

A critical analysis of the role of clans and economic patronage in the collapse, and continual fragmentation of Somalia.

Chapter 1: Introduction

It seems Somalia once again has the opportunity to gain political legitimacy and security for a devastated people. The UN have approved a task force of 8,000 peacekeepers with approximately 4,000 pledged so far while about 10,000 Somali's have been merged to form the Trans-Federal Governments (TFG) security force representing all the major clans of Somalia.¹ However, there are still grave concerns that the hardest part of establishing peace to Somalia is still ahead. Although the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) were defeated in with ease by the TFG and their backers, causing the UIC effectively dissolving itself on 27th December 2006² a power vacuum has been left across much of Somalia that the TFG has been unable to fill. This carries with it the dual threat that the UIC may seek to continue their cause through guerrilla warfare or that southern Somalia will return to clan based politics.

Moreover, much anger has already been directed at the TFG due to perceived clan discrimination as it has pursued policies that have alienated the Hawiye clan through the relocation of government to Jowhan and then to Baidoa from the capital Mogadishu. In many regions this has left the government "weak, unpopular and faction ridden"³ with fears that the power vacuum is once again to be filled by those warlords and elites that the UIC defeated less than a year ago.

Since 1991 Somalia has been labelled as a collapsed state that according to Zartmann is defined by a situation "where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart"⁴. Somalia's collapse since 1991 is the longest period any country has gone in modern history without a functioning government. Indicative of state collapse is not the disappearing but the changing of politics, altering its form, drawing from the traditional to conceive a new socio-political evolution. In order to consider and understand the emergence of a new politics, both external and internal forces of division, resource, authority and political will, may impact upon the political evolution of Somalia into statehood.

With international help from Ethiopia, the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the United States, Somalia is currently struggling to form a unified government after more than 15 years of clan warfare. A number of explanations can be offered for the initial collapse and then continual failure to restore a legitimate state to Somalia. Both external and internal reasons have been cited such as criticisms that Somali leaders have been irresponsible, corrupt and unwilling to compromise on power. Others argue that Somali's are fearful of a re-emergence of

¹ <http://allafrica.com/stories/200702240015.html> United States Department of State (Washington, DC) February 23, 2007 Posted to the web February 24, 2007
Jim Fisher-Thompson
Washington

² <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4630&l=1>

³ <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4630&l=1>

⁴ P26 state failure, collapse and reconstructio

an authoritarian corrupt regime that would repress the populous so scupper efforts for a centralised state. A further explanation for the collapse of Somalia is that the traditional clan make-up of Somali society is incoherent with the ideals of a centralised state. Those that argue external factors may be the cause of Somalia's difficulties blame neighbouring states such as Ethiopia for perpetuating state collapse within Somalia to serve their own interests. While others point the finger at western diplomatic and interventionist policy for being badly managed, ignorant and neglectful of Somalia's difficulties.

The object of this essay will be to analyse more specifically at how privatised illicit networks of economic power may have combined with Somalia's clan heritage in contributing to the collapse of Somalia in 1991, and continual failure to form an effective centralised political authority.

Chapter 2: The Build Up To Collapse

The Barre Regime

During 1991 at Fukuyama's supposed 'End of History'⁵ ideological plateau, Somalia was in the midst of large scale clan fighting comparable to civil war that sent Siad Barre's ruling authoritarian regime fleeing from the capital Mogadishu. Barre's regime had ruled over Somalia for 21 years following a violent seizure of power in October 1969 after the assassination of democratically elected president Abdirashid Ali Shamarke⁶. Following the seizure of power Barre was appointed chairman and later the presidency of the ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. However, Somalia proved to be a country difficult to exert political control over, and as Barre's regime extended its' control upon Somalia its' method of rule became increasingly authoritarian.

Siad Barre's initially socialist regime became increasingly reliant upon methods of survivalist politics in an attempt to exert and extend political power and authority across the whole of Somalia. It denied Somali citizens the right to vote, destroyed any vestige of a legitimate and independent judiciary system and became evermore oppressive towards traditionally democratic institutions such as a free press and free speech. Moreover, Barre concentrated much of his political power and economic reform in and around Mogadishu and fertile southern river valleys, creating vast inequalities and in-balances in economic growth, giving rise to group rivalry for scarce resources outside of the capital. As the regime continued such a hard-line approach to governing Somalia, policy often depended upon creating clan divisions and sometimes inter-clan conflict through a method of divide and rule that led to the creation of evermore powerful enemies and competing factions that would lead Somalia to future collapse.

Cold War Politics

Somalia was a pawn of super power rivalry during the Cold War period. Both the US and the Soviet Union supported Siad Barres regime at one point or another. The two great powers of the day saw Somalia's strategic location at the entrance of the Red

⁵ Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 essay "The End of History?" postulated at the end of the Cold War that man had reached the 'end point' in their ideological evolution with Western liberal democracy emerging as the final form of governance that would eventually transcend into all nation states.

⁶ http://www.somalilandforum.com/news/the_republican/Republican-Issue-163.htm

Sea as an important oil route and a means of extending their influence in a unstable region. Having seized control from the democratically elected government and then declaring Somalia a Socialist state Siad Barre's regime was quick to receive international support from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union helped arm and aid Barre's regime militarily through the 1970s as Barre sought support from the Soviet military to annex the majority Somali Ogaden region of Ethiopia. However, when the Soviet Union switched its support to the new Marxist government in Ethiopia mid-way through the conflict Somalia lost the war. Defeat in the Ogaden war was catastrophic for the Barre regime. It ruined Somalia's military, forcing Barre to abandon his dreams of a 'greater Somali nation' causing an upsurge in discontent within the Barre regime as well as leading to the formation of the first organized opposition group, the 'Somali Salvation Democratic Front' (SSDF).

During the 1980s the US, hoping to gain a greater influence in the destabilised region and counter strong Soviet influence in Ethiopia became a donor to the Barre regime. US support for the Barre regime was to last up to its collapse, providing both military and economic aid to fight insurgent warlords. The legacy of the Cold War left a lasting impact upon Somalia, creating a huge weapon surplus in Somali society due to military super-power support during the arms race. Such arsenal derived from Cold war patronage was often sold on the shadow economy during and immediately after the collapse of central government authority. This allowed some to accumulate vast amounts of wealth and weaponry while others were forced into circumstances of survival.

After losing patronage from the Soviet Union the Barre regime quickly aligned itself with the US and Italy. Foreign aid generated \$2.8 billion for Somalia between 1972 and 1989, more than any other African state's aid per a capita at that time⁷. However, most of the Somali population benefited very little from state led development as much of the generated wealth was siphoned off by the corrupt regime. An indication of the level of internal difficulty and corruption is that Somalia's dependence on foreign aid for 90 per cent of its development spending⁸. Moreover, when examined government spending in other areas not related to social development indicates possible reasons for the collapse, break-up and continuous lack of legitimate authority in Somalia after the disposal of the Barre regime.

There were certain developments in Somalia during Barre's regime. Initially Barre carried out policies aimed at state-building, pursuing a project to unite all those who spoke the Somali language within a single state, which led him into the catastrophic Ogaden war. Also in order to achieve such an aim Barre supported literacy programmes to disseminate a new Somali script. This followed from his ideological policy termed as 'scientific socialism' where Barre took in a number of ideological ideals embedded in Cold War politics including, the centralised state of Leninism, the cult of personality from North Korea's Kim Il-Sung and Islamic culture that shaped customs and gender roles within Somalia. However as Jean Francois Bayart outlines the pursuit of cultural homogeneity within Somalia only led to the "fanciful pursuit of irredentism, and has not weakened the damaging intensity of factional struggle"⁹

Possibly the most enduring legacy of the Barre regime was the mean by which it exerted authority over the population and warlords through politicised development

⁷ <http://www.somalilandtimes.net/2003/62/6201.htm>

⁸ <http://www.somalilandtimes.net/2003/62/6201.htm>

⁹ Pg 175 the state in Africa Jean Bayart

programmes targeted at particular communities. As development often favoured a certain ethnic or regional community over another, great crevasses in inequality emerged between different social groups. The situation was further worsened as formal “social spending fell from 6.3 per cent of development spending in 1975 to less than one per cent in 1989”¹⁰ leading less to be dependent on the state for their social welfare and basic needs. Moreover, politically neglected groups often looked to forming ties with other states in order to generate income independent of the Barre regime and his favoured elites.

Following the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991 that brought with it the destruction of any remittance of central authority in Somalia since 1991, the world prepared to intervene. The Cold War had ended, Francis Fukuyama had declared man to have reached the end of his ideological evolution, and the world was to become safe place full of liberal democratic ideals. The new collective security paradigm following the end of the cold war conceived a new world order asserting greater emphasis upon global governance institutions, democratization and a neo-liberal global economy. The requirement for aid intervention further heightened in the case of Somalia as the collapsed state stood outside the teleological neo-liberal remit of development theory that still placed Somalia on an evolutionary path to fulfil a liberal development paradigm. Therefore, the response conceived by the international community was one of ‘mission creep’, a term coined from the intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s to describe the changing goals of the intervention.

Issues of Global Governance

The UN, US and International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) sought to intervene in collapsed Somalia at various times during the 1990s. However, their task was made decidedly difficult without a government to impose their policies or accept their aid efforts whether it was loans or aid. Civil conflict and societal break-up induced a devastating famine for much of 1991 and 1992, causing mass internal displacement and an estimated 300,000 deaths¹¹. A UN peacekeeping force was assigned to Somalia in December 1992, but faced greater violent resistance than expected from militias’ armed with Cold War arsenal. Moreover, there was the added difficulty of exercising neutrality in civil conflict. The result was that foreign forces working without the help of a domestic state authority led only to an increase in tensions, as Meagher outlines, “any introduction of assets will impact power relations, any interaction will tend to legitimise one group of leaders at another’s expense”¹²

The United Nations involvement in humanitarian relief within Somalia was radically altered in 1992 due to civil conflict. The Security Council established a UN intervention force UNSOMI to monitor a ceasefire in Mogadishu. Mission aims for UNSOMI was to provide protection and a secure working environment for United Nations “personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centres in and around Mogadishu¹³. In August 1993 UNSOMI was enlarged to administer such services throughout all of Somalia. Following little success in the midst of large scale civil conflicts the Security Council authorised the forming of UNITAF (Unified Task

¹⁰ <http://www.somalilandtimes.net/2003/62/6201.htm>

¹¹ <http://www.netnomad.com/somtimes.html>

¹² Prendergast, pg34, *frontline diplomacy*, boulder, us:lynne riennen publisher inc, 1996

¹³ http://www.un-somalia.org/UN_Somalia/index.asp

Force) to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance while UNSOMII was later established in March 1993 to disarm and reconcile the internal conflicts within Somalia and install law and order back into Somalia. However, there was little success as following the shooting down of two US Black Hawk helicopters and the global media portrayal of the horrific deaths of 18 US soldiers in 1993, US troops were withdrawn¹⁴. Later the UN also withdrew from operations in Somalia claiming that there was no peace to keep. The poorly planned foreign intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s raised many questions about the developing role of various actors in global governance and humanitarian efforts. It would also have a radical impact upon UN and international interventionist policy in African states, leading to the non-intervention in the Rwandan genocide in 1994

Since UN and US operations retreated from Somalia, difficulties in Somalia were largely ignored by the international community until the events of September 11th 2001. Prior to September 11th Somalia was portrayed by the world media as a collapsed state torn apart by tribal rivalry and corrupt warlords set on personal gain. Civil conflicts, social strife, and humanitarian atrocities became evidence for corruption and ethnic rivalry to such an extent that foreign powers remained unable to remedy, despite reports suggesting up to a million people had died in the time period¹⁵.

The emergence of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in the midst of the US led war on terror, has increased concerns within the West that Somalia was becoming a safe haven for Islamic fundamentalism ruled by a regime similar to that of the Taliban prior to intervention in Afghanistan. The US has acted on such fears, worried that Somalia will become a safe haven for terrorists intent on launching attacks upon the West as “events of September 11th have elevated the relevance of collapsed states into a central question for international security.”¹⁶ In May 2006 the Washington Post claimed that the US was secretly supporting warlords fighting against Islamic groups linked to the UIC in and around the capital Mogadishu¹⁷. However, African researchers have criticised the Bush administration claiming that, “little was being done to support economic development initiatives that would provide alternative livelihoods to picking up a gun or following extremist ideologies.”¹⁸

Attempts for the Restoration of Somalia

Since the turn of the century there has been a renewed attempt from the international community to restore order within Somalia. This has primarily been done through support for the establishment of a new Somali transitional government. In October 2000 newly appointed Prime Minister Ali Khalif Gelayashi announced his transitional government that was the first in Somalia since 1991. However, within months of the establishment of the government Somali rebels, with backing from Ethiopia had seized the Southern town of Garbaharey. Further damage was then done to the transitional government’s authority in April 2001 when a number of Somali warlords announced their intentions to form their own national government in opposition to the transitional government¹⁹. A year later warlords based in South West Somalia

¹⁴ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1986302,00.html>

¹⁵ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world....._somalia_country_profile

¹⁶ Pg63 stae failure collapse and reconstruction

¹⁷ Washington post, us secretly backing warlords in Somalia, may 17th 2006, Emily wax, Karen de young

¹⁸ Washington post, us secretly backing warlords in Somalia, may 17th 2006, Emily wax, Karen de young

¹⁹ http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200104/24/eng20010424_68436.html

attempted to follow their counterparts in Somaliland and Puntland by declaring six regions to be autonomous from the transitional government to form a 'South-Western Regional Government.'²⁰ After the failure of the previous transitional government a new transitional government was formed in 2004, headed by Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi, who was elected to the precarious task of restoring order and legitimate authority within Somalia. However, due to the volatile situation in Mogadishu and throughout much of Somalia it was not until June 2005 that the transitional government was able to return from exile in Kenya. Moreover, it was still unable to establish a parliament in Mogadishu due to warlord fighting, so after much dispute set-up parliament miles north of the capital in the town of Baidoa. A further threat to Ghedi's transitional government's authority was seen by the rise of Islamic warlords mainly in South and central Somalia. Islamist warlords compromised government authority by gaining control of vast regions in the South including Mogadishu. The Islamic advance in Southern Somalia was only halted and forced to retreat due to the UN Security Council resolution 1725²¹ outlining an endorsement of peace keeping strategy to prop up the transitional government in December 2006. Then later intervention by Ethiopia and the US, fearful of the formation of a radical Islamic state, forced Islamist warlords to abandon Mogadishu and concede their strongholds in southern Somalia.

A recent BBC report from January 1st 2007 declared, "It is unlikely that the transitional government would be able to fulfil that vacuum without the help of powerful clan leaders."²² Underlining that since 1991 there has been 14 failed attempts to establish a central government in Somalia without key infrastructure such as government buildings or civil service.²³ The last 15 years of warlord fighting has taken its' toll on Somalia, destroying conventional differences between government and the populous, causing a radical transformation within Somali society. Such intra-state conflict has caused the breakdown of Somalia's modern structures of power within political and civil society, which have since been replaced by distorted traditional structures of kinship and regional elites. This has been enveloped within much conflict intervention and rhetoric worldwide that views intra-state conflict and, importantly traditional civil authority to contradict liberal development moralities.

Chapter 3: New Networks of Power

The Weakness of Centralised Authority

The building of legitimate authority in Somalia is a hazardous task not only because of its' warlord rivalry, lack of government infrastructure, authority, and civil society, but also because of a low population density, and a fragile fluctuating social fabric. Due to a relatively low population density in Somalia it is expensive and more difficult to exert control over, and bond communities to one another, complicating the task of exerting a centralised authority over a diverse populous. This makes it increasingly hard to diminish the power of local elites and warlords that hold regional influence. A knock on effect of this is that peace building processes become more fragile, potential spoilers more numerous. It also increases the likelihood of peace

²⁰ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/09/usomalia309.xml>

²¹ <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/646/11/PDF/N0664611.pdf?OpenElement>

²² <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6222681.stm>

²³ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1072592.stm

processes further worsening a situation, potentially adding further complexities to already complex situations.

A further empirical problem faced in the establishment of a centralised government authority over Somalia is due to its agricultural based economy, with livestock making up by far the largest export sector. Somalia's agricultural based economy when combined with the nomadic nature of large swathes of its population makes it incredibly hard to implement legitimate taxation. Taxation of the commercial sector is equally difficult with petty traders and small businesses often oblivious to ideals of book keeping and accountancy²⁴. The problem of legitimate development in Somalia has been further complicated as wealth is often tied to regional power, similar to the colonial and Barre era where wealth was tied to political power. This led to a situation where the vastly wealthy often paid little or no taxes at all, as Robert Theobald claims "all in all the structure of less developed economies present serious impediments to the accumulation of wealth by the state"²⁵

Jean-Francois Bayart claims that social divisions in African states are far more tangled and difficult to conceptualise through orthodox western notions upon the state and societal classes.²⁶ He argues that the forming of hegemonic states in an African sense is radically different to the formation of state hegemony that was seen in Europe. In an African context, Bayart places the pursuit of state hegemony as being greatly influenced by ideology and ethnicity rather than territory or state based administration, as in Africa the state has been strongly acquainted with ideals of identity, inequality and inevitably separation.²⁷ Due to the complex tangles of the Somali social structure between 1991 and 2006 where Somalia has been without a centralised authoritative political power, there has been a great dependence upon the illegitimate use of force, largely reliant upon clan associations and economic divisions. It is through such nodes of authority that the power vacuum has been illegitimately filled in post 1991 Somalia, as outlined by Martin Doornbos, "state collapse is not the offspring of any state theory that promotes the total withering away of the state, but rather the pathological by-product of a combination of local and/or global political, social and economic development."²⁸ Somalia's ethnic and cultural divisions also impact greatly upon Somalia's social and political cohesion.

Mark Duffield claims processes of privatisation and market deregulations that were conditional within SAP's and HIDPC schemes have allowed African rulers to access new resources and privatised networks that encouraged the privatisation of security, and the growth of the shadow economy within African states. This is especially catastrophic in Somalia where security is privatised to an extreme due to the lack of state authority. According to Foberg and Terlin small arms such as assault rifles, AK47s and even rocket launches of some description can be found in most households²⁹. It is young men often make-up the vast majority of soldiers and ex-militiamen across sub-Saharan Africa, with Somalia being no exception. This has proved especially detrimental to Somalia's society and economy as they are removed from being able to contribute to the development of basic social structures, food production, and other much needed entities within a war-torn society. Towards the end of the Cold War a shift in location of small arms production meant that it was no

²⁴ P83 corruption, development, and underdevelopment

²⁵ P84 corruption, development, and underdevelopment

²⁶ Pg 104 The State in Africa, Bayart

²⁷ Pg 110 the state in Africa, Bayart

²⁸ Pg 67 state collapse and reconstruction.

²⁹ Foberg + Terlin 1999, duffield prob pg 171

longer the sole preserve of the industrialised global North as production became more prevalent in the global South. Furthermore, in the global South it became more imbedded in the social fabric of countries than it ever did in Northern industrialised states. To a degree this has led to a culture of small arms acceptance, legitimating and de-sensitising their use in civil society, an example being given by Bellas “In Somalia..... At the beginning of 1997, a local company, Barakaat, opened one of the first banks in Mogadishu for several years. Of the company’s 300 employee’s a third were armed guards”³⁰.

Ali Mazrui a leading Kenyan Scholar has argued that Western importation of political and social institutions during colonialism established narrow roots in African state infrastructure that have been continued through processes of globalisation. This has led to circumstance that allow violent sub-state groups to emerge with ease. Arguing that the neo-liberal agenda has led to an increase an outsourcing of the powers of weak, unconsolidated governments, leading some authors such as Bayart, Ellis, and Fibou to refer to the privatisation of the African state as the ‘criminalization of the African state’ for reasons Mazrui outlines, “in a technologically underdeveloped society in the twentieth century, ultimate power resides not with those who controlled the means of production (as postulated by Marx), but in those who controlled the means of destruction (captured by the soldier/ bandit with an AK-47)”³¹ The weakening of state structures, social provisions, and the loss of economic controls due, to the deregulation of economic power away from the state can be linked to the empowerment of private groups in Somalia that filled the power vacuum left by the state.³² This was spurred on by Somalia’s quasi statehood³³ during the Barre regime due to the reliance upon foreign aid and the ineffective building of political and social structures.

Informal Networks and Social Fragmentation

Academics and NGO’s have been fickle in their interpretation of informal economies over the past thirty years, switching between proclaiming it to be a viable exciting progressive system for growth for much of the developing world to condemning it for causing social and state breakdown in the global south. Over the last ten years informal economies have been interpreted negatively partly due to the illicit sale of gems and minerals through war economy networks. However, informal economics in Africa are so expansive and integral to the survival and daily routines for millions that it is far too large to be generalised. Furthermore, those processes that operate within it are integral to African cultural and social ideals of kinship, ethnic grouping and local elites outlining it as “essentially non-liberal in its structure and aims,”³⁴but still integral in upholding African social orthodoxy. When informal economies take the place of the formal economy due to the collapse of the state, empowers illegitimate networks of power.

³⁰ Duffield pg 172 (bellas 1997) global gov and new wars

³¹ A. A Mazrui, the african’s: a triple heritage, bbc publications, London 1986, p20

³² Nossal 1998:pg3 p 106 state failure, collapse and reconstruction.

³³ Quasi-statehood was is a term coined by Robert Jackson to refer to states that are said to possess a negative conception of sovereignty due to a dependence upon the international community for support or protection.

³⁴ Duffield global gov, pg 156

The Somali state under Barre's regime began to progressively deteriorate. During the 70s and 80s the shadow economy developed to provide the Somali people with services that the state did not. As the shadow economy expanded opportunities were created for a few Somali's to generate large amounts of wealth, while many more became dependent upon it for survival. Elites involved in the Somali shadow economy generated wealth through the importing and exporting of goods so that there were few incentives for the elites involved to reform and clamp down on the shadow economy within Somalia.

It has been argued that political power and regional authority is proportionally linked to economic wealth and a monopolisation of authoritative violence in Somalia. The linking of personal wealth with violence and authority is unrestrained by the state and civil society. However, due to conclusions being drawn between personalised profit and illegitimate networks of authority it is too simplistic to argue that the cause of conflict could be pinned down to a single variable such as wealth. In fact, William Reno argues it may be variables such as greed that some determine as a primary cause of a conflict when in fact it is just a tributary consequence³⁵. However he still concedes that one of the major causes of state collapse is the shift in power from state institutions into the commercial sector. A condition that was very prevalent in the imposed SAP's and HIDPC schemes. Underdevelopment, corruption and the weak legitimacy of many sub-Saharan African governments caused many African leaders to avoid the centralisation of the military and potentially powerful social structures due to the threat they would possess. However, such a strategy led by the Barre regime caused the creation of autonomous regional centres of power capable of dominating the use of violence within a given region. Such a fracturing of authority was also prevalent within the regime itself, leading to a situation where many of the warlords in Somalia once held high office in government. This allowed for them to develop important commercial connections through patronage networks because of their positions³⁶.

Position within government that originally enabled an accumulation of wealth also necessitated access to provisions beyond that of personalised economic relationships. Office within government also granted them access to other requirements for conflicts such as arsenal, armed youths and paramilitary units. Also the predominant position held by ex-regime elites and bureaucrats meant that they had been priory engaged with and able to exert influence over mass opposition movements that may have been more politicised and ideologically motivated than themselves but lacked capital and connections. A possible indication as to why many rebel groups across sub-Saharan Africa despite having an apparent ideological or political title do little to try and promote ground support or mass social movements through the promotion of an ideological plan at local levels. Cynics have argued this to be due to a lack of any true political will designed to benefit populations at large but rather and indicator of economic aims. Moreover, old regime elites operating through illegitimate networks of power often want attention turned away from real politics and any potential political misgivings they have been involved in. Reno therefore is arguing that, due to the domination of ex-regime elites there is a destruction of social spaces that would usually harbour potentially more progressive alternative spheres for development. However, wanting to benefit economically and still exert illegitimate political power is not necessarily exclusive to one another.

³⁵ The politics of insurgency in collapsed states, William Reno, book state failure collapse and reconstruction

³⁶ Pg 87 The politics of insurgency in collapsed states, William Reno, book state failure collapse and reconstruction


The Rise of the Clan

Genealogy lies at the heart of Somali social and clan systems shown by the Mareehaan clan who still revere Said Barre as a hero due to his immediate link with them, neglecting his ruthlessness and political corruption³⁷. The map below shows Somalia's six major ancestral clan families, that are the; Darood, and the Hawiye that are the most prevalent in and around the capital Mogadishu, the Isaaq who were severely persecuted by the Barre regime, the Dir, the Digil and the Rahanwayn. The Dir, Darood, Hawiye and the Isaaq are often livestock dependent and nomadic, making their organisational structures transient and fragile with shifting allegiances and informal networks formed to promote power, in non-fixed regions.

Academic Alex de Waal claims that IMF and World Bank policies of Structural Adjustment Programmes have had a negative impact on clan-ism helping to lead Somalia to a state of collapse. De Waal argues that IMF and World Bank attempts to alleviate Somalia's economic problems during the 1980s neglected clan culture and traditions imbedded in Somali tradition. Claiming that IMF policies instigated in Somalia weakened traditional systems of exchange between clans that developed an importance upon co-dependency and traditional clan values such as the authority of elders that could dictate clan actions, making them easier to control through diplomatic means. Moreover, de Waal further criticises the World Bank and IMF reforms for being half-hearted, lacking any genuine attempt to develop and offset Somalia's economic woes in the long run, causing a weakening of the formal economy and the state, "The economic policies forced upon Somalia by the Western donors aggravated the situation....., deflating the formal economy merely drove entrepreneurs into the informal economy"³⁸

³⁷ P33 Somalia, a nation in turmoil, 1991, Samatar Said S, a minority right group report, MRG publication.

³⁸ De waal pg 7 the shadow economy :somalias economic difficulties. African report, april/march 1993 vol 38 no2



With the absence of any state authority, warlords and local elites have gained social, political and economic power throughout Somalia, indicative of Vilfred Pareto's assertion "whenever the influence of public authority declines, little states grow up within states, little societies within societies"³⁹. This contravenes liberal global governance paradigms as non-state actors that are hostile or possibly just have alternative values and interests to the liberal peace agendas of; rule of law, human rights and democracy are seen to possess a challenge to the status quo of the international system. Moreover, institutions of global governance such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), states and trans-national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are concerned that the disintegration of state authority in one state threatens the stability of other regional states. However, sub-state networks of powerful groups are not new in African states. Often chiefs or regional warlords are able to trace their authoritative lineage which has allowed them to remain in control of economic incentives at the local level to pre-colonial times⁴⁰. Moreover, during colonialism powers often disseminated power to regional elites and strongmen for administrative and political purposes. These combined have had an affect upon power networks within present day Somalia and since the collapse of the Barre regime.

The Implications of a Collapsed State

Following the collapse of central authority in Somalia there has been much debate concerning possible socio-economic developments which may be radically different to the neo-liberal model. Needless to say economic activity did not stop but rather altered, creating different nodes of economic authority dictated by and dictating that

³⁹ Pg63 state collapse and its implications for peace
⁴⁰ Staes and power in Africa

some accumulated vast amounts of wealth and resource, , while many were forced into a daily routine of survival. However, such economic inequalities are not new to Somalia although economic prosperity became tied to a greater ability for power-entrepreneurship, as before those who had wealth also required ties to the state to exercise the same degrees of authority and political will. As a consequence of greater gains combined with fewer restraints informal cross border trade grew, linking the internal Somali economy with global economic linkages. This allowed many of Somalia's border territories to remain on an economic plateau with some of its' neighbouring states. Moreover, following the departure of all US and UN troops in mid 1995 the Somali economy actually improved,⁴¹ benefiting those that had links to informal patronage networks.

Somalia's major economic sector, livestock, is well suited to a stateless system in a number of ways as there is a heavy reliance upon systems of kinship, and tradition making it more of a lifestyle for many Somali's rather than merely a means to accumulate wealth. However, there is still a great divide between the Somalia of livestock, herdsman and petty trade and the Somalia of arms, warlords and conflict in economic and political capabilities. The lack of health and education facilities in part due to the conflict and partly due to rural Somali culture has weakened capacities for social progress and fluidity between groups that are involved in separate economic and social sectors. Moreover, intra-state conflicts by their nature are very divisive for inter-group or ethnic relations while also strengthening bonds within groups, leading to an increase in tension as well as greater inter group disparities. This takes on greater importance in Somalia as clan divisions can disrupt trade between regions, as trust is critical for trade when there is little or no legal enforcement.⁴²

State collapse allows for the emergence of different nodes of authority that are often independent of outside support or legitimating actors. Mark Duffield argues in his book "Global Governance and the New Wars" that to regard war solely as a form of aberration and breakdown fails to understand the complexities, significance and adaptive processes that take place behind the bloody curtains of intra-state conflicts⁴³. The development and transformation of society and objectives that alter in circumstances of social breakdown remain to a large extent un-critiqued by western academic literature due in part to the illegality of much of the activity. As Duffield argues, when images of state collapse, conflicts and suffering appear on the evening news it is hard to acquaint them with western ideals of progressive social adaptation and possible statehood formation. Furthermore, liberal global governance attempts at settling disputes have not adapted or acknowledged the radical alterations in civil conflicts. Liberal peace agendas still focus upon formal economic activity that in countries such as Somalia represents a contracted footing for development prospects and only indirectly engages much of the population. Moreover, market liberalisation programmes such as Structural Adjustment Programme's (SAP's) of the 1980's and the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIDPC) schemes in the 1990's actually lessened the population's reliance upon the state for basic needs such as education and health, further legitimising the informal networks as a means of survival.

A Change of Nature within Conflict

⁴¹ Somalia: economy without a state

⁴² Pg10 Somalia: economy without a state.

⁴³ Pg138 global governance and the new wars

To fully analyse the extent to which economically driven patronage networks impact upon the collapse and continual breakdown of any vestige of legitimate central governance within Somalia, greater examination of the warring parties is required to understand how they are resourced and through what means they establish a legitimisation of authority. It is important to examine how elites and warring groups function politically and economically, how they are resourced, what security they provide. Armed clashes were most destructive and widespread in Somalia between 1988-1992 due to the overthrowing of the Barre regime, extreme resource deprivation and clans jostling for political position. However, throughout the course of the 1990s conflicts in Somalia altered radically. In the early 1990s conflict almost always was based upon inter-clan fighting, “the first explosion came immediately in the wake of the fall of Mogadishu, when the victorious Hawiye started to kill all non Hawiye residents of the capital”⁴⁴. This was also the case in the South with widespread fighting between the Darood and Hawiye clans over control of territory and resources. The primary funding of such conflicts was through pillaging and looting defeated clan territories and villages. However, as early as late 1991 although generally more prevalent in the mid to late 1990s there was a sign that intra-clan quarrels would lead to further conflicts as the major Hawiye clan in Mogadishu split in two forming the ‘Abigal’ led by Ali Mahdi and the ‘Haber Gedir’ led by Hussein Farah Aideed. Such a split brought an onslaught of heavy fighting throughout various districts of the capital, making a quick restoration of peace impossible. Meanwhile, the Darood clan based in Southern Somalia also conceded to intra-clan fighting in and around the Southern coastal city of Kismayo. While inter-clan hostilities still prevailed in many other parts of the country such as at Baidoa between Rahanweyn and Hawiye clans. This has had a knock on affect upon ethnic topography that has become distorted in many parts of Somalia, especially the border regions due to migration and temporary settlement caused by the social strife resulting from clan conflict.

Throughout the 1990’s the break-up of different clan allegiances became the primary prerequisite for fighting. This had implications for Somalia’s battered social tissue. Atrocities against civilian populations began to decrease due to the localised nature of intra-clan conflict and the re-emergence of traditional based authority from clan elders, meaning that conflict crimes would be more likely to be punished through clan customary law (xeer) or the enforcement of blood payment (diya). Pillaging and looting also saw a decrease in intra-clan conflicts as less territory was gained in such clashes. This indicates that actions and interests in Somalia following the collapse of the Barre regime have not remained fixed. It could also be argued the change of conflicts from one based upon ethnicity to one based upon interests will give external actors more leverage in building peace.

Clan based political actors such as the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Front (SNF) that emerged following the overthrowing of the Barre regime have since retreated from the political agenda in Somalia. This is partly due to the fracturing of ethnic divides and the breaking up of numerous lead organizations. An example being, the split in the mid 1990s of the USC, into the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by General Mohammed Farah Aideed and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed. Similar fracturing has led to a weakening of support and power for many of the warlords and militias since the years immediately after 1991, making those groups that once benefited smaller and more fractured. Ken Menkhaus a professor of Political Science at Davidson College North

⁴⁴ <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.htm?tbl=RSDCOI&id=3ae6a6c98&page=publ>

Carolina claims most businessmen who initially profited from conflict have made a transition into more legitimate goods and commercial networks. Indicating that recent armed conflict in Somalia is not so much driven by economic interests directly linked to warfare but rather, “parochial political agendas of individual leaders engaged in power struggles.”⁴⁵ Moreover as previously mentioned this is often within their own sub-clan. Menkhaus further argues that Somalia’s continual collapse cannot be explained only by greed interests as they would profit more from an internationally recognised ‘paper state’, allowing them to attract foreign aid that the elites could pocket as was the case with much of the aid that was given to Somalia during the 1990s. This however is not the desire of many Somali clans, militias and businessmen, as attempts to establish a transitional government in Somalia have been met with an increase in armed conflict, as many groups remain with the capacity to spoil a peace process.

Chapter 4 :The Dismantling and Expansion of Authority

The Conception and Expansion of Patronage Networks

To fully understand the initial reasons for the expansion of the shadow economy in Somalia analysis needs to be directed to the colonial and Cold War era, where foreign powers held great influence over the Somali economy. In pre-colonial times Somalia was a relatively peaceful homogenous society that held very strong ties to the land. However, these were neglected by Italian and British colonisers “land and its sacred identity of place was neglected by the colonialists with propriety of ownership and production becoming the central concept”⁴⁶. Due to this negation by the colonial powers traditional trade relations between different clans within Somali were strained or destroyed. The major trade relationships that had served many of the Somali people well for centuries was between the primarily agricultural clans in the South that held territory in and around fertile river valleys and those that occupied drier regions and dealt mainly in livestock. Colonialism disrupted the trade between such groups as Somali’s were dictated to by their colonial administrators in order to create a situation dependency upon their colonial power. The North of Somalia now a protectorate of Somaliland was affected differently from the South by their British colonisers. British colonialism did not employ the same coercive technique of breaking up trade routes as Italian colonialism. Instead they pursued their political and economic goals by keeping the native population underdeveloped to a degree. In many ways due to Cold War benefaction colonial dependency in Somalia did not end until the fall of the Barre regime. A further factor from the colonial era that has had recriminations today was the arbitrary drawing of a national boundary around the Somali clans, creating tensions that would have served the colonial powers divide and rule techniques well. When administering state boundaries the colonial powers showed little regard towards clan heritage and traditional living such as the nomadic lifestyle of some sub clans of the Darood, Ishaak, Hawiya and Dir that traditionally lived nomadically, sometimes venturing across borders into Ethiopia and Kenya establishing trade routes “the crisis in Somalia was concerned within the formation of

⁴⁵ Review of African political economy, no97, pg 405-427, ROAPE publications Ltd, 2003

⁴⁶ Pietro Toggia and Pat Lauderdale, “An Indigenous Perspective on the New World Order: The Rule of Law and Somalia,” *Columbia International Affairs Online* – <http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/lap01>

the centralized nation-state under which all the different clans were forcefully enclosed”⁴⁷ .

Cold War support for Somalia was mainly a reaction to politics within Ethiopia mainly concerned with the militarization of Somalia rather than the establishment of progressive politics. This meant that there was little social and political development made while arms were pouring into Somalia, as Stephen Zunes professor of peace and justice at San Francisco University outlines “as the US poured in more than \$50 million worth of arms annually to prop up the Barre regime, there was virtually no assistance offered that could help build a self-sustaining economy”⁴⁸ During the Barre regime the official economy failed to diversify away from what Somalia’s colonial powers had dictated. Somalia’s trade was primarily regional with its main export markets being Saudi Arabia that brought much of Somalia’s exported beef, and Kenya. However, trade with both Kenya and Saudi Arabia was subject to irrational economic circumstances as both the Saudi Arabian and Kenyan border was shut to Somali trade at various times during the 1980’s. The Kenyan President of the day Daniel Moi shut of trade with Somalia periodically due to regional violence and instability. This had severe consequences for those who imported and exported the mild stimulant ‘qat’ that grows in the Kenyan highlands that is very popular with Somali’s.

Although the shadow economy was prevalent in Somalia prior to the collapse of the state in 1991, its growth was embedded within the collapsing of the regime. Western liberal policy advocated by the major International Financial Institutions (IFIs),(the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank) dictates that a large shadow economy can lead states to collapse as governments raise taxes to increase their revenue that in turn causes a flight into the shadow economy, further weakening government authority. IMF researchers Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste claim “a heavily regulated economy combined with weak and discretionary administration of law provides especially fertile ground for shadow economy activities”. Initially the Barre regime followed a policy of heavily regulating the economy in line with their socialist doctrine. On the 8th May just one year after taking control the regime authorised guidelines for the tight control of the economy including the nationalisation of the Italo-Somali Electric Society (SEIS), oil distributing companies and all foreign banks⁴⁹. Such a situation was complicated in Somalia due to regime rule, a poor failing official economy, foreign aid, intervention, and clan rivalries. All of these factors enabled and led to the expansion of the shadow economy as Somali’s sought security and food.

Warlords are able to generate extra revenue through involvement with the illegal trade of qat, which according to a 2003 panel of UN experts has been used to generate revenue to buy weapons and prolong Somalia’s internal strife⁵⁰. Qat use increased dramatically after the outbreak of civil war possibly due to its virtues of escapism. International aid agencies have cited the use of qat, commonly known in Somalia as khat, as a primary cause of the continued fragmentation of Somali society

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 9. ref 5 of the collapse of Somali, economic considerations

⁴⁸ Zunes, Stephen, “Somalia as a Military Target,” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, January 11, 2002 –

http://fpif.org/commentary/2002/0201somalia_body.html

⁴⁹ Pg 87/88 socialist Somalia rhetoric + reality

⁵⁰ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/15/AR2006041500666.html>

as researchers have estimated 75 percent of adult males use the stimulus that has addictive properties that can lead men away from traditional family and work responsibilities.

When the Kenyan border closed Somalia entrepreneurs turned to the shadow economy in order to smuggle 'qat' across the Somali Kenyan border to sell in provincial Somali markets. Through the illegal cross-border trade Somali smugglers were able to avoid paying tariff chargers and trade licenses for the 'qat' making it more lucrative to smuggle on the shadow economy than to import officially. As the Barre regime became increasingly oppressive, corrupt and de-legitimised, expansive networks began to form for shadow economic activity. By the late 1980s trading in small arms was prevalent within the Somali shadow economy as private Somali entrepreneurs often with links to the Barre regime sold small arms to Somali clans, and resistance fighters in regional states such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, at the same time as this upsurge in small arms sale upon the shadow economy the Barre regime was becoming increasingly violent towards political opponents with incidents of mass jailing, attack on civilians and the indiscriminate use of landmines in dissident regions "the Majareeten, the Isaacs, and the Hawiye clans were ruthlessly suppressed."⁵¹ Such action did not have the results the regime intended or expected as opposition to the Barre regime and inter-clan violence began to erupt. Moreover, increasing numbers of weaker minority clans and sub-clan groups became displaced from their territory, further worsening the official economy and security in Somali society "the entire social fabric of the pastoralist economy was ruined."⁵²

Fractured Somalia

A deteriorating official economy, displaced and repressed people, a corrupt regime, a large shadow economy involving the large scale sale of small arms, and a severe draught dictating a severe scarcity of resources, came to ahead in Somalia in the early 1990s with disastrous consequences, "Armed thugs and bandits roamed the country, pillaging and plundering, and murderous warlords battled savagely for the control of the capital, Mogadishu. The carnage and the draught claimed over 300,000 lives, and heartbreaking spectacles of emaciated bodies of a famine that became the daily diet of the Western media"⁵³

All of Somalia's underlining problems exploded upon Somali society when Siad Barre's regime was overthrown by the USC (United Somali Congress) and replaced by an interim government led by Mohammed Ali Mahdi in 1991. The Somali National Movement (SNM) proclaimed independence from Somalia breaking away to form Somaliland in the North, leaving the rest of Somalia fractured, stateless, and lawless, with an abundance of small arms from the Cold War era circulating on the shadow economy, as many sought security within clan identities. US and UN humanitarian intervention in early to mid 1990's sought to reconcile the fragmentation of Somalia,

⁵¹ <http://www.ccsu.edu/afstudy/upd1-1.html> Somalia: The Real Background Issues
by Julius O. Ihonvbere

Department of Government, the University of Texas at Austin

⁵² Michael chussodovsky, the globalisation of poverty-impacts of the imf and world bank reform,
(penang, molay, zed books, ltd, 1997, pg104

⁵³ George ayittg, look up, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-205.html>

but was criticised for making the situation worse. Foreign aid gave Somali warlords a greater ability to fund and continue violent offensives. Warlords exchanged aid for small arms upon the shadow economy creating new nodes of authority “it is now understood that the politics of warlordism in Somalia is no more than a logical extension of the Siad Barre’s methods of wielding power.... Aid to Somalia has been part of the problem, not part of the solution.”⁵⁴ Moreover, this has continued as foreign aid capital has been replaced by shadow economic networks.

According to a report in the Somaliland Times the main actors within the Somali conflict centre upon the control of property that enables them to generate, authority and profit through illicit infrastructure⁵⁵. Control of illegitimate airports, markets and bridges that carry a toll allows warlords to make a profit within the power vacuum left by the collapsed state. This makes fighting and power struggle within Somalia dependent upon material investment rather than notions of state building or political power struggle. The profits generated from illicit taxation allows Somali Warlords or businessmen that back the Warlords to buy arms from an endless list of willing sellers through illicit means. UN experts reported to the security council in 2003 that “Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, the Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait have given arms, money or training to Somali factions”⁵⁶ at some point since 1991.

William Reno in a special piece for the Somaliland Times argues that the factors that have brought about the collapse and the continual fragmentation of the Somali state are not purely economical or clan based. He claims that institutions that have lasted the Somali conflict that have created violent and economic authority cannot be traced solely to structures within the collapsing state, ethnic lineage or clan families. Moreover, he claims orthodox structures of authority such as those who control the legal arrangements that exist within Somali society, world economic players and alliances with non state international actors are essential when attempting to understand the unorthodox social evolution of Somalia since the collapse of the state. Such institutions still exercise a degree of control over what and who is considered legitimate, who gets available resources and where coercion is exerted. Not discounting that Somali traders have continued economic and inter-clan networks of trust following the collapse of the state, with Somali scholars identifying at least 67 sub clans from the six major clan families that have formed defensive networks against predation since the 1990s,⁵⁷ making clan lineage not necessarily detrimental to Somalia’s strife. For instance, oral history from the Jabba river valley outlines how loss of elder control over matters of matrimony will lead to disruption- as has been the case, while throughout other regions of Somalia “traditional clan structure ... acted as a framework for identity the settlement of disputes and conflicts, and communal security”⁵⁸. However, it is undeniable that some clan structures have

⁵⁴ Jacqueline Coolidge and Susan Ackerman, “High-level rent-seeking and corruption in African regimes,” *World Bank Documents and Reports*, August 1999 – http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet **look for other quote/reference. think this page has run out.**

⁵⁵ <http://www.somalilandtimes.net/2003/89/8909.shtml>

⁵⁶ <http://www.somalilandtimes.net/2003/89/8909.shtml>

⁵⁷ Part two William reno Somaliland times

⁵⁸ http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_II/issue_3-4/ssereo.pdf

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Clanpolitics, Clan-democracy and Conflict Regulation in Africa: The Experience of

Somalia

Florence Ssereo, Catholic University of Paris

cooperated with violent entrepreneurial-ship activity, as by clan nature not all clan families have the same history or cultural heritage.

As the faltering Barre regime became more repressive in an attempt to hang on to power it led to a fracturing of security that to a large extent created privatised nodes of authority that would make transition to democratic rule more difficult. During the 1980s the regime began to privatise Somalia's economic assets so that they would be tied to the regime, allowing the regime to administer authority through privileged economic networks. An example of this dates back to as early as 1975 when the regime expanded land tenure law, encompassing it in patronage networks, by giving legal legitimacy to those civil servants and businessman that could get government backing. This enabled them to claim traditional clan owned village that were not already being used for commercial farming⁵⁹. This has had an adverse affect especially upon southern inter-clan relations as the law was applied mostly to Southern lands destroying any autonomous traditional authority over resources. The severity of the situation meant that economic power, especially in primary export resources was now tied to a quickly fragmenting state. This has resulted in many of the most violent warlords that emerged post state collapse being part of patronage networks during the regime. An example being, General Mohammed Aydeed, a former elite within the Barre government during the 1980s, that with political backing giving him the authority to administer land in Southern river valleys, provided land on which 'Mooryan' (free lance armed groups), could settle. Moreover, those tied to Aydeed including his principle backer Osman Ato organized the looting of locally owned farmsteads before establishing militia controlled banana plantations that exported to Europe, providing financial support for his violent campaigns in Somalia after the collapse of the state. The already embedded networks of Southern elites meant that much of Northern Somalia was marginalized. However Barre still exercised control in the North through violent means arming Ogadeeni refugees to fight Isaaq communities that were thought to pose a threat to his rule.⁶⁰ The control of those that posed a threat through violent armed groups made clans fight against each other down clan lineage divisions, destroying hope that stable political order would emerge after regime collapse. While illicit trades on the shadow economy promoted the fragmentation of Somalia and authoritative elements that may have had a hand in building a new order.

Rigid divides between communities formed as a result of outsiders disrupting and seizing local lands due to coercive policies created animosity and security dilemmas between communities. This forced people to seek protection from clan militias and outsiders that exploited land and resources to lead long-term violent campaigns and build rigidified ethnic in groups and out groups. Moreover, since the collapse of the regime studies show that very few Somali's have benefited from aid, with agriculture only receiving 22 percent of development spending in the 1980s, the vast majority of which was invested in large scale commercial farming⁶¹ in the South that was dominated by those with links to the Barre regime. The result of such un-equal and deprived spending in many parts of Somalia was that marginalized, disfavoured groups were forced to rely upon the shadow economy. This had a reinforcing affect upon warlords who participated in shadow economy activity to generate revenue for violent struggle.

The link between the Barre regime and patronage networks that dictated who controlled economic resources following the collapse of the regime meant that there

⁵⁹ William reno , Somaliland times , part 3

⁶⁰ William reno , Somaliland times , part 6

⁶¹ William reno , Somaliland times , part 5

was very little space for the emergence of indigenous resistance and traditional nodes of authority to stabilise Somalia. Groups that may have been able to resist the onslaught of 'warlordism' such as the Somali African Muki Organization (SAMO) based within the Shebelle and Jubba valleys representing the Bantu population, do not have the same access to the economic resources that were granted to warlords via patronage networks during the Barre regime. This can be seen as a taking away of responsibility of organized violence from clan division, and instead placing responsibility on regime malpractice. Moreover, it can be argued that a cause for the continuation of conflict in Somalia can actually be traced back to colonial influence that broke with customary networks of trade between what are now competing clans and regions. The same can be said upon the destruction of the traditional authority held by elders that influenced land and marriage arrangements, which helped haze ethnic lineage boundaries.

Chapter 5 Conclusion: A New Hope for Somalia?

This essay has sought to explain why Somalia's collapse had lasted over fifteen years without any successful restoration of central authority with special attention aimed at economic patronage and clan behaviour. It initially discussed that the Barre regimes 21 year reign over Somalia was repressive towards much of the populous creating imbalances in economic growth as development was directed primarily towards Mogadishu and Southern river valleys through a divide and rule policy. This became especially significant when combined with how Cold War politics affected Somalia.

During the Cold War Somalia was pawn of super-power rivalry changing allegiances from the Soviet Union to the US following the catastrophic defeat in the Ogaden War. Importantly during the Cold War period the essay found that very little genuine social development took in Somalia for the populous at large. Instead, Cold War patronage was primarily concerned with the militarisation of society, creating a huge weaponry surplus in Somalia society resulting from the overspill of superpower arms race. Moreover, failed attempts to build a greater Somali nation only increased tensions within the regime and increased inequalities between different social groups.

Following the collapse of the Barre regime intervention in the early 1990s by the international community failed due to widespread inter-clan fighting made worse by a devastating famine and was withdrawn following the horrific deaths of 18 US soldiers. It was not until the events of September 11th and the rise of the UIC that the international community would once again turn its attention towards Somalia in a meaningful way.

Chapter three of the essay started by discussing the theoretical weakness of state authority prior to the collapse of the regime. It was argued that the relatively low population density of Somalia made it difficult to exert control over large swathes of the population, making potential spoiler to peace processes more numerous. It also found the agricultural and petty trade tradition of Somali society was not best suited to the collecting of taxes, stating this would have a knock on effect in decreasing centralised government revenue. Martin Doornbos argued that state collapse was due to a combination of local and global politics that effect social and economic development within the state enabling the creation of illegitimate nodes of authority. While Ali Mazrui exemplifying Doornbos's argument outlined that global politics had played a role in Somalia's collapse outlining that the importation political and social structures imposed during colonialism and Cold War patronage only established narrow roots in state infrastructure. When the essay discussed the authority of the

role of the clan within Somalia Ale de Waal claimed that IMF policies imposed upon Somalia had weakened traditional systems of exchange between different clan groups historically were important for co-dependency and diplomacy between clans via of elders. As chiefs and other traditional elites are able to trace their authority back to pre-colonial times they command a degree of respect that was broken.

When considering the implications for a collapsed state it was claimed that corrupt regime patronage networks aimed at the accumulation of wealth and power prior to the collapse of the state meant that the economic prosperity of ex-regime elites was tied to a greater ability for power entrepreneurship, especially the case when combined with a growing informal cross-border trade. This meant that following the fall of the Barre regime elites involved in the lucrative cross-border trade were able to quickly extend their influence in the power vacuum left by the state. While the lack of social provisions in education and health especially in rural Somalia lessened the capacity for social progress and fluidity between those groups left behind by the warlords. Moreover, the intra-state conflicts that were rampant in Somalia during the demise of the Barre regime were very divisive for inter-group relations.

The essay then examined the change of nature of conflicts that had taken place during the 1990s it outlined that almost all the conflict following the demise of the Barre regime were inter-clan and fought primarily over control of territory and resources funded primarily by the pillaging and looting of rival clan territory. However, Ken Menkhaus, outlined that during the 1990's a split occurred, most significantly in the major Hawiye clan in Mogadishu, that could be claimed to have signified the start of intra-clan conflicts. The prevalence of intra-clan conflicts also caused the re-emergence of traditional based nodes of authority that meant conflict crimes were more likely to be punished either through customary law (xeer) or blood payments (diya).

Chapter four discussed in more detail the expansion of patronage networks and the fragmentation of Somalia. It claimed that the initial policy of the Barre regime of heavily regulating the economy rooted with Barre's socialist doctrine weakened the official economy by causing a flight of revenue into the informal economy. Moreover, it was argued that the political and economic impositions by colonial powers also destroyed traditional trade relations between Somali clans and economic groups, especially between agricultural and livestock traders. Furthermore, the arbitrary drawing of nation state boundaries by colonial powers showed little regard especially to nomadic clans so that enforcement of a heavily regulated formal economy was detrimental to traditional clan networks. Also while colonialism had ruined many of the virtues of traditional clan culture it was found that Cold War aid patronage to the Barre regime was not invested back into development money for clans to adapt to the changing times, but instead spread out amongst regime elites to extend their power and wealth. Such elites then turned themselves to illegal cross-border trade due to erratic border closures, in order to import / export 'qat' and arms.

Finally it was argued that due to the Barre regime by administering authority through privileged economic networks, displacing villages and destroying traditional authoritative power was tied to a quickly fracturing state. Consequentially many of the most violent warlords that emerged after the collapse of the state had been part of the ex-regime patronage networks such as General Mohammed Aydeed. Moreover, Barre's manipulation of inter-clan rivalry in areas of the North of Somalia, arming the Ogadeeni' refugees to fight Isaaq communities, created rigid divisions down clan lines prior to the collapse of the state a many sought security in clan communities. While patronage networks meant there was very little space for alternative node of development of authority.

