described as an “economic basket case and a fountainhead of terror” dominates the headlines of the 21st century and is a complex yet vital area of study.¹ It has evolved into a country that poses a significant threat on a global scale in terms of international security and regional instability. The problems that the country itself suffers frequently permeate into surrounding regions causing greater unrest and large-scale unease. Pakistan currently stands as one of the most dominant areas for Islamic extremism in the world and, as research conducted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies asserts, “is passing through one of the most dangerous periods of instability in its history”.² In recent years the region has been propelled into the spotlight for its increase in extremist activity and its government’s inability to provide a secure framework for dealing with this. It is a common misconception among the general population that Islamic extremism arrived with the devastating events of September 2001; what many scholars in this field have ascertained, such as Monte Palmer, is that Islamic extremism has its roots much further back in history.³ For Pakistan in particular it has been claimed by authors such as J D Johnson that former colonial rule has contributed to the country’s devolution into an area that struggles with Islamic extremism.⁴ The main aim of this research is to ascertain to what extent colonial rule has influenced the level of extremism found in contemporary Pakistan.

Islamic extremism itself is not a new concept and has been traced back to events around the Christian Crusades with Hashshashin being one of the first recorded groups guilty of acts of Islamic extremism.⁵ It has, of course, evolved over time with renewed grievances and diversified ideologies yet there are key elements of Islamic extremism that remain almost unaltered. The preservation and elevation of Islam remains central to the ideology of organisations that follow a path of religious extremism. They are known to recount examples of Western intervention in Muslim lands which is

¹ Muthuswamy M, 2010, *Why have Pakistan and India evolved so differently?*, South Asia Analysis Group, [www], available at: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers42/paper4138.html>

² Vira V & Cordesman A H, 2011, *Pakistan: Violence V Stability*, [pdf], Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, pg ii, available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan.pdf

³ Palmer M & Palmer P, 2008, *Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity and Challenges*, Rowman and Littlefield, USA

⁴ Johnson J D, 2007, *Analysis of the Sources of Islamic Extremism*, [pdf], Kansas USA, available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a471870.pdf>

⁵ Hashshashin were a medieval Ismaili sect that evolved around 1091. In order to achieve their goals they undertook assassination type actions. Hashshashin translates to mean *Assassin*.

abhorrent in their eyes and are key catalysts for their activities. Mustafa states that extremists believe “...The Muslim world has been angered by the sufferings of Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq, following the U.S. occupation of these countries”.⁶ Of course, each organisation varies in their approaches and beliefs yet the core grievances that motivate these organisations appear to be universal. Today headlines are punctuated by names such as Al-Shabaab, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas, highlighting the actions of Islamic extremist groups that blight the security of countries across the globe. Extremism is well documented within Pakistan yet its origins are greatly contested. Farooq Sulehria argues that Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan only really began in the 1980’s with the inauguration of General Zia ul-Haq.⁷ However, this research aims to provide evidence that extreme behaviour in the name of Islam was evident long before Zia’s arrival and that it can in fact be traced back and linked to the policies and actions of colonial leadership.

Often described as a relatively new country Pakistan has undergone significant transformations and upheavals in its 65 year history. Beginning as a mere whisper of an idea in the early 1800’s the true foundation of a movement for creation was not consolidated until around 1940. The road to partition was littered with political and economic difficulties and gave rise to areas of unprecedented violence and prolonged tensions. Following independence the newly formed dominion would encounter further problems and struggle to gain a legitimate standing on the world stage. Britain ruled in this region for decades and it would be unrealistic to assume that colonial rule had no long term impact on the development of Pakistan as a country. In attempting to ascertain exactly what degree of damage colonial rule had on Pakistan and its possible role in the present situation within the country it is essential to briefly outline what the current situation is. Since 2001 Pakistan has been under intense scrutiny for its involvement in the terrorist attacks upon America as analysts found that the country had been the home and training ground for some of the members involved. Despite pledging support in the fight against extremism the country’s government has failed to create a secure region and 2011 saw security forces locate Osama Bin Laden, infamous head of terrorist group Al Qaeda, residing

⁶ Mustafa G, 2004, *Religious extremism: Causes and remedies*, available at: <http://www.hssrd.org/journals/2004/english/religiousextremism.html>

⁷ Sulehria F, date unknown, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan*, [www], International Journal of Socialist Renewal, available at: <http://links.org.au/node/117>

within Pakistan's borders. Levels of security within the country have continued to decline into 2012 with a rise in militant activity and suicide attacks carried out by Islamist groups within the region ensuring the country remains a considerable threat to global security. Pakistan is a critically important region in terms of international security and a vital area to be researched and understood. It is important to note at this early stage that Pakistan is not alone in its spiralling dissent into religious extremism. Countries such as Somalia, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria and Sudan are all very much on the radar of security forces in terms of Islamist threats. However, whilst this essay will use regions such as this for comparative purposes as well as to assess the context of situations, the research will focus primarily on Pakistan.

Methodology.

This research utilises a variety of sources in order to allow for a full and inclusive study of Pakistan as a country and its composition. Primary sources consulted include legislatures such as The Lahore Resolution, cabinet minutes and memorandums, alongside photographs, census data and a number of newspaper articles from the time period being researched. These various sources add depth to the arguments proposed during this analysis and allow a greater sense of the governmental documentation passed at the time and the impact of these. Images by world renowned photographer Margaret Bourke White have been included to facilitate a visual understanding of the times being discussed.⁸

Research within this area is not without its boundaries and as with all projects issues do arise during the period of investigation. Although not impeding this research to any significant degree the sensitive nature of the topic does provide some barriers to information. As terrorism is an area that is of paramount concern to all security organisations much of the information regarding certain movements and organisations involved in terrorist activity is still classified. In order to overcome this it became imperative to widen the search for the information and utilise that material that has been legitimately released by governmental archives and organisations such as MI5, The International Crisis Group and The National Archives.

The statistical information compiled for this piece incorporates original data collected in order to ascertain whether there is any possible correlation between colonial rule and religious extremism (see Appendix A). Whilst the data does not focus entirely on Pakistan the aim is to show a wider relationship between former colonies and their present situation in regards to instability, military intervention and extremism. The conclusions drawn from this, whilst not only being vital to this research, point to a wider area of future study that could most definitely produce a fascinating insight.

Definition of terms.

⁸ Margaret Bourke-White was Time/Life magazine's photo correspondent in India and Pakistan in 1946-1947. She is regarded as one of the greatest photographers of all time. More information can be found regarding her work at the following website: <http://www.lkwdpl.org/wihohio/bour-mar.htm>

Religious extremism is a sensitive topic and an area that can lead to overly ambiguous terminology and the threat of offence or stereotyping. As *Farooq Sulehria* notes, Islam and Islamic fundamentalism are not one and the same and this research is aware of this and the possible problems that could be encountered when researching such an area.

*“When analysing Islamic fundamentalism, one must understand that the religion of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism are not one and the same thing. Islamic fundamentalism is a reactionary, non-scientific movement aimed at returning society to a centuries-old social set-up, defying all material and historical factors. It is an attempt to roll back the wheel of history.”*⁹

There is also very little agreement among scholars and security organisations on a working definition of extremism. For the purpose of this research Islamic extremism is defined as the following as outlined by British security force MI5;

*“The use or threat of action designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public, or a section of the public; made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause”*¹⁰

Literature Review.

⁹ Sulehria F, date unknown, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan*, [www], International Journal of Socialist Renewal, available at: <http://links.org.au/node/117>

¹⁰ Mi5, date unknown, *Terrorism*, [www], available at: <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism.html>

It is the belief of this research that the connection has not accurately been made between colonial rule and Islamic extremism within Pakistan. The investigation needed to delve deeper into the true implications of colonial rule within India and how this impacted the newly formed Pakistan and its eventual involvement in religious extremism. The literature available relating to this area of study varies greatly from books and journals to newspapers and archive images yet it is felt that there still remains a void to be filled by the conclusions of this research. As there is no dearth of information regarding colonialism and extremism respectively, the following is a brief review of the bibliographic resources utilised during the course this essay.

Many sources when looking at Pakistan focus solely on the elements that are most obvious, namely its tumultuous relations with military rule and the numerous occasions the country has suffered under martial regimes. Ayesha Siddiqa looked specifically at how the Pakistani military has infiltrated almost every section of life from official government relations to social rules and regulations and has been relied on and used as something as a prop in times of need.¹¹ This reliance has had many diverse effects and has caused much controversy within the international community as well as those living in Pakistan itself. However, Siddiqa's *Military Inc* has been met with mixed reviews by critics; Stephen Kotkin from *The New York Times* remarked that "...while dense and full of jargon [it does] offer a detailed and powerful case study".¹² The text does however highlight some of the true motivations behind the continued periods of military rule Pakistan has seen since 1947 and provides great analysis of this. The Pakistan army, formed shortly after independence, hold significant levels of power in Pakistan and are continually seen to be meddling in affairs that seemingly should not concern them. Despite Siddiqa's attempt to provide a deep and critical insight into the Pakistani military she does not venture an analysis of a colonial impact to any significant degree. Whilst the role of the military is an important aspect relating to former colonial rule Siddiqa alone does not make this link.

It was also found that the majority of the research encountered in this field looks at more modern historical components as causes for Islamic extremism within Pakistan and texts repeatedly cite the

¹¹ Siddiqa A, 2007, *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, Pluto Press, UK

¹² Kotkin S, 2007, 'Economic growth clad in military garb', *The New York Times*, [online newspaper], available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/business/04shelf.html>

late 1970's as the turning point. Hassan Abbas argues that the late 1970's and early 80's saw the arrival of General Zia ul-Haq and that this was in fact the pivotal era for Pakistan's evolution in terms of religion extremism.¹³ Despite Zia being a dominant Islamic leader in Pakistan's history all blame cannot be placed upon him; if anything he can be viewed as merely a catalyst in the country's tussle with violent extremism. This propensity to place responsibility upon modern causes for extremism is again evident in Palmer and Palmer's 2008 research "*Islamic Extremism; Causes, Diversity and Challenges*" and works such as these exclude the possibility that extremism evolved much earlier than these authors dare to assert.¹⁴

In relation to the particular area of investigation chosen for this study, much literature does agree that colonial rule did have a significant impact upon the evolution of Pakistan. However, many researches appear to assess the involvement of colonialism merely in terms of economics. Investigations such as *Lakshmi Iyer's* 2009 project *Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-term Consequence's* show the decline in economic prosperity and outlines the country's political debilitation.¹⁵ Sarah Marker's 2003 research also highlights the economic problems faced by Pakistan post colonial rule yet does not venture a link between colonial impact and extremist activity.¹⁶

The vast majority of the material encountered fails to highlight the possible correlation between colonial rule and Islamic extremism. Many cite the conditions conducive for extremism to flourish such as the aforementioned economic woes and political unrest, yet they never go on to the next step of making that connection to extremism. This research asserts that it was the policies and actions of the British colonial administration at the time that influenced the struggles faced by Pakistan post partition and that the roots of present day Islamic extremism can be linked, in some way, to colonial rule.

¹³ Abbas H, 2005, *Pakistan's drift into extremism: Allah, the army, and America's war on terror*, M.E Publications, USA

¹⁴ Palmer M & Palmer P, 2008, *Islamic Extremism; Causes, Diversity and Challenges*, Rowman and Littlefield, USA

¹⁵ Iyer L, 2008, *Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-term Consequences*, [pdf], Harvard, available at: <http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/05-041.pdf>

¹⁶ Marker S, 2003, *Effects of Colonization*, [www], Beyond Intractability - Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado USA, available at: <http://www.beyondintractability.org/post-colonial>

There are however, some historians that have correctly identified some of the lasting legacies inflicted upon Pakistan following the end of colonial administration and that these have influence the country's demise. David Gilmartin and Ian Talbot assert that colonial rule made a huge impact on the newly created Pakistan; agreeing with author Lawrence Ziring in the idea that the country's fight to affirm its identity is linked with colonial oppression and western ideologies that ruled over them for so long prior to partition.¹⁷ This period could well have been the beginning of extremist's distaste for the western world; a notion that will be further investigated in the course of the ensuing research.

The literature in this area identifies the negative aspects inherited by the newly formed Pakistan; one being the inheritance of the Durand Line Agreement. This agreement separated Pakistan and Afghanistan territory and was a significant source of contention between the two countries with Pakistan resenting their former rulers for this anguish. This border has now become a permeable boundary for incoming mujahedeen fighters as cited by Peter Lyon.¹⁸ Lyon's work entitled '*Conflict between India and Pakistan: an encyclopaedia*' is an informed resource for this area of study. It details the contemporary threat India and Pakistan pose as neighbours in relation to nuclear threats as well as the ever present extremist movement in the Pakistan region. Lyon refers to his work as an encyclopaedia and that it is; a text that comprehensively describes Pakistan's struggles since 1947 and cleverly chronicles its upheavals to date. However, it is just that, a chronological recital of events that provides little in the way of informed reasoning as to what impact specific events have had on the country. The critic Dnisha Thar remarked on this in his review referring to the text as an "...airy narrative" with "... little depth" to his work.¹⁹

Again author Farzana Shaikh identifies the struggle for identity in '*Making sense of Pakistan*' as a clear result of colonial rule and a key element that has influenced extremist behaviour within Pakistan.²⁰ Her work particular has influenced this research as it proposes further questions as to what additional damage was caused by colonial rule and the impact of this on contemporary Pakistan.

¹⁷ Gilmartin D, 1988, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*, University of California Press, USA, Talbot I, 1998, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, Palgrave Macmillan, UK; and Ziring L, 2005, *Pakistan: At The Crosscurrent of History*, One World Publications, London

¹⁸ Lyon P, 2008, *Conflict between India and Pakistan: an encyclopaedia*, ABC-CLIO Publishing, USA

¹⁹ Thar D, 2009, *Peter Lyon's Conflict between India and Pakistan: an encyclopaedia*, www.guardianbookshop.co.uk/plencyclopaedia/gfs/go2

²⁰ Shaikh F, 2009, *Making Sense of Pakistan*, Columbia University Press, USA

Whilst the abovementioned material does highlight the impact of colonial rule many texts still focus on the economic and political struggles following Pakistan's creation. This research aims to fill the void regarding the impact of colonial rule, the struggles that followed and the resulting religious extremism.

There is no shortage of literature that investigates Islamic extremism as the area continues to become a subject of immense fascination for scholars, journalists and analysts alike. There is a vast amount of literature published, for obvious reasons, post September 2001 pertaining to Islamic extremism. Much of this unfortunately focuses on the contemporary side of this behaviour rather than providing an analysis of the historic roots of it. However, Beverly Milton Edwards' insightful text '*Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945*' is one of the few that provide a fascinating review of the historical components of Islamic extremism and more importantly, the first chapter highlights specifically the impact of colonialism on Islam.²¹ Whilst she does not focus exclusively on Pakistan, Milton Edwards provides an account of how colonial rule influenced and impacted the Islamic world and its people through its policies and legislatures during its reign.

In regards to accessing the literature some material remains classified as terrorism and religious extremism continues to be one of the greatest threats to global security. Information released by governmental organisations does however provide accurate outlines of current legislature where possible. The International Crisis Group works as a non-profit, non-partisan source of advice and analysis for governments across the world and their documents provide up to date analyses of current affairs in a factual and unbiased manner. Their 2002 publication entitled *Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military* provides a well informed observation of contemporary Pakistan's current battle with religious extremism and the role the military play in this.²² The Centre for strategic and International Studies in Washington 'provide strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions'

²¹ Milton-Edwards B, 2005, *Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945*, Routledge, UK

²² International Crisis Group, 2002, *Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military*, [pdf], Brussels, ICG, available at: https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:vR-dy6W-kzAJ:merln.ndu.edu/archive/icg/pakistanmadrasasextremismandthemilitary.pdf+&hl=en&gl=uk&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEsILFgadTmkz9-wDftaXkZATjZC2_NGlu4aCbPfcOXOJtGCAqXQYFmuVQksKHK-9uf5FQcbZPdhxB1fPglqvQ4ghWmLZ3OOO_ByZaiwug17lyOumDKq4Pk0J5IR_LApTHC9Q9Y&sig=AHIEtbRN4UN_Drmu8aaanK8CICJfx9iXFA.

allowing for the production of unbiased and widely available material in relation to sensitive political research topics as do the International Institute for Strategic Studies founded in the UK in 1958. The National Archives also produces excellent and invaluable primary source material in terms of cabinet minutes, draft proposals from the governmental discussions and ministerial memorandums pertaining to the exact period being studied.

As Pakistan as a country evolves so does the literature published on this complex yet fascinating country. Early publications discuss Pakistan's difficult battle to survive following partition even offering support for the region at times. As research progressed into the late 20th and early 21st century material available on this country turned its focus to the dangers of Pakistan; its continued economic debilitation, growing religious violence and the whispers of it becoming a failed state. Modern, specifically western, literature now almost exclusively records Pakistan as a growing terrorist nation, fixated upon its role as an extremist training ground and the threat its growing nuclear capabilities pose to the global population. Whilst this literature is very relevant to understanding the present situation it is imperative that researchers, authors and analysts do not overlook the region's history and how it came to be.

Chapter 1- 1857 to 1905; A turning point.

The aim of this chapter is to establish the initial setting of time and place, and to justify 1857 as a starting point for this research. British involvement in India dates back to the early seventeenth century with their initial concerns being that of trade giving rise to the East India Company. A

permanent British presence followed with their primary concern being that of the development of trade routes and expansion of their colonial empire. The East India Company would evolve from a trading organisation to one that exercised political control over a foreign land in the late 1700's. From this point forward the issues of governance and control would become more prominent as the challenges of ruling a largely unknown population escalated. By the beginning of the nineteenth century disruptions were beginning to materialise among the increasingly disgruntled native population and the events of 1857 would be the greatest display of cooperation and determination amongst the people of India that the British rulers had seen. This would mark the start of a contentious period of rule. This period highlights the consolidation of the Indian Muslim identity and the importance of this. Partly through British legislatures and partly on their own merit, the Muslims of British India began to band together as a cohesive unit, bound together through religion and a shared dislike for foreign rule. From 1857 through 1905 it is possible to see this unification of the Muslim population through events such as collective uprisings, which show Muslim members uniting for a common cause, and the arrival of groups that were formed to deliberately oppose British rule such as Anjuman Himayat-i-Islami. These elements will all form a large part of the following analysis.

Until 1857 it was possible to entertain the view, as Marx did, that the British may eventually destroy traditional Indian society and westernize the entire country. However, the Sepoy mutiny, or War of Independence as it became known among Indians, was a clear display of the simmering feelings of the natives and their desire to prevent the destruction of Indian society at any cost. The details of the mutiny itself vary wildly with blame being ushered from one group to the next and the reasons for the events differing between historians. However, statistics reveal that around 100,000 people were killed during the skirmishes instigated by the rebel natives. Attacks in Cawnpore and Lucknow suffered the highest casualty figures with records detailing how all of the 350 members of the British garrison in Cawnpore itself were slaughtered followed by a reported 150 women and children of the neighbouring villages.²³ By the middle of 1858 the rebellion and its violence had been

²³ Ramesh R, 2007, India's secret History: a Holocaust , One Where Millions Disappeared, The Guardian Online, [www], 24/8/2007, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/24/india.randeepamesh>

completely quashed by British enforcement yet the underlying feelings that initiated the rebellion remained.

It is important to note that this was not an isolated incident for there had been revolts earlier in colonial rule too; the Madras army mutinied in Vellore in 1806 as well as the uprising among the Bengal Army in Java in 1815. However, the 1857 mutiny displayed an increased capability in terms of organisation and size and this suggested a significant rise in the potential threat posed by the natives. As Sugata Bose observes "...What gave the 1857 revolt its unique character was the convergence of various strands of resistance, the expansion of scale and a new level of intensity".²⁴ The increased level of intensity witnessed during the mutiny suggests the actions of the British that ultimately led to the uprising were becoming increasingly strict or simply that the tensions among the Indian population had reached boiling point. The reasons for the mutiny are multifaceted with historians often reaching a variety of conclusions. At the time there was concern among the native army that the arrival of Christian missionaries heralded the start of forced religious conversions. This caused much agitation as the Hindus and Muslims feared their religions being usurped. Alongside this was the unrest among the ranks of serving Sepoys who had been subjected to financial cuts together with a loss of pensions and alternative prospects. However, the turning point is said to have arrived when soldiers were equipped with ammunition cartridges greased with tallow, a fat derived from pigs or cattle. The predominantly Hindu and Muslim army were greatly distressed by this as both religions believe such animals to be unclean. The culmination of events thus manifested in civilian uprisings, revolts against the British military leaders and general disorder among the ranks.

British regulations, whether committed knowingly or not, had greatly upset the army and the reaction of the British leaders would further compound the natives disdain for their colonial rulers. In the wake of the unrest the British placed the blame upon the Muslim members of society rather than accusing the army as a whole. There were reported calls by Muslim leaders like Maulana Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi and the millenarian Ahmedullah Shah for action, which were taken up by Muslims. This led the British to assume that the Islamic members were the main force behind this event. They

²⁴ Bose S & Jalal A, 2003, *Modern South Asia: History, Culture and Political Economy*, Psychology Press, UK, pg70

claimed that the mutiny was “an insidious plot by Muslim fanatics”.²⁵ In labelling not just individuals but members of a specific religious order as the perpetrators the British created greater divisions and exacerbated the growing feelings of injustice. It is these early examples of the British singling out a specific section of society that have stayed with the Pakistani people. In this instance the British immediately made a bigger enemy of themselves in casting blame upon the Muslims.

Before the British arrived the Muslims had ruled the Indian subcontinent under the Mughal Empire since 1526 and prior to this there was the presence of Islam under the Delhi Sultanate from as early as 1210.²⁶ As a population, they undoubtedly held strong religious and cultural ties to the region. Following the mutiny the British thought it necessary to exile the last remaining Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar for his alleged role in the uprising. Indeed he had supported the Muslim community in their dislike of British policies yet there is no evidence to suggest he played a significant role in the mutiny itself. This decision by the British unsurprisingly led the Muslim population to believe that their roots to the country were being suppressed and ignored. This apparent disregard for the heritage and lineage of the native population by the British rulers led to the emergence of a simmering anger and clear distrust from the Muslim people; historian William Dalrymple agrees and asserts that the exiling of the last Mughal Emperor only sought to inflame the natives disdain for the British.²⁷ The pattern that begins to emerge here is that of growing hatred exacerbated by British actions and this remains a key grievance of Islamic extremist groups today; the intervention and intrusion of Western, specifically British, rules in Islamic countries continues to inflame tensions.

Indeed contemporary Islamic extremism cites the preservation, elevation and promotion of Islam and its beliefs as one of the main reasons behind extremist behaviour. The actions of Indian Muslims during the mutiny were born out of this frustration and a feeling of desperation; a primitive need to protect their heritage. It is, however, vitally important to note that the Muslims were not acting alone; the Hindus were very much a part of the events too. However, the British saw the Muslim population as a greater threat as this land had previously been ruled under Islam and it was, after all, an Islamic

²⁵ Ibid pg74

²⁶ Jackson P, 2003, *The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History*, Cambridge University Press, UK

²⁷ Dalrymple W, 2009, *The Last Mughal: The Fall of Delhi 1857*, Bloomsbury Publishing, United Kingdom, pg444

Emperor they had just exiled. At the time the British could not have foreseen that over a hundred years into the future their decision could still be making an impact.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century the Muslim population continued to grow increasingly worried that their religion was being relegated and suppressed. Through a series of legislatures, social constructs and leadership changes the British made the Islamic community feel threatened. Census taking, language changes and the passing of controversial bills reinforced the belief that Islam was being shunned and the Muslims of India ignored and their subsequent behaviour was out of a need to protect their faith. As previously outlined the British powers fragmented the society they presided over very early on. The various measures of control employed by colonial leaders were rooted in the belief that such methods would make for a more organised rule of the region. However, through the various laws and policies that were passed what they actually achieved was greater levels of division, distrust and exclusion. In the 1860's the British authority's decision to oust the ancient Persian language as the official language in courts and governmental proceedings angered the natives greatly. This move subsequently gave rise to the Urdu-Hindi controversy when the colonial powers further discouraged Hindi and Nagari in official scripts.²⁸ Many of the natives felt not only that their culture was being forgotten but that they were being alienated by these policy changes, particular those in more rural villages, as they spoke the more historic Persian dialects the British were keen to cast out. The rationale behind implementing a census modelled very much on the system used in Britain was that it would enable colonial leaders to produce a clearer picture of the people they now ruled. The quintessentially British preoccupation with categorisation and labelling came to the forefront during this period and resulted in a greater level of awareness among society in that all were not equal. "More importantly British social engineering through censuses helped create supra-local caste and religious categories to whom the colonial state could distribute differential patronage. The *depressed classes* and the *Indian Muslims* were such constructs".²⁹ In introducing a more rigid and regimented caste system the Hindu- Muslim gulf was re-opened and also paved the way for inter-communal disputes. It has been argued by authors such as Bishambhar Nath Pande that prior to British rule

²⁸ King R D, 2001, *The Poisonous Potency of Script: Hindi and Urdu*, International Journal of the Sociology of Language, Vol. 2001, No.150, pg55

²⁹ Bose S & Jalal A, 2003, *Modern South Asia: History, Culture and Political Economy*, Psychology Press, UK, pg84

Hindus and Muslims coexisted relatively peacefully; they remained aware of their religious differences but managed an equal representation in politics and forged economic allegiances. However, Pande does acknowledge that Hindu-Muslim relations have, on occasions, been strained partially because both religions share very little commonality but that these differences were greatly highlighted by the behaviour of the British.³⁰ Following partition Muslim-Hindu tensions have resurfaced on many occasions suggesting that interreligious relations between these two religions will remain tense for the foreseeable future. The debate regarding the British role in relation to caste still divides researchers; some, such as Frank de Zwart, argue that the system was already in place, a historic fact of life, prior to British occupation while others like Stuart Corbridge assert that the British intensified caste demarcations and classified society more rigidly.^{31, 32} Caste became a prominent part of codifying the population during the census and it was this meticulous labelling of society that evolved into divisions and caste differences.

The policies of the colonial administration created an ‘us and them’ division. In their attempts to control and administer the new land the British issued an order that, under the direction of Inspector General of Registration Henry Beverley, a census to be taken in late 1872. There is nothing inherently wrong with producing a population census yet it was the imposition of British classifications that created the problems. India already had a caste system whereby members of society were loosely labelled by caste but the British wrongly equated this with the British Class system. Class is defined by political and economic factors, caste is most definitely not. In determining caste, race and nationality during the census the British believed they could dissect and divide the country into manageable chunks according to these classifications. However, remarks made during this process as well as the indignation of many at having to label themselves in the first instance led to the idea of census taking becoming a considerable mistake. Beverley allegedly concluded that the Muslims were in fact “converted low caste Hindus”, a painfully inept conclusion that led to an almighty outcry from

³⁰ Pande B N, 1995, *The Hindu Muslim Problem*, The University of Michigan, USA, pp51-52

³¹ Zwart de F, 2000, *The Logic of Affirmative Action: Caste, Class and Quotas in India*, Acta Sociologica, vol. 43 no. 3, pp235-249

³² Corbridge S & Harriss J, 2000, *Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy*, Wiley Publishing, United Kingdom

the Islamic population that would haunt the British for many years to come.³³ Interestingly there is a completely different interpretation of the way the censuses were conducted: it has been suggested that the seemingly naive British officials were in fact fully aware of the result and impact their incessant census taking and typecasting of society would have. Author John Darwin argues that the true motive behind such policies was to reignite or maintain religious tensions between the Muslim and Hindu populations to ensure that the two factions would never collaborate and work to overthrow the Raj; a fear that would stay with the British and one that would come close to being realised on numerous occasions throughout their rule.³⁴ This apparent unease among the colonial powers suggests they were aware that their rule was not accepted and were worried by the potential ability of the natives to unite and rebel again following the events during the Sepoy Mutiny.

It is possible to see some connection between this creation of divisions and intolerance and the principles among present day groups that adhere to an extreme ideology. They appear unwelcoming and intolerant of non-Muslim organisations and individuals of other religions and belief systems. Al Qaeda, for example, professes a profound hatred for the Jewish community citing that they have collaborated with the West to dissect Muslim lands such as Israel and Palestine. In 1998 leader Osama Bin Laden told TIME magazine that Al Qaeda's work "targets world infidels. Our enemy is the crusader alliance led by America, Britain and Israel. It is a crusader-Jewish alliance".³⁵ Although not the elevated level that is evident among 21st century terrorist organisations the element of intolerance towards other religions and outside rule are clearly evident even at the early stages of Pakistan's conception. It could be asserted that these early grievances and notions of intolerance were cemented into the ideology that formed Pakistan and are in fact apparent within the extreme dissident groups at work within the country today.

During the early periods of colonial rule various acts of parliament and governmental legislations affected the way British rule was perceived by the native peoples. In passing particular bills and acts

³³ Hobson K, date unknown, *Ethnographic Mapping and the Construction of the British Census in India*, [www], available at: <http://www.britishempire.co.uk/article/castesystem.htm>

³⁴ Darwin J, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of The British world System 1830-1970*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom

³⁵ Garrison C, 2011, *Why did Osama Bin Laden hate Americans, Jews and Christians?*, The Washington Times, [www], USA, 11-05-2011, available at: <http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/truth-be-told/2011/may/11/why-did-osama-bin-laden-hate-americans-jews-and-ch/>

the Muslim population specifically felt that they were being oppressed and their civil liberties taken away. In 1873, sixteen years after the mutiny and with the country's Muslim population still simmering in frustration, the government passed the Ilbert Bill followed by the Vernacular Press Act in 1878. Although not widely controversial in their constitution these two legislatures nevertheless inflamed the Muslim societies disdain for the British once again.

1873 saw the British attempt to pass a bill that, to begin with, would prove the most controversial among the British themselves. The Ilbert Bill sought to allow Indian judges jurisdiction to try British offenders in criminal law courts. In a statement issued at the time, it simply outlined that the Bill aimed to “remedy injustice” yet opposition questioned ‘injustice to whom?’.³⁶ The British tea producers within India were especially outraged as they now believed that the Indian prosecutors would not overlook their mistreatment of the Indian workers they employed. Alongside this the notion of superiority emanating from the British enraged the natives more, increasing the racial tensions and pushing the population towards breaking point. The divisive bill was however passed in 1884, despite vociferous opposition, on the proviso that half of the jury be made up of European nationals. Newspaper of the day, *The Hampshire Advertiser*, reported back home in Britain on the resolution citing that the conflict regarding the bill had been “happily settled” and that the leaders of the opposition “considered the arrangement satisfactory”.³⁷ But, natives were still unhappy and were left feeling second class in all areas of society once again.

The British were clearly worried that their position could be usurped since they sought control of all aspects of Indian life. The Vernacular Press Act of 1878 was designed to facilitate control of the Indian newspapers, to contain the ‘printing and circulation of seditious material’ that the British believed was calculated to further produce disaffection. The British were undoubtedly worried about the possibility of further uprisings following the mutiny and believed the placing of censorship on the media would assist in quelling any possibility of this. Unfortunately however, it had the opposite effect in creating even more of a desire to oust the British. Censoring the freedom of speech of both

³⁶ Library of the University of Illinois, date unknown, *The Ilbert Bill: A collection of letters, speeches, memorials, articles stating the objections to the bill*, Woodfall and Kinder, London, available at: <http://ia600302.us.archive.org/23/items/ilbertbillcollec001ond/ilbertbillcollec001ond.pdf>

³⁷ The Hampshire Advertiser, 1883, *The Ilbert Bill Compromise*, The Hampshire Advertiser, Wednesday December 26 1883; pg. 4; Issue 3916, 19th Century British Library Newspapers: Part II at the British Library, London

the Hindu and Muslim population increased the levels of dissatisfaction among the natives and pushed them ever closer to taking action. In April 1878 British newspaper *The Daily News* included an article that detailed the gathering of 4000 natives who gave “speeches condemning the Vernacular Press Act”.³⁸ During the meeting it was agreed that eminent politician Mr Gladstone would petition parliament on behalf of the natives. This demonstrates the ability of the natives to legitimately achieve their goals through numbers. It is elements such as this that are key to this investigation; the highlighting of specific events that most certainly contributed to the dislike of the British and could have assisted in the gradual formation of extremist behaviour from pockets of the Islamic community.

Most significant is the *response* of the Muslim community to these legislatures. In 1884 Anjuman Himayat-i-Islami was formed; an organisation that was in direct response to the feeling of religious oppression and a fear of cultural degradation and loss.³⁹ The official aims of this group were to propagate and defend Islam against the Christian missionaries and Hindu revivalists as well as to counteract the apparent propaganda against Islam through the medium of speeches and publications. The movement played an important role in awakening the Muslim population to the fight for freedom and the need to become educated and aware to do this; much as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan had said during the Aligarh Movement.⁴⁰ This organisation as well as Khan, stressed the need to use education as a tool to override British rule; in obtaining knowledge it would become possible to outmanoeuvre colonial rule through the correct and proper channels and contend on a level playing field. However, as this chapter has highlighted, not all could see that this was the way of moving forward and many chose violence instead.

Looking at the events during the period 1857-1905 there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the actions of the British significantly affected the way the Muslim population perceived their colonial leaders. The feelings of discontent, insecurity and oppression began to manifest themselves as violence and civil disorder towards the latter half of the 19th century. The mutiny of 1857 was a

³⁸ The Daily News, 1878, *The Native Press in India*, Daily News, Friday, April 19, 1878; Issue 9983, British Library Archives, London

³⁹ Hasan M, 1995, *Muslim Intellectuals, Institutions and the Post-colonial Predicament*, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.30 No.47, pg 2996

⁴⁰ Founded by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan following the 1857 mutiny this movement aimed to educate the Muslims of India in order to legitimately oppose British rule and contest it as equals.

turning point in the relationship between colonial leadership and the Muslim natives and from this point on the country would witness a variety of events that were clear displays of the Indian Muslims' negativity towards the Raj.

One of the core elements of contemporary Islamic extremism is the transparent hatred towards the Western world, specifically the United States and Britain. What this chapter highlights is early evidence of extreme dislike among the Muslim population of the British administration. It also depicts the ability of Islamic groups to unite against an identifiable enemy; then it was the colonial leadership, now it remains the British but is often coupled with American foreign policy and members of rival religions or tribes.

Whilst the events outlined in this chapter alone do not constitute all out religious extremism they are evidence of the seeds of disgruntlement and are areas of unrest that could well evolve into further elements of trouble. It could be argued even at this early stage that 21st century Islamic extremism is a product of an evolution of these primitive desires for division and the need to protect ones religion witnessed in colonial rule.

Chapter 2- 1905 to 1940; The struggle for Independence.

Through 1905 to 1940 Indian Muslims saw the idea of Pakistan transform from small whispers to a fully fledged movement that harnessed support at an intense rate. This chapter will focus, initially, on how colonial leaders continued to implement changes and enforce legislature that can be seen to compound the Muslim need and desire for a separate nation. The analysis will then move on to the actions of the Muslim population in their bid to consolidate the movement for partition, highlighting

the early emergence of violence as a tactic. The period 1857 through 1905 demonstrated the early appearance of Muslim unhappiness and a growing level of resentment and subsequent disturbance among the population. The purpose of this analysis, as outlined previously, is to highlight the actions of the British that then further influenced Muslim behaviour and the relevance of this.

The partition of Bengal in the early months of 1905 is an important component in this research for the decision by the Raj was one that would not work in their favour as first assumed. Once again stressed as a tool for effective administration the decision to partition Bengal into a largely Muslim East and predominantly Hindu West outraged the natives as it was another example of the foreigners partiality to 'divide and rule' policies. Initially embraced as a triumph for the Muslim population the celebration was short-lived as events in Bengal became yet another cause to mistrust and detest the colonial leadership.

Despite initially favouring partition the Muslim population felt they had no more freedom than before and had in fact lost ground in the battle for greater independence. During the agitation for the annulment of partition *both* Hindu and Muslim groups are reported to have carried out acts of terrorism and violence in the name of religion. It could be argued that because the British chose initially to partition the region specifically along religious lines rather than along linguistic boundaries, as they later did in 1919 when they re-divided Bengal, that they were paving the way for religiously motivated conflicts and uprisings. It is again the idea of separateness that caused difficulties. In dividing the two religions the British left no possibility for integration and made the two increasingly insular and elevated levels of intolerance. By dividing the two the British allowed for the Muslim people to revel in the divisions and become accustomed to not cohabiting with members of different religions. This desire to be separate, to be a contained religious unit, is a characteristic that has followed Pakistan from its conception to the present day country it is. It is criticised as being one of the most "glaring examples of religious intolerance in the world" with its governmental structures purportedly elevating Sunni Islam above all other religious sects and its historic blasphemy laws alienating moderate and non-Muslim members of society.⁴¹

⁴¹ Asia- Pacific Human Rights Network, 2001, *Religious intolerance in Pakistan*, [online], Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network, India, available at: <http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF31.htm>

Despite the disastrous results of the Bengal partition there was a positive outcome for the Muslim population in some sense. As previously outlined, the Bengali Muslims were desperate for political representation following the division of Bengal and established their own small political party called the Mohammedan Provincial Union. However, members quickly realised as a minority the resolution of their problems would be highly problematic. In an attempt to better their chances they called upon all Muslims of the Indian region to band as one and unite to increase their status; the ultimate result was the formation of the All India Muslim League in 1906.⁴² This political party would play a pivotal role in the eventual creation of Pakistan.

Following the hapless outcome of the Bengal partition the population of British India would undergo further upheavals. The British administration would make a decision that seemed to go completely against their goals. In 1913 Muslims were outraged to learn that a portion of their mosque in Kanpur was to be demolished in order to conduct road alterations yet a Hindu temple had been saved from such a fate. It was claimed that the British dismissed the natives' pleas and went ahead with the proposed work prompting a huge uprising and backlash from the Muslims. During the chaos of the protest in which the Muslims were described as an ignorant mob, throwing stones and building debris at approaching officers, police were ordered to quell the violence and proceeded to fire upon the group of protesters. In a telegram to the Viceroy of India, Lieutenant Sir James Meston recalls that twenty to thirty rioters were killed and wounded alongside one police casualty during the day's events.⁴³ The loss of life was relatively small but it is the overall impact of the events and the context of the situation that is important. The Muslim population had felt that the British favoured the Hindu natives ever since the divisive blame heaped upon them following the mutiny of 1857. Finding that their holy building was to be damaged when a Hindu temple had been spared only increased this belief of favouritism and fuelled the Muslims' distrust and increasing dislike of the colonial powers. Whether the decision to demolish part of the mosque and save the Hindu temple was deliberate is arguable with possible motives in a similar vein to those underlying the repeated census taking

⁴² Hayat S U, 2007, *Muslim Political Ascendancy in Bengal: A Case Study of the Roles Played by the Bengal Provincial Muslim League and the Krishak Proja Party (1906-41)*, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2, pp111-128

⁴³ Meston J as cited by Lavan S, 1974, *The Kanpur Mosque Incident of 1913; The North Indian Muslim Press and Its Reaction To Crisis*, [www], Journal of The American Academy Of Religion, Vol 42, No.2, pg 263

discussed previously. The Muslim population saw only a division between their religion and the Hindus'; the element of favouritism resurfacing. Ever since the events of the Sepoy Mutiny the Muslims felt that the British had favoured the Hindu population and had repeatedly chosen to tailor decisions and policies to appease them overlooking the needs of the Islamic community. In actual fact it was probably more the case of the British being worried of the potential anger and subsequent power of the Muslim population. As previously outlined, the British were aware of the historic religious and cultural ties the Muslim members had to the land and the possible implications of the colonial executive now ruling that land.

It is important to stress during analyses such as this that the actions on that day in 1913 were exacted by a small minority of Indian Muslims, a disgruntled faction in the region on that day. From research carried out regarding group pressure, obedience, social conformity and the ability to persuade we know that it can take very little to organise and promote a cause that harnesses popular appeal and plays on peoples' allegiances.⁴⁴ In this instance the organisation would have undoubtedly united its members through the call of Islam and the need for solidarity among their religion. In undeniable parallels Islamic extremist organisations today use this very same tactic to recruit new members to their cause; using a common grievance to unite individuals, who otherwise have no common ties, through religion. Brynjar Lia's 2008 research suggests that extremist organisations "harness the power of pan-Islamic sentiments and the strength of popular Muslim solidarity in order to rally a mass following".⁴⁵

Various events throughout history have called for unity among the divided and support from those previously sidelined. World War One saw the British recruit members of the Indian subcontinent into their armies; individuals that they had previously labelled, divided and angered on numerous occasions would now fight alongside them for the British cause. The natives of India were promised support for partition in return for support of Britain during the war and, believing this to be true, approximately half a million Indian troops volunteered for service to the Empire. The one main

⁴⁴ Milgram S, 1960, *Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority*, [pdf], available at: <http://www.abdn.ac.uk/pir/notes06/Level5/IR5503/Milgram.pdf>

⁴⁵ Lia B, 2008, *Al Qaeda's Appeal: Understanding its Unique Selling Points*, Perspectives on Terrorism: A Journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative, Vol.2 No.8, available at: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/44/html>

concern of the Indian Muslims involved was the threat to Turkey and the possible dismemberment of the ancient Ottoman Empire. However, the British reassured the Muslim population that no harm would come to Ottoman rule, a move thus resulting in a small building of bridges between the Muslims and the British. But, this would not last. Following the defeat of Germany the British powers began negotiations to discuss the division of the Ottoman Empire. Seeing that the British had revoked their original pledges of assistance the Indian Muslims grew furious and their hatred for the colonial powers was once again reignited. Not only did the actions of the British set their relationship with the Muslim population back it also pushed Hindu and Muslim groups together; something the British had long been anxious about, fearing a combined uprising.

The unity would continue through the Khilafat Movement that followed the disappointment at the end of world war one. The general feeling among Indian Muslims at the time was said to be that the western powers were waging a war specifically against Islam throughout the world in order to pilfer it of its power and influence. This is remarkably close to the rallying call of Al Qaeda who believes that the world is out to suppress Islamic nations. In response the Indian Muslims, alongside other Muslim enclaves, worked to protect the unity of the Ottoman Empire, to protect the holy places of Islam and to maintain the Turkish Caliphate. As will be explored later the Indian Muslim identity was pan-Islamic, they identified with all Muslims globally rather than securing an identity for just the Indian Muslims with British India hoping for a separate land. This is no more evident than during the Khilafat Movement. This preoccupation with religion on a global scale could be said to have impeded the Muslims' ability to concentrate on the original goal for partition. It could also be argued that it is this same preoccupation that has prevented contemporary Pakistan from developing and functioning as a thriving region.

The actions of the British police forces during the Kanpur Mosque incident bare key similarities to the events witnessed at what would become known as the Amritsar Massacre six years later in 1919. Following the establishment of greater law enforcement powers and the prevention of speeches and rallies through the Rowlett Act, the Indian natives gathered for a protest march in Jallainwala Bagh. Fearing a repeat of the 1857 mutiny army leader General Reginald Dyer took the situation into his

own hands and ordered his officers to fire indiscriminately into the crowd to quell the supposed violence. The official British tally for that bloody afternoon was 379 killed and 1,137 wounded with General Dyer earning the ominous title of Butcher of Amritsar.⁴⁶

Whilst the core memories of this event are the needless deaths the context to the situation is important. The British were only too aware of the distrust towards them and their policies and had been increasingly wary of uprisings and possible coups in recent years. In the months preceding the events in Amritsar the Rowlatt Act had been passed in order to ensure the power in society lay strictly within official realms. The act was a controversial piece of legislature that gave the police unlimited powers and stripped citizens of the right to appeal arrests or employ a defence lawyer. In the minutes published from a meeting held at the War Cabinet in 1919 it is detailed that the British leaders in India had sent telegrams to England advising the Prime minister of the recent unrest. In the telegrams it states that “racial feelings, mohammedan soreness, Rowlatt Bills and high food prices no doubt all contributed” clearly displaying awareness that the bills and changes they were implementing were causing difficulties and subsequent uprisings.⁴⁷

The response of the members of society across the world in Britain highlights just how controversial the colonial decisions were with many believing the tactics to be brutal and unnecessary. Through General Dyer’s overzealous attitude to law enforcement the natives of India were more inspired to fight for freedom than ever. This tragedy played a vital role in arousing nationalistic feelings and once again cemented the hatred of colonial rule. In attempting to stop violence with yet more violence the British succeeded in demonstrating that in order to accomplish something violence, weaponry and manpower worked; it is little wonder then that the Muslim, and Hindu, groups resorted to similar measures in the future.

During this period incidents appear to have come in quick succession suggesting that the disaffection for the British was growing at a considerable rate. Or it could be argued that the British

⁴⁶ Horniman B G, 1984, *British Administration and the Amritsar Massacre*, Mittal Publications, India , pg95

⁴⁷ War Cabinet, 1919, *Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Monday April 14 1919 at 12 noon*, [parliamentary minutes pdf], CAB/23/10, London, National Archives, also available at: <http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-23-10-wc-556-4.pdf>

anxiety grew in line with perceived threat levels from the natives thus prompting them to act irrationally and exacerbating tensions. An undeniably vicious circle of affairs.

The Hijrat Movement of 1920 was another display of frustration and desperation on the part of the Muslim population. The Islamic community within British India felt the region was now a place where religion and Muslim identity was in jeopardy following the actions of the British immediately after World War One. According to Islamic culture in this situation Muslims have two choices, Jihad or Hijrat (migration). In a fatwa issued by Jamiyat-al-Ulema-i-Hind Muslims were urged to migrate to countries “in which Islam was respected”, such as neighbouring Afghanistan.⁴⁸ Tens of thousands of Muslims descended into Afghanistan causing substantial rifts and problems for the region which struggled to accommodate such a vast number of incoming people in such a short space of time. This movement displayed the ability of the Muslim population to unite and take action when they felt their beliefs were under threat. These repeated displays of unification continued to make the British uneasy and pushed them to crack down harder on the natives. This in turn would only make the Muslim community resent the colonial administration even more.

Again the Moplah uprising in August 1921 was a movement born out of frustration and anger directed towards the British. The Moplah farmers believed that the Hindu land owners were in collusion with the British in instigating the reorganisation of land which saw the Muslim farmers’ land reduced together with an increase in the fees levied. Once again the Muslim peasant farmers felt oppressed and as if they were being sidelined by the Hindu and British society. The result was a reported 4000 peasant farmers killed and a further 10,000 supporters injured during violence that saw the Muslim Moplah’s specifically target Hindus.⁴⁹ The tragic ending to this movement clearly displays the harsh tactics used by the British of shutting down revolts and oppositions. It also highlights the lengths the Muslim farmers were prepared to go to when they felt they were being wronged.

Throughout this period the desire for a separate Muslim land gradually gained momentum and harnessed greater support. Following the provincial elections in 1936 the Muslim population began to

⁴⁸ Lal B, 1979, *The Hijrat Movement and The North West Frontier Province*, Islamic Studies, Vol.18 No.3, International Islamic University, Islamabad pg 231

⁴⁹ Gopal R, 1994, *Hindu Culture During and After Muslim Rule: Survival and Subsequent Challenges*, MD Publications Ltd, India

feel ever more alienated. The Muslim League won very few seats, partly through its own inefficiencies and inability to remain united, and the elections resulted with Congress assuming the greater power. Originally stating that they worked for all religions and all regions, Congress had hoped to win over Muslim voters and subvert the Muslim League as a party in order to retain sole political influence. However, the Muslim population did not agree with the policies and demands instigated by the Congress party, now renamed the Congress Ministries and the country began to see the movement for partition gain currency. It is also asserted that Congress officials were involved in detailed communications with the British in order to secure a promise that the colonial powers would not interfere in congress decisions. The knowledge of this collusion would only have angered the Muslim population even more.

These events show the desperation of the Muslim population who continually felt that their religion and culture were under threat and that they must take such measures in order to preserve it. They specifically highlight how the frustrations of the Indian Muslims materialised in riots, protests and gatherings united by religion and were forcibly quashed by the British rulers. In quelling violence through violence the British only fuelled the movement against themselves and the result of this can be seen in the push towards partition analysed in the following chapter.

Administrative decisions made during this period further exacerbated the Muslims' dislike of their British leaders. The evidence displays how the Islamic population turned to acts of violence in the face of oppression and frustration, an element that is often witnessed among dissident groups in contemporary Pakistan today. The partition of Bengal allowed the Muslim people to experience what it was to have a separate Muslim land and this consolidated the notion that Indian Muslims needed their own region free from British rule as well as other religions; in this instance Hinduism. Pakistan today remains a religiously divided country with very little integration, 96.4% of the population are Muslim, a fact that has clear connections with the divisions established and reinforced by colonial rule during its tenure.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Pew Foundation, 2011, *The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030*, [pdf], The Pew research Centre: The Forum of Religion and Public Life, Washington, available at: <http://features.pewforum.org/FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF.pdf>

The following chapter will examine the path the partition, how colonial leadership continued to reinforce the natives disdain for the British administration and evaluate the response of the Muslim population.

Chapter 3 - 1940 to 1958; The road to partition and beyond.

The years in the run up to partition were dominated by political rallies, demonstrations and decision making processes peppered with rebellions and frustrations. The idea for a separate state only really emerged post 1940 and in the next seven years the country would become two very separate groups working towards obtaining their own separate nations. The events leading up to partition display how the British almost took a back seat in the proceedings with the native Muslim and Hindu populations forming their own arguments and legitimately putting forward their desires for separate lives.

However, partition and the years following it are vital to this investigation. The nature of the division itself left indelible scars on the newly formed Pakistan and events around 1947 will form a large part of this analysis. The initial years of Pakistan's life were incredibly difficult ones yet they provide the greatest insight into why Pakistan has continued to struggle. From political unrest to financial instability, Pakistan carried its troubles with it through partition and into its creation where they have continued to evolve and unfortunately escalated. The period from 1947 to the first military coup in 1958 provide a clear picture of the unravelling of an already fragile nation.

In March 1940 the Lahore Resolution was passed. It put forward the idea of Hindus and Muslims being completely separate allowing the idea to come into the public awareness. The resolution outlines the All India Muslim League's refusal to accept previous suggestions and states that,

“no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, namely, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign”⁵¹

At the assembly Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah furthered the discussion when he described that to him “the differences between Hindus and the Muslims were so great and so sharp that their union under one central government was full of serious risks”.⁵² Jinnah’s speech was crucial to this referendum as he gave the Muslim population a legitimate voice from which to air their desires. The final resolution outlined the need for the demarcation of lands where Muslims are the majority and the protection of them where they are the minority. It laid out only the principle ideas however, with the intricate details being left to be finalised at a later date. Nevertheless, the resolution itself was historic in that it secured the notion for separate lands according to religion and this idea simply grew from this point onwards. Following the passing of the Lahore Resolution the Muslim population appeared to change their ultimate goal. Whereas previously they have moved to create a cohesive unity with the Hindu population, they now unanimously set out to establish a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims. The British, who previously had hoped for a simple outcome to the unrest, came to realise that unity was looking more and more impossible. In a government document marked ‘secret’, it is stated that “there is no prospect of acceptance of the Cabinet Mission’s plan for a union of India on any basis”.⁵³ This statement is a clear indication of the British resignation, even acceptance, of the need for a divided nation.

⁵¹ Pakistani P, 1958, *Struggle for independence, 1857-1947: a pictorial record*, Pakistani Publications, Karachi

⁵² Rao M H, date unknown, *March 23rd 1940: The Lahore Resolution*, [www], Pakistani Times, Pakistan available at: <http://pakistanimes.net/pt/detail.php?newsId=20054>

⁵³ War Cabinet, 1919, *Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Monday April 14 1919 at 12 noon*, [parliamentary minutes pdf], CAB/23/10, London, National Archives, also available at: <http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-23-10-wc-556-4.pdf>

The Lahore Resolution shows that even though it was the British leadership that eventually drew the line of partition it was the natives themselves that put real substance to the idea for separate homelands divided along religious lines alone. At the resolution it became clear that the Hindu and Muslim leaders were aware of their religious differences and agreed on the notion that both were too different to coexist as one. With this admission coming as early as 1940 there is little wonder that Pakistan developed as a country that is very much set apart from religions outside of Islam and not widely tolerant of beliefs that differ from their own. As the build up to partition gathered momentum it was almost expected that all Muslim members of India join the push for partition. However, there were individuals and small groups that continued to believe that all could live as one. Since the majority of Indian Muslims had firmly cemented the idea of a separate Islamic state into their consciousness, the knowledge that some did not agree was certainly not well received.

In the years prior to partition Muslim political and spiritual leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan created a movement known as Khudai Khidmatgar or Servants of God. Linked to Mahatma Gandhi, Ghaffar opposed British rule alongside the majorities but vowed to do so in a non-violent manner.⁵⁴ More importantly he did not agree with the idea of partitioning India along religious lines as he believed that all could live as one. Despite his movement harnessing considerable support, the community who were fighting for a separate land deemed the leader anti-Muslim and his opposition to partition un-Islamic. As well as the apparent pre-partition exclusion of Ghaffar Khan in the months following partition he was repeatedly arrested and hassled by authorities. Because of his continued association with India and his opposition to authoritarian rule Khan would spend much of his life in and out of confinement, exile and under house arrest. Ghaffar Khan and his Servants of God movement is vitally important; it illustrates that not all Muslims were fighting for the same cause and that some did believe that Hindus and Muslims could live together as one nation, a view diametrically opposed to the two nation theory. But, his party was overruled and there was a crackdown on those sharing his beliefs. This clearly demonstrates the power of those who wanted partition; opposition was not acceptable and the way of dealing with this was to shut them down and exile prominent leaders.

⁵⁴ Easwaren E, 1999, *Nonviolent Soldier of Islam: Badshah Khan-A Man to Match His Mountains*, Nilgiri Press, USA

Hardly a diplomatic way of dealing with those who disagree but this has turned out to be a tactic employed by the Pakistani leadership on numerous occasions throughout history.

The focus has previously been on the events that preceded the division of India and the subsequent creation of Pakistan. However, the details and context surrounding the partition itself provide a real insight into contemporary Pakistan's problems. August 14th 1947 saw India carved up by the British following what can only be described as a rash and misguided decision, resulting in chaos and further unrest. The dividing line, known as the Radcliffe line, was formerly announced under the Mountbatten Plan issued a month prior to the date of independence and immediately posed major geographical difficulties. The division did not take into account family owned land nor did it consider the displacement of communities and family members. It also resulted in Pakistan being divided in two, East and West Pakistan with the Eastern enclave being hundreds of miles away on the opposite side of India (see appendix B). Even with a superficial examination of this dividing line it comes as no surprise to learn that problems arose. The Indian Muslims had fought for a separate Islamic nation, a place to be as *one*, yet what the British had succeeded in doing was to create *two* Muslim nations completely separated by Hindu India.

The mass displacement of the population, almost 10 million, was on an unprecedented scale with thousands of people now having to travel huge distances to their newly allotted religious regions. Along these journeys the different religious groups were often confronted with violence and repeatedly attacked one another. Documentary evidence provides some sense of what was actually happening during this time. Appendix C displays the brutality of partition all too vividly with official statistics recounting that close to one million refugees were killed during the violence following partition. Alongside this was the ever present threat of starvation and exhaustion with hundreds forced into refugee camps as they simply had nowhere else to go. Appendix D clearly illustrates the scale of the movement of people and the harsh conditions many had to endure. The dream of freedom and prosperity appeared to be a figment of the past. The hardship that was faced by thousands during this time would have been firmly embedded in the memory of this population and could have fuelled the

resentment felt towards their former colonial leaders. The British were blamed for the atrocities since it was their mishandling of partition that produced this logistical nightmare.

There is much criticism here of the British government's decisions made during the time of partition yet what must be taken into account is that it was not a deliberate attempt to undermine the future of these countries. Historian Patrick O'Brien argues that at this particular point in history Britain was suffering economically and had neither the will nor the resources to act as anything other than a broker for partition.⁵⁵ They were heavily wounded both financially and politically by the recent war and the pressure of upholding an Empire was beginning to take its toll. In a cabinet meeting memorandum issued by the Prime Minister in 1947 he outlines in a draft proposal that "it has always been the desire of His Majesty's Government that power should be transferred in accordance with the wishes of the Indian people themselves" and that they "wish to make it clear that they have no intention of attempting to frame any ultimate constitution for India: this is a matter for the Indians themselves".⁵⁶ It could be argued that these statements show that the British government may have genuinely attempted to work out a resolution that would benefit the natives in line with their true wishes. Nevertheless, it is still claimed that the British could have done more; in fact they left little more than a future of underdevelopment. As Professor B. R Tomlinson argues, "...the suggestion remains that British rule did not leave a substantial legacy of wealth, health or happiness" for the people of former British India.⁵⁷

Ideologically the foundations of Pakistan were shaky from the start. The original two nation theory was no longer as solid as it had been prior to division. The mass migration that came as result of the colonial leaderships rushed division meant a large number of Muslims still lived in what was now India and meant that they remained integrated with Hindus. This in itself is in complete contradiction to the core sentiment of the two nation theory which clearly stated that Hindus and Muslims were to exist as two entirely separate nations. Jinnah himself contradicted his original support for the two

⁵⁵ O'Brien P K, 2004, *Colonies in a Globalizing Economy 1815-1948*, London School of Economic, UK, available at: <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/Research/GEHN/GEHNPDF/WorkingPaper08POB.pdf>

⁵⁶ Clement A, 1947, *Indian Policy: Memorandum by the Prime Minister*, [government minutes pdf], CAB/129/19, London, National Archives, also available at: <http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-129-19-cp-47-158.pdf> pp3-4

⁵⁷ Tomlinson as cited by Ferguson N, 2003, *British Imperialism Revised: The Costs and Benefits of Angloglobalization*, [pdf], New York University, USA, available at: http://englisch.bildung-rp.de/fileadmin/user_upload/englisch.bildung-rp.de/DRIWP02.pdf pg 5

nation idea following the creation of Pakistan when he is quoted as saying in his infamous 1947 speech that “You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state”.⁵⁸ This inability to maintain a constant, in any form, led to instability and confusion and this remains a dominant feature of Pakistan’s contemporary leadership.

The case of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, further highlights the continued disintegration of the two nation ideology as well as the profound instability among the people of Pakistan. Beginning in 1952 and in a repeat of life in British India, the Bengali people of East Pakistan felt oppressed and suffocated by the politics of West Pakistan and wanted freedom to express their culture and beliefs. Forcibly suppressed by the military rule of West Pakistan the Bengalis formed a government in exile and finally won independence in 1971 renaming the region Bangladesh. Despite being granted the separate Islamic land the Indian Muslims had fought for there remained deep divisions and unrest amongst their own as dominant Islamic politics failed to consider ethnicities rather than simply religion. Asaf Hussain notes that “the creation of Bangladesh had proved that the integrative power of Islam had failed”.⁵⁹ The push for an Islamic nation had sidelined ethnic differences within Islam and did not provide for expression of cultural and ethnic variation which subsequently led to these varying cultures wanting an alternative. The geographic difficulty of having two separate Pakistan regions would have added to this problem but above all, the case of Bangladesh shows just how impractical the two nation theory was. Under Pakistan, the different cultures felt unable to express themselves and to form an identity of their own; a striking similarity to the Indian Muslim complaints in British India.

Disintegration of the two nation theory, which Pakistan was founded upon, displays the fragility of the country. With influential leaders such as Jinnah backtracking on their original statements and future politicians unable to consolidate a framework on which to build, the nation quickly struggled. The British, through their policies and behaviour enforced the idea of division and separateness among the Hindu and Muslim populations which later evolved into the notion of the two nation

⁵⁸ Adnan A, 2006, Pakistan: Creation and Genesis, [pdf], The Muslim World, Vol26, USA, pp1-17, available at: <http://iissr.org/images/creationandgenesis.pdf> pg 14

⁵⁹ Hussain A, 1976, Ethnicity, national Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan, Asian Survey, USA, Vol.16 No.10 , available at: <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2643533?uid=2134&uid=374928443&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3&uid=374928433&uid=60&sid=21101038885763> p6 925

theory. Whilst the roots of the ideology itself lie with the political leaders at the time the elements that underpin it are traced back to colonial rule. Had the British not outlined such distinct divisions to begin with it is possible to argue that the impractical and unworkable two nation theory may not have arisen and subsequently fallen apart leading to more unrest and disruption.

The last event this chapter is set to analyse is the first military coup of Pakistan's existence and is imperative in understanding why contemporary Pakistan struggles with political instability and military interference. It also highlights how legitimate bids for leadership are overridden and illegitimacy takes over. This is how extremist groups gain influence, by force similar to that displayed during the various military coups that have afflicted Pakistan. In 1958, just over ten years since its creation, Pakistan was dealt a significant blow. Amid the troubles it was already facing in the tumultuous time since partition the country witnessed the overthrowing of its leader Iskander Mirza by military chief, General Ayub Khan. In an unprecedented turn of events Ayub overthrew the man who had promoted him just days earlier, insolently appointed himself as President and installed martial law. This event is crucial in Pakistan's history as it was the start of the country's descent into military dependence and extreme rule. Since 1958 Pakistan has spent several decades under military rule and the army's presence in political and social affairs is heavily criticised and blamed for the country's decline.⁶⁰ As will be examined in the following chapter the notion of instigating a coup-d'état and the idea of forcibly changing a situation because it is not agreeable with one's own ideas can be linked back to colonial policies and the disastrous partition. The true impact and roots of this legacy, among others, will be further investigated and clear parallels can be drawn between these situations and colonial influence.

So, where does the analysis of this series of events leave the discussion on links with Islamic extremism? At the end of this period Pakistan was suffocating under a continued air of discontent; a continued hatred of the British for leaving such a mess, the two nation theory reneged on by respected political leaders and continued infighting among their own people. The country was devoid of a

⁶⁰ Siddiq A, 2007, *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, Pluto Press, UK

strong political power, had very little financial or economic stability and remained largely fragmented in terms of national identity. The combination of such conditions, as discussed in the next chapter, allows for extremist groups to take hold. Where there is little on offer from the country's government, such organisations claim to provide an alternative and use religion to harness members. In Pakistan, religion at this point, was the only constant and the emphasis placed upon it only allowed for an easier manipulation by Islamist individuals.

The aim of the initial three chapters of this investigation has been to highlight specific events that show the growing disdain for the British administration. Through doing so the material depicts how colonial rule created disaffection, led to greater Muslim nationalism and impacted the people of Islam greatly. It is the assertion that this behaviour and the feelings initiated through colonial rule have evolved over time into greater hatred, greater frustration, increased intolerance and eventually extremism. Evidence of the native's frustration at colonial policies has been demonstrated through the analysis of the mutinies and establishment of specific Muslim organisations. The behaviour of the British has been evaluated in terms of the governmental bills passed, controversial military behaviour and experimental divisions of society. Whilst these chapters have outlined the impact British rule had on the people at the time the following will discuss the legacies colonial rule left behind and how these have manifested themselves in contemporary Pakistan.

Chapter 4 – The Legacies.

Colonial rule left indelible scars on Pakistan; these have affected, if not directly hindered, the country's ability to progress towards becoming a successful nation. Described as a failed state in 2011 the region has suffered since its creation and many of its problems can in fact be traced back through colonialism and its lasting legacies.⁶¹ The former chapters have outlined specific events during colonial rule that gave rise to disdain for the British which could have led, directly or indirectly, to acts of religious extremism. The following analysis looks at the specific legacies left behind by colonial rule and how these could have impacted the country's contemporary battle with extremist behaviour. So, with the colonialist background to partition firmly in place and having explored historical grievances between Pakistani Muslims and the British, it remains to establish what permanent effects colonial rule had on Pakistan. Only then might it be possible to determine the degree to which colonial influence is linked to Pakistan's Islamic extremism.

Economic Instability.

The decision to partition Pakistan was a hasty conclusion following the realisation that war ravaged Britain could no longer afford to continue its reign over the subcontinent. Apparently thinking only of itself Britain hurriedly drew the boundary lines; reportedly by a man who had little knowledge of Indian conditions and with the use of out-of-date maps and census materials. In doing so the British divided family owned land, dispersed thousands of people and paved the way for some of the worst violence the region had ever witnessed. Many Muslims hoped that partition would bring freedom; freedom from competition within the economy, from the overbearing moneylenders who were predominantly Hindu, freedom to prosper on their own. However, in reality the boundaries constructed by the British left newly formed Pakistan with very little to work with. Most importantly

⁶¹ Foreign Policy, *2011 Failed States Index*, [www], available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings last accessed: 23/9/2012

the country inherited the longest and most strategically problematic borders in the region and sits alongside a number of volatile areas. Afghanistan to the North-West faces its own battles with extremist behaviour and as this region directly borders Pakistan this too poses increased levels of threat in terms of infiltration and recruitment. Kashmir also remains a hotly contested subject for Pakistan and has been the crux of many military disputes between Pakistan and India. Again, this can be argued to be a result of colonial divisions and geographical stipulations.

At partition 90% of the former country's industry lay inside India's borders along with the largest established cities leaving Pakistan with very little to expand and develop from.⁶² The newly formed Islamic nation also won a poor share of the colonial government's financial reserves; it inherited only 17.5% of the former government's financial assets leaving an undeniably low fund from which to construct a viable economy.⁶³ Once again the ill-advised actions of the British only sought to increase the resentment of western powers by the Muslim world. Knowing that India had in some ways reaped the benefits of partition whilst Pakistan was left floundering amplified the resentment felt for the British powers. Amid the struggles that Pakistan now faced they sought to find an identifiable enemy, someone they could accuse and blame for the situation they found themselves in. This enemy took on the mantle of Britain once again.

Intolerance.

Through their initial plans of census taking, divide and rule policies and the perceived favouring of the Hindu population above the Muslims, the British succeeded in breeding an air of intolerance and fostering the idea of separatism rather than cooperation. In contemporary Pakistan and particularly within the ideologies of established extremist organisations the element of intolerance and dislike of other religions is clearly apparent. Al Qaeda repeatedly states that the reason behind much of their activity is their hatred of the west, the belief that specifically British powers, have too much influence in Islamic nations and that they are trying to once again suppress Muslims much as they had done under colonial rule. In an open letter to the American government Osama Bin Laden stated that the

⁶² Marker S, 2003, *Effects of Colonization*, [www], Beyond Intractability - Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado USA, available at: <http://www.beyondintractability.org/post-colonial>

⁶³ Ibid.

Qur'an calls for Muslims to kill any American or Jew they encounter and on numerous occasions he has recounted how Islam, or his perception of it, carries an inbuilt disdain for those deemed as infidels: "every Muslim, the minute he can start differentiating, carries hate towards Americans, Jews and Christians, this is part of our ideology. Ever since I can recall, I felt at war with the Americans and had feelings of animosity and hate towards them".⁶⁴ This transparent intolerance of other religions could possibly be linked to the implementation of caste systems and census taking during colonial rule that highlighted religious differences and divided communities.

Despite appearing as if the onus is on Islam this is not without justification. Pakistan as a Muslim nation has appeared prejudiced and emanated intolerance in the actions of the extremist groups within its borders and even governmental decisions. In March 2011 The Guardian reported that the only Christian politician within the Pakistani cabinet, Shahbaz Bhatti, had been killed by insurgents as he left for the office on the morning of March 1st. Those responsible then calmly showered the area with pamphlets declaring that Mr Bhatti was a Christian infidel and signed their calling card "Taliban Al Qaeda Punjab".⁶⁵ Shahbaz had dedicated much of his professional career to giving marginalised Christians within Pakistan a voice and, despite previous threats to his life, Mr Bhatti vowed to continue. In a statement shortly before his death he was recorded as saying "I will die to defend their rights" and that the "threats and warnings cannot change my opinions and principles".⁶⁶ This article clearly demonstrates the struggle Pakistan has with religious intolerance and the power of the Muslim extremist factions within the country. India on the other hand, a largely Hindu population, has repeatedly expressed its ability to live as integrated communities and has a diverse range of religions within the country.

Role and dominance of the military.

Due to the country's role in WW1 and WW2 Pakistan, although left with very little political infrastructure, was created with a strong and well established army. However, the Kalashnikov

⁶⁴ Garrison C, 2011, *Why did Osama Bin Laden hate Americans, Jews and Christians?*, The Washington Times, [www], USA, 11-05-2011, available at: <http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/truth-be-told/2011/may/11/why-did-osama-bin-laden-hate-americans-jews-and-ch/>

⁶⁵ Walsh D, 2011, *Pakistani Minister Shahbaz Bhatti Shot Dead in Islamabad*, The Guardian Online [www], London, 2/3/2011, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/02/pakistan-minister-shot-dead-islamabad>

⁶⁶ Ibid

Culture has led Pakistan down a path that has caused much trouble for the nation. Britain's reliance upon its military to quell the unrest during the colonial period demonstrated to the natives that success was achieved through military might and this is a philosophy which Pakistan seems to have carried with it through conception and into creation. As Ziring notes "...a surrogate for the departed colonial authority, the military remained in place so that the country could find time to correct course and seek an appropriate path. But the military would not be content with a mere holding action".⁶⁷ The military has played a key role in politics from its creation and has often intervened in areas beyond its normal remit. As previously outlined Pakistan has undergone considerable periods ruled through martial regimes and has fallen victim to a number of military coups seeking to oust the often democratically elected government. Military leaders such as Zia ul-Haq in the late 1970's damaged the country some might say irreparably through his process of Islamization and his love of martial politics. The military's controversial position within Pakistan and the country's reliance upon it remains a focal point in its relationship with extremism. If it cannot separate the army from its political agenda contemporary Pakistan stands little chance of gaining true stability and legitimacy on the world stage.

The lack of political stability witnessed within Pakistan since partition highlighted through the numerous military coups, has often left a vacuum of power which has repeatedly allowed secular and outsider groups to attain a foothold. Where there is little stability and security outsider rebels and terrorist organisations manipulate the plight of the ordinary people and harness this insecurity with promises of a better life. During colonial rule there were ongoing disputes regarding separate electorates, the ability for self rule and legislatures that withheld independence. Though these movements political knowledge and experience was stunted and coupled with wavering ideologies after partition, Pakistan was left with little governmental knowledge or leadership. Political groups vied for position much as they do today yet fair elections and democratic discussions were certainly not common place. Once again the legacy of Britain's inability to prepare or assist the people of Pakistan in establishing their new country is evident in the present day regions struggles with political corruption and unrest. "The residue of the failed political experiments of the postcolonial era is a set

⁶⁷ Ziring L., 2005, *Pakistan: At The Crosscurrent of History*, One World Publications, London, pg70

of repressive, corrupt, and unrepresentative regimes incapable of providing a modicum of democracy, economic well-being, or social justice”.⁶⁸

These legacies display that colonial rule undoubtedly played a significant role in Pakistan’s development, it was impossible for it not to. However, in order to conclude the true impact of colonial rule it is essential to view Pakistan’s evolution from colonialism to contemporary in context with other regions that have suffered a similar fate. Somalia as a case study reinforces the conclusion that colonialism had a significant impact on regions and their subsequent relationship with religious fanaticism. The British fought an ongoing battle against the resistance movement led by religious leader Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan in their protectorate in Northern Somalia; opposition within the region claimed that that the British "have destroyed our religion and made our children their children".⁶⁹ Following independence, Somalia has suffered much the same as Pakistan with a succession of civil wars, violent inter-communal clashes, unstable governments and an unprecedented rise in Islamic extremism. Colonial rule has left an indelible mark on the Somali region with the imposition of physical boundaries becoming fault lines for conflict. As the *Centre for Justice and Accountability* states, “While Italy developed a comprehensive economic plan for the more agrarian southern Somalia, the largely nomadic British Somaliland remained neglected”; a description that bears striking parallels to the outcome of India and Pakistan.⁷⁰ The region also has a heavy reliance upon the military similar to that of Pakistan and is prone to coups and uprisings instigated by the army or military related factions. Currently there is hope for Somalia in terms of growth and stability yet it is still plagued by Islamic jihadists Al-Shabaab who many fear are simply biding their time in order to re-take control. Somalia demonstrates through comparison that colonialism has impacted other regions much as it has Pakistan and that the outcome of that region is not an isolated case.

⁶⁸ Rabasa A, 2007, *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, Rand Corporation, USA, pg37

⁶⁹ The Centre for Justice and Accountability, date unknown, *Somalia: Colonial Legacy*, [online], CJA, San Francisco, available at: <http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=436>

⁷⁰ CJA, *Somalia: Colonial Legacy*, [www], Centre for Justice and Accountability, available at: <http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=436>

Religion and an ongoing hunt for identity.

Since the beginning of colonial rule the Muslim population struggled to unite its people as one. They continually felt undermined and diminished in their positioning, fighting to secure an electorate, a place within society, an identity. Following incidents such as the Sepoy Mutiny and the failed partition of Bengal the Muslims' feelings of oppression and a belief that they were being ignored escalated and the population was left feeling deflated and isolated. Events leading up to partition only exacerbated these feelings and the chaotic nature of the division itself left populations further fragmented and disillusioned. Unsure of exactly what the foundations were from which Pakistan was built the country has continued to struggle in building a solid identity for itself. This difficulty with the unification of a national identity links closely with the element of religion. Islam was used initially by the British to separate societies and later by Muslims to bind people together; it became the key catalyst for partition. However, even religion could not cement the people of Pakistan following on from partition. Hussain notes that "...the political leaders of Pakistan expected too much of Islam when they used it as the only integrative determinant of national identity in a state based on the Westminster type of democracy and the secular ideologies of the West".⁷¹

Following partition the people of Pakistan were largely undecided as to the exact role religion should play in the growth of their country. Some argued it should be made the state religion and legislature should run in accordance with Islamic code, others such as Jinnah himself argued that Islam would not be the lead religion and that the population should be free to follow whatever religious persuasion they wished. This in itself angered some who believed the foundation of and fight for Pakistan was on religious grounds and that the country should stay entirely Islamic. It is this inability to decide, or compromise that has caused problems, much like the indecisiveness witnessed among their politics.

The emphasis placed upon religion to consolidate the push for Pakistan played a considerable role in the current relationship Pakistan has with extremism. The movement for freedom began to evolve

⁷¹ Hussain A, 1976, Ethnicity, national Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan, Asian Survey, USA, Vol.16 No.10, available at: <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2643533?uid=2134&uid=374928443&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3&uid=374928433&uid=60&sid=21101038885763> pg 925

around religion rather than independence and it is this single minded focus that has allowed for manipulation. The ability by such minded people to modify the meaning of the holy books of Islam and persuade other believers to act in the name of God has allowed for extremism to flourish in this region. This again ties in with what has been previously outlined regarding identity; extremist groups provide individuals with a sense of being part of a larger identity through religion. The identity that the Pakistani people have managed to formulate is Pan-Islamic, rather than a national, Pakistani identity. A person from Britain identifies themselves as British, an American, American yet a Pakistani identifies themselves as Muslim. A recent study carried out by research group Gallup Pakistan asked the population of Pakistan the following question: *“Different people choose to identify themselves differently. What do you consider yourself to be, first and foremost?”*. The results of the survey showed that 59% of Pakistan’s population identified themselves as Muslims first. A further 22% answered Pakistani as their primary identity, 10% answered with their provincial identity and the remaining 7% gave ‘human beings’ as their response.⁷² The early and continued dominance and emphasis on religion in the creation and early years of Pakistan have hindered the country’s ability to form a national identity for its people.

During this research it was felt that in order to fully understand the true relationship between colonialism and religion, in the context of this research question, a statistical analysis was needed. The statistical analysis of the data collated aims to investigate whether there is a wider correlation between the impact of former colonial rule, a country’s development following independence and their relationship with religious extremism. Appendix A illustrates that of the 39 former colonies administered by Britain, 22 of them have struggled since independence from colonial rule in terms of political instability, military intervention, rebellions, religious uprisings and civil wars. Sierra Leone, for example, has suffered from numerous military coups, violent revolts and civil disputes since its freedom in 1961. The research shows that those countries that have struggled are not simply blighted by an occasional small scale protest but that they are afflicted by a significant combination of grievances: political revolts, military interventions, terrorism and interethnic violence. The former

⁷² The Express Tribune, 2011, *Muslim First, Pakistani Distant Second Say Majority*, The Express Tribune, 4/5/2011, [online], available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/161704/muslims-first-pakistani-distant-second-say-majority-gallup-poll/>

colonies appear to suffer on all levels, economically, socially and politically making success difficult to achieve.

Sandra Marker's 2003 research suggests that despite freedom from colonial rule, the former colonies were not free from the legacies. She cites that "Colonial legacies were visible in the desire of the new governments to keep the boundaries that were created during colonial times, in the promotion of ethnic rivalry, in the continuation of inhumane and unjust actions against minority populations, and in the practice of distributing the country's resources in an uneven manner".⁷³ The aim of this analysis is to highlight the fact that Pakistan's descent into unrest and eventual religious extremism is not an isolated case and that there is concrete evidence to suggest that colonial rule laid the foundations for extremist behaviour to develop in not just Pakistan but other formerly British administered colonies.

The statistics reveal that above 50% of those former colonies that struggled politically, socially and economically have also gone on to develop problems with religious extremism. What this combination of statistics allude to is a possible correlation between widespread instability following partition owing to former colonial rule and a subsequent relationship with religious extremism. The conditions that resulted from difficult partitions and lack of provisions could have paved the way for extremist groups to gain a firm foothold, much as they have done in Pakistan. Religious extremism thrives in areas that are devoid of basic provisions and regions that exist under defunct political infrastructures. In total, 17 of the 39 former colonies have a documented relationship with extremism originating from within their borders. Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Uganda are all former colonial regions with known links to extremist organisations residing within the country. During his 2009 research Omer Taspinar cites colonial subjugation as a catalyst in creating a "dangerous sense of victimization, resentment, and injustice in large parts of the world" thus providing further support for the conclusions drawn during this statistical analysis.⁷⁴

⁷³ Marker S, 2003, *Effects of Colonization*, [www], Beyond Intractability - Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado USA, available at: <http://www.beyondintractability.org/post-colonial>

⁷⁴ Taspinar O, 2009, *Fighting Radicalism, Not 'Terrorism': Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined*, [www], SAIS Review, Vol XXIX, No.2, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2009/9/summer%20fall%20radicalism%20taspinar/summer_fall_radicalism_taspinar pg78

Furthermore, of these 17 former colonies, 9 of them are Islamic nations. It is an assertion of this research that one of the most significant catalysts in the evolution of extremism, aside from colonial rule, within these nations, lies in religion. This is not to say that all Islamic nations are to be afflicted by extremism but that there is significant evidence to suggest that elements of this specific religion are the dominant factor and this coupled with the conditions instigated by colonial rule allowed for extremism to take hold. However, it should be noted that failure is not widespread across Muslim nations. Regions such as Iraq and Egypt are, as author Angel Rabasa states, “functioning if imperfect”.⁷⁵

In order to investigate this in greater depth a study would need to be carried out into the relationships other Islamic countries have with extremism that were not previously ruled by colonial powers. Granted, Pakistan had to contend with an array of problems following partition that India did not yet this surely is not enough to offset India’s memories of subordinate rule under the British Empire. If Islam is not a dominant factor in this one wonders why India and its largely Hindu population did not take umbrage during colonial occupation to the same extent Pakistan did. Is it then mere coincidence that of these 17 afflicted states, 9 of the countries are Islamic nations?

Conclusion.

⁷⁵ Rabasa A, 2007, *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, Rand Corporation, USA, pg38

Analysing the actions of the British during their time as rulers of the Indian subcontinent it is hardly surprising that the former colony populations resent the western world. Barrelling in to their lands the British revoked former liberties, separated regions and willingly pitted religions against one another. In labelling each individual by caste or religion colonial leaders made social differences glaringly obvious and unavoidable. Aware of the upset caused the British merely drew a line, withdrew and left the dismantled region to, in effect, sort itself out. Problems in Pakistan today are undeniably the result of, at least in part, British influence.

However, it is far too simplistic to suggest that Pakistan's descent into extremism is rooted solely in the actions of colonial rule and the early years. But, the legislatures and implementations put in place under the Raj did significantly impact the country's people and the ability of the region to prosper. The previous chapter highlighted exactly how the legacies entrenched in the country by British rule and the push for Pakistan have damaged the region and, to some extent, led to its current problems. Extremism has evolved and the reasons and causes of such behaviour continually change. What once began as a move towards freedom from foreign rule has now become a tool for immediate, yet often small scale, change and a general platform to air ones grievances. What this research *has* determined is that a number of elements relating directly to colonialism and the formative phase of Pakistan's existence have indeed contributed to its battle with Islamic extremism.

Pakistan has witnessed a gradual evolving of the behaviour classed as extremism throughout its 65 year existence. Early revolts were widespread, carried out by both Hindu and Muslim groups and aimed to end colonial rule. But the British predisposition to categorize and label situations coupled with their unease at the perceived Muslim strength led to these actions being deemed as those of Muslim fanatics; a label that has lingered.

The years following the tumultuous partition were plagued with instability and uncertainty and any successes were overshadowed by martial regimes, coup de tats and inter-communal violence. The battle with extremism exists through this inability to produce a stable government with cabinet members working toward a common goal and without the pressure of the military to change tact. Where there is no secure and favoured leadership factions will always seek to promote their power

and exploit members of society 'looking for something more' and this is exactly what has been witnessed in Pakistan. The country, as a nation, still struggles to formulate a true, cohesive identity and many struggle to recount their actual historic roots. Their identity is only found within Islam; where there is not a national identity available within the country religion has provided one. "Muslims worldwide may not have an organizational hierarchy that unites them, but they do have a theological basis for global identity, it is called the *Ummah*, an invisible community of the faithful. It is a mythological homeland for them which is both nowhere and everywhere."⁷⁶

When evaluating the true extent of the role of colonialism and the formative years in creating contemporary extremist Pakistan it is then necessary to turn the initial question around and ask whether Pakistan would have the same relationship with extremism had it not been ruled by colonial powers and subsequent changes brought about by this. The answer is probably not, its creation could very well have been delayed somewhat, if not indefinitely, leaving the Indian Muslims to follow a different path. However, it could also be argued that left within India as one, religious divisions and communal fighting would only have escalated and resulted in contemporary Islamic extremism all the same. Christophe Jaffrelot argues that the Hindu-Muslim tensions were evident prior to colonial rule and that such tensions would have continued with or without the assumption of colonial powers. He maintains that the country's problems with extremism stem from existing religious tensions rather than the actions of colonial rule and governments during the formative phase.⁷⁷ However, what this research concludes is that despite the pre-existing religious tensions the actions of colonial rule and the ensuing years only exacerbated situations, compounded the air of mistrust and dislike and acted as a catalyst for the future problems the region would face.

Even though there have been various investigations into this area of research the conclusions drawn during this project differ slightly in their result. What this research proposes is that whilst colonialism did have a significant role to play in Pakistan's dissent into extremism it has another significant counterpart; religion. As outlined in chapter 4, Islam is a key catalyst in this and evidence

⁷⁶ O'Connor T, 2012, *Islamic Extremism and Jihadism*, [www], available at: <http://www.drtoconnor.com/3400/3400lect04asecure.htm>

⁷⁷ Jaffrelot C, 2004, *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*, Anthem Press, London

for this lies in the statistical analysis of the former colonies as well as the detailed look at Somalia's current situation. Even with this conclusion, it cannot be generalised and applied to all, Pakistan's struggle with extremism only exists within a small minority of the population and this research is not asserting any inherent problems within the religion of Islam itself.

Despite colonialism playing a significant part, contemporary Pakistan's problems are a culmination of events that have played out during its history such as the American intervention in Muslim lands of Palestine. As previously explained, Pakistan's belief system is Pan-Islamic and this unites grievances from across the Muslim world not just within the confines of Pakistan. Therefore, as Pakistan evolves, so do the grievances; the anger that is felt among Islamic extremist groups is not simply built on the problems originating from colonial times but they are continually added to as more and more events from around the globe go against the beliefs of these organisations.

Appendix A - Table 1.0 – Statistical analysis of British administered colonies in 1914

<u>Country/Colony</u>	<u>Date of Independence</u>	<u>Dominant / state religion</u>	<u>Has there been a struggle to establish itself as a nation in terms of political</u>	<u>Is there a documented relationship with Islamic extremism</u>

			<u>instability</u> <u>, interreligious</u> <u>unrest and military</u> <u>intervention</u> <u>following</u> <u>independence?</u> <u>Y/N</u>	<u>within the country?</u> <u>Y/N</u>
Aden (Yemen)	1970	Islam	N	Y
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (now Sudan)	1956	Islam	Y – ongoing religious (Muslim V Christian) and economic conflicts , coups and invasive military rule	Y
Ascension Island	1922	Christianity	N	N
Australia	1986	Christianity	N	N
Bahamas	1973	Christianity	Y	N
Basutoland (now Lesotho)	1966	Christianity	Y – battled military coups and governmental upheavals alongside poverty	N
Bechuanaland (now Botswana)	1966	Christianity	N – free and fair elections since independence	N
British East Africa (now Kenya)	1963	Christianity	Y – struggled against political instability, military and tribal uprisings	N
British Guiana (now Guyana)	1966	Christianity	N	N
British Honduras (now Belize)	1981	Christianity	Y – small scale border disputes, political unrest, gang violence and drug trafficking	N
British Hong Kong (now Hong Kong)	1997	Buddhism	N	N
British Somaliland (now Somalia)	1991	Islam	Y – left with little administrative	Y – active Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda

			infrastructure, struggled increasingly with political instability, violence, poverty and elevated levels of terrorism	links
Burma (now Myanmar)	1948	Buddhist	Y – political unrests and rebel insurgency	Y – Accounts of Muslim violence against Buddhists.
Canada		Christianity	N	N
Ceylon (now Sri Lanka)	1948	Buddhism	Y – political unrest, controversial legislations, Tamil Tiger struggles	Y – Tamil Tigers are officially recognised as an extremist organisation.
Egypt	1922	Islam	Y – anger and upset at ongoing British presence, manifesting in revolts, political instability and acts of terrorism	Y
Ellice Island (now Tuvalu)	1978	Christianity	N	N
Falkland Islands		Christianity	Y – ongoing large-scale sovereignty disputes	N
Fiji Island	1970	Christianity	Y – political instability punctuated by numerous coups	N
Gambia	1965	Islam	Y – political coups and violent clashes	Y
Gold Coast (now Ghana)	1957	Christianity	Y – political disturbances, poverty and significant economic decline	N – cohesive and integrated Muslim/Christian societies
India (now India & Pakistan)	1947	Hinduism in India, Islam in Pakistan	Y&N – India: mixed successes and failures, relatively stable government and booming economy. Pakistan: suffered considerable political	Y– India has struggled with extremist attacks aimed at Muslims and Christians. Pakistan=proven links with Al Qaeda and

			instability, economic struggles and battles with military coups and religious extremism	acts of religious extremism dating back to pre independence. India
Ireland		Christianity	N	Y – Northern Ireland with Sinn Fein and the IRA
Jamaica	1962	Christianity	N	N
Malaya (now Malaysia)	1957	Islam	Y – race riots and invasion of race and ethnicity in politics.	Y – Underlying threat from fanatical Muslim groups within region.
New Zealand		Christianity	N	N
Nigeria	1960	Muslim North, Christian South	Y – spates of religious clashes and violent uprisings	Y – Boko Haram terrorist group
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia)	1964	Christianity	Y – large-scale economic difficulties	N
Oman		Islam	N – never completely under rule of Britain like India was, has maintained some autonomy all along.	Y – constant threat from underlying extreme Islamist groups
Papua (now Papua New Guinea)	1975	Christianity	Y – revolts and uprisings among ethnic groups	N
Sarawak (now Malaysia)	1957	Christianity	N	N
Sierra Leone	1961	Islam	Y – military coups, revolts, rebellions and civil wars	N – peaceful cohabitation of Muslim and Christian religions
South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)	1965/1980	Christianity	Y – Robert Mugabe’s controversial rule, Africanization process and eradication of ‘white rule’, human rights violations, economic difficulties	Y

			combined with numerous cases of ethnic violence	
St. Helena	1981	Anglican	N	N
Swaziland	1965	Christianity	N	Y – reports of small scale terrorist activity
Trinidad & Tobago	1962	Christianity	N	Y – small scale problems noted from Islamist group Jamaat al-Muslimeen
Uganda	1962	Christianity	Y – civil unrest, political instability, poverty, human rights violations, uprisings from and against the Lords Resistance Army	Y – links to terrorist group Al Shabaab as well as the Lords Resistance Army (led by Josef Kony it is a mix of Islamic and Christian fundamentalists)
Union of South Africa (now Republic of South Africa)	1961	Christianity	Y – civil unrest, apartheid, political instability, economic decline and rioting	Y – like other African nations they face extremists threats from the smaller Muslim enclaves within the country.

The data in the above table was compiled from extensive research that utilised a wide variety of source material. Governmental country indexes, such as the CIA’s World Factbook that is available online and the United Nations statistical databases provide accurate data on religious demographics and population statistics as well as the dates for independence from colonial rule.^{78, 79} Evidence for the two remaining categories was obtained from numerous texts that focused entirely on one country’s history such as Walter Nubin’s *Sri Lanka: Current Issues and Historical Background*, whereas other texts provided a more inclusive overview of nations that have been or still are afflicted by elements of extremism.⁸⁰ Further research was often needed to examine each regions colonial past.

Definitions of the categories used within this analysis:

Is there a documented relationship with Islamic extremism within the country?- By the term documented relationship the research is referring to any written record or published research into a country’s proven links with Islamic extremist groups originating from within the borders of that region; it is *not* looking at extremist acts conducted against the country from outsider factions. For

⁷⁸ CIA, 2007, *Field Listing: Religions World Factbook*, Central Intelligence Agency, [online], USA, available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html> last accessed: 25/9/2012

⁷⁹ United Nations, 2010, *Demographic and Social Statistics*, United Nations, USA, available at: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/default.htm> last accessed 26/9/2012

⁸⁰ Nubin W, 2003, *Sri Lanka: Current Problems and Historical Background*, Nova Publishers, USA

Source: **R McNally**, 1947, *Popular Map of India, Pakistan and Burma*, [electronic print], Columbia State University USA, available at:
<http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00maplinks/modern/maps1947/maps1947.html>

Appendix C - Margaret Bourke-White's 1947 photo shows the victims of rioting during partition migrations.



Source: **Margaret Bourke White**, 1947, *The Great Migration*, [electronic print], available at:
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00routesdata/1900_1999/partition/riots/riots.html

Appendix D –

Margaret Bourke-White's iconic image of a refugee camp that arose during the post partition migration across India and Pakistan.



Source: **Margaret Bourke-White**, 1947, *The Great Migration*, [electronic print], available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2006/09/20/books/singh2.html>

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