FROM ABANDONMENT TO INCLUSION:
The Role of the State in Violence, Public Security and Human Rights in favela communities in Rio de Janeiro
The Case Studies of Santa Marta and City of God

by

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Abstract

Beginning in December of 2008, the State of Rio de Janeiro and federal government of Brazil began a new policy shift in securitizing favela communities. In an effort to combat the city's drug traffickers and prevalent violence, the State began installing "pacification" or "peacekeeping" units in vulnerable favela communities. Following pacification, the State then increases investment in infrastructure and social programs.

This paper will look at the evolving role of the State of Rio de Janeiro in recent years in two specific favela communities: Santa Marta and City of God. As the city prepares to host the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games, preparations mount and the international community awaits to see what Rio is capable of accomplishing in their fight to eliminate the city's famous drug trade and infamous violence. Will these preparations benefit those most marginalized? Or will it continue to push the socially excluded even further into the periphery?

After multiple failed security policies since the 1980s, recent actions and investments show the State's new human rights based approach to security and social and economic investment. Fulfilling its national and international obligations of respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of all citizens while also moving forward on a path of progressive economic and social development, the State of Rio de Janeiro is entering a new era. Its new policies are battling a deeper embedded structural violence while enhancing the capabilities of formerly deprived citizens. Santa Marta and City of God serve as case studies in analyzing the State of Rio de Janeiro, its fulfillment of human rights obligations and its progressive path of economic and social development in favela communities.

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PART I

Introduction

In the opening weeks of March 2011, the streets of Rio de Janeiro were inundated with
revelers and participators of arguably the biggest Carnaval celebration in the world. As
tourists poured in from all over the globe, the city prepared for the influx of international
and domestic visitors. Celebrations and excitement pulsed through every street from
centrally located neighborhoods like Ipanema and Copacabana to the notorious favelas
that intertwine throughout the city to the marginalized outskirts of town. In City of God,
a favela famed for its name and a film released in 2002, *moradores* (community
members) mirrored the celebrations of their more affluent neighbors in the south zone,
organizing events in their local community.

Tony Barros, a local community organizer and photographer in City of God, was
documenting and filming the festivities late one night. Amidst music and celebrations, a
commotion involving moradores and local UPP[1] officers occurred. Tony, a strong
supporter of the local security forces, approached the officers in an effort to mediate the
commotion. Almost immediately and with no explanation, UPP officers seized his

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[1] Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP): translated to Police Pacification Unit is a government led
program in an effort to drive out drug traffickers and install "pacification" units in the most vulnerable,
dangerous favelas in Rio de Janeiro; the program began in 2008.

camera and slammed it to the ground (Barros, 2011; "Imagens Mostram…," *O Globo*, March 2011). As the officers present laughed off the situation, community members dispersed into the late night, upset and frustrated at what seemed to be a play on power by authorities who claim to be present in the community for protection.

Since 2008, City of God, along with about a dozen other favelas in Rio de Janeiro, has been undergoing a pacification process planned and implemented by municipal authorities with the verbal and monetary support of the federal government (http://www.rj.gov.br). In an effort to eliminate drug traffic and violence, the State of Rio de Janeiro sends specialized units, Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE),[2] to drive out drug traffickers and establishes peacekeeping units (UPP) to maintain the calm, yet socially intense environment of favela communities. This effort and strong, original policy change is persistent and continuous since 2008 as the city prepares for even larger influxes of tourists and athletes as the upcoming host of the World Cup in 2014 and the 2016 Olympic Games.

The international community and local residents applaud Rio de Janeiro and the anticipated policy action towards drug traffic and violence. Referred to as Rio de Janeiro's "parallel power"[3] drug traffickers continue to control a majority of the city's favela communities with arms, violence and lucrative money to be earned by its young citizens. Since being "pacified," City of God has – for the most part – become a calm environment of thriving local businesses and family homes. Social services are being established and the presence of State in a once abandoned far away, west zone favela

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[2] Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais: translated to Special Police Operations Battalion, as their website states, police force in Rio de Janeiro that specialize in combating crime in areas of high risk. More info at: http://www.boperj.org/

[3] Multiple reports and journalists refer use the title "parallel power" when referencing Rio's drug trade. See: "Rio de Janeiro, Victimized by Drug Dealers" Amnesty International 7 September 2010

continues to increase. But quietly, discrimination and prejudice continue to build on both sides of the conflict. Personal – or human security – is one of many rights being addressed in Rio de Janeiro's overall changing policy landscape. With State Governor Sergio Cabral at the helm (and with the support of President Lula) and Secretary of Public Security Jose Mariano Beltrame, the State's active and human rights based approach can be seen in new policies. Along with a host of NGOs, the State is attempting to address the staggering inequalities and violence that continue to plague the city of Rio and the entire State of Brazil. Through the establishment of the UPP units in various favela communities, the State of Rio de Janeiro is beginning a new relationship with favela residents and setting new tones that reverberate throughout the entire city.

Just weeks after Tony's camera was broken and the excitement of Carnaval had dissipated, City of God had a first time visitor, President Barack Obama. Videos and pictures show him surrounded by the protective forces of UPP and BOPE while playing soccer with kids from the community and talking to local citizens (Barnes, *Christian Science Monitor,* March 20, 2011; City of God Welcomes Obama, *BBC News*). Much like previous reporting from City of God, the media tends to paint a pretty picture of what changing policy looks like in Rio's most famous favela.[4] However, residents and citizens have a different story to tell. The ambiguity of the State, its responsibilities and what it wishes to accomplish in the coming years continue to be blurred through media coverage and the State's actions. The most affected and confused of all: favela residents. And as media attention rises in the area, the State feels more pressure to perform and finally fulfill the promises and goals they have been making for decades.

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[4] An article by Alexei Barrionuevo in the New York Times highlighted the UPP's "soft touch" approach to security through text and pictures showing officers interacting with children at a daycare in November of 2010. See Appendix.

The continued growth and expanding, progressive social policies of Brazil – in tandem with its GDP – over the past decade cannot be denied. What this paper aims to do is offer a look – on a microlevel – into Brazil and Rio's macro level changing security, economic, social and development policies. The city has battled violence for decades in various unsuccessful campaigns, movements and invasions in favela communities. Instead of building trust and confidence, they shatter hopes and expectations. The city's newest effort, a combination of BOPE forces and UPP units, shows a step in the right direction in reestablishing ties to neglected communities and residents who are referred to and treated as "second class citizens."

Methodology

Research and ideas in this paper draw on my experience from living and working in Rio de Janeiro June 2010 – August 2010 and January 2011. I conducted various informal and formal interviews in multiple favela communities during both stays. Most of these interviews took place in Santa Marta (January 2011) and City of God (June – July 2010). In addition to my work and research in favelas, I also draw upon my personal relationships and experiences outside the communities as well. Interviews and conversations with all residents revolved around the presence of the UPP and what the new security program means to local communities as well as general perceptions of the State of Rio de Janeiro and the federal government of Lula and Dilma.

Analytical Framework

The first section of this paper explores the foundational context of Rio de Janeiro and its history of inequality, marginality and violence in Brazil. I will look at how economic, political and social inequalities stem from centuries of structural violence and how this

violence has effectively created Rio's favela communities in purposeful spatial seclusion as a result of lack of government involvement. Beginning in the 1980s, this structured marginalization resulted in drug trafficking and increased violence in favela communities throughout Rio de Janeiro.

Within this context I will briefly examine past security policy and how the State's fight to rid favelas of drug traffickers and violence has resulted in multiple failures of fulfilling human rights obligations. This section will be within a human rights based framework recognizing the State's obligation to respect, protect and fulfill the rights of all citizens. The State of Rio de Janeiro has implemented multiple policy initiatives since the 1990s – most resulting in higher morbidity and mortality rates and even stronger disdain for government interventions by favela residents. Since 2008 Rio has begun installing UPP units in vulnerable favela communities reflecting a shift in the State's security policy.

Looking at the State's investment in security policy in addition to other social and economic programs in Rio's favela communities, I will use the framework of Amartya Sen's capabilities theory to analyze the State's achievements and setbacks as they seek to alter the social and economic landscape of Rio.[5] Using two favela communities – Santa Marta and City of God – I will evaluate the impact of macro-level policy changes and investment in each community. Focusing on the role of the State in fulfilling its human rights obligations in addition to its role as facilitator in economic and social development,

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[5] Ingrid Robeyns defines the capability approach as "a broad normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies, and proposals about social change in society." "The Capability Approach: a theoretical survey," *Journal of Human Development*, March 2005.

I will analyze whether the social well-being of residents is being affected through the enhancement of capabilities and freedoms.

PART II

Legacy of Violence and the Growth of a City

The growth of Rio de Janeiro

Rio is Brazil's second largest city (behind São Paulo) with a population of over 6 million in its municipality (Perlman *Favela*, 51). Before São Paulo's heavy investment in both industry and finance, Rio was not only the largest city in Brazil (and one of the largest in Latin America) but also served as the federal capital and a cultural epicenter. Changes and growth continue to ebb and flow in the area and are reflected in Rio's current economic, social, political and urban contexts. As inequality and poverty remain a pervasive component in the city's marginalized favelas communities, violence persists throughout the city. According to data supplied by the Ministry of Health in 2002, 94

people die a day due to gun violence in Rio (Phebo, "The Impact of Firearms," 9). Firearms accounted for over 38,000 deaths in 2002 - 90% homicide related (Phebo, 9). Here, in data provided by *The Economist* in June of 2010, one can see Rio's gradual murder rate decrease. But as the title to the chart indicates, the city still has "a way to go" in decreasing overall homicides and violence in the city. The State of Rio de Janeiro and the State of Brazil are fighting the persistent violence through disarmament

campaigns and policy changes, but death tolls continue to plague the landscape of this picturesque city.

Rio's proliferation of guns is just one example of a surface only, but deeply embedded violence. Upon a closer look, one will see that this violence was born and thrives out of the socioeconomic structures established decades ago when Brazilians (predominantly black and mulatto) from the poverty stricken northeast arrived to Rio throughout the twentieth century. With no access to housing and little to no money, these individuals were forced to create temporary homes in the hills of the city. High above the middle and upper class *Cariocas* (people born in the city of Rio) – the economic, political and social exclusion was established in the very literal and very physical distance.

A move from the Northeast to the South

The Portuguese first colonized Brazil in the early 1500s and maintained their active presence until independence in 1826. During the three hundred year period Portugal built major port cities throughout the northeast to export the region's valuable resources including wood, sugar cane and various minerals like gold and diamonds. (It should be noted the Dutch also established a brief colonial empire in the same region in 1630 until the Portuguese and Spanish expelled them in 1654). Portugal was able to sustain these labor-intensive industries by importing up to eight million slaves from across Africa between the 1540 and 1850 (Rocha, "Brazil's Racial Democracy, 19 April 2000). This solid colonial and (extremely profitable) infrastructure pushed Portugal to the forefront of Western Europe's quest to colonize and made them one of the most powerful and wealthiest countries in the world. Enrique Desmond Arias explains Portugal's

decentralized government and how appointed officials in colonial Brazil helped to

establish and the region's structural violence towards African slaves:

> *Political power in Brazil was originally vested in a small number of Capitanias*
> *Donatarias in which the crown gave powerful soldiers and nobles near-*
> *plenipotentiary power over vast swaths of territory. The Portuguese took a very*
> *long time to set up any sort of official bureaucratic administration. This vested*
> *legal force in a very small number of colonists, who used that power to extract*
> *wealth from the land and from the other settlers. This, combined with the African*
> *slave trade, led to the emergence of a system in which an immense amount of*
> *coercive violence came form the hands of a few private actors* (20).

Today Brazil has the largest black population outside the continent of Africa. The racial,

political and economic hierarchy established in Brazil's early colonial development

remains a pervasive element in the development and current social structures of the

northeast and the south. Racism, discrimination and social exclusion continue to be the

Afro-Brazilian population's largest and most difficult obstacle in reaching economic,

political and social equality.

Salvador da Bahia served as Brazil's colonial and economic capital and center for

slave trade for over three hundred years. Together with Recife, Fortaleza and other

strategically placed northeast cities on the Atlantic coast, Salvador was the colony's

economic and cultural stronghold. After Brazil's independence (1826), removing the

federal capital to Rio in 1822 and the abolishment of slavery (1888) the region fell into

heavy poverty due to lack of industry, economic growth and capital. Inhabitants began

their slow, consistent migration to the south. Coming alone or going in groups, people

from the northeast left all that they knew to forge new paths of economic opportunity in

southern cities like Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Porto Alegre.

Favela: the birth

Documents show the name and use of the word *favela* began after thousands of soldiers hired by the central government of Brazil returned to Rio from the Battle of Canudos in Bahia in 1897. After defeating a group of rural settlers labeled as "monarchists," they arrived to Rio's shores, left without housing or payment for their service. In their social and spatial limbo, the men took refuge on a hill near the port in tents and shacks. It is here (most believe) that Rio's first favela, Providência, was born.

Throughout the twentieth century, Rio's urban population skyrocketed as the city became not only the political capital, but moved to the forefront of economic, cultural and industrial development. Migration between 1950 and 2000 quadrupled the urban population of Rio with over five million people in the urban area as of 2009 (Perlman *Favela*, 52.). Most arrived from the northeast and settled in already present favelas or began building their own communities throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Settlement, industrialization and cheap labor increased throughout the 1960s and 70s, and the federal and state government looked the other direction as favela communities proliferated throughout the city's hills. Today, "Rio has over 1000 favelas and the largest favela population of all Brazilian cities," numbering over a million residents in 2009 (Perlman *Favela*, 52).

Based on the migration patterns of residents, favelas were majorly comprised of people of Afro-Brazilian descent from the northeast. As Brazil and Rio continued to grow, the presence of the State was either hesitant, inactive or highly disorganized as squatter settlements and temporary housing quickly grew. From the beginning the State of Rio de Janeiro's lack of involvement and neglect of favela communities is made

clearly apparent. The poverty stricken groups from the northeast responsible for creating the squatter settlements that would eventually evolve into favelas were offered no other alternatives by the federal or municipal governments. Discriminated and socially excluded because of their origins and race, structural violence established in Brazil's colonial foundation controlled the fate and marginalization of the displaced communities. Government entities refused to act on the part of these new, urban citizens but did manage to exploit the vulnerable populations in cheap labor as the city invested in various sectors of industrialization throughout the 1950s and 60s.

Favela: the people

Often referred to as Rio's second-class citizens, residents of favelas now make up ¼ of the urban population of Rio – over 1 million people (Perlman *Favela*, 52). Culturally, they are much like their wealthier neighbors, speaking with the same local accent and sharing a love of samba. However, unlike those neighbors, most favela residents earn lower wages (usually below the State minimum) and have limited access to health care and education. Race and discrimination play key factors in favela residents and their continual fight to climb out of poverty. In a study done by Valéria Pero she concluded, "Rio has the lowest rates of social mobility among all the metropolitan regions of Brazil" (Perlman *Favela*, 52). In Rio, the two most important determinants of social stature are based on race and address. The socioeconomic divisions are stark and clear between social classes throughout the city. Research and data show that residents of favelas are consistently discriminated against in school, hospitals and in the workplace.[6]

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[6] Graphs are provided in the Appendix from the Inter-American Development Bank.

Exclusion: Economic, Social, Political and Spatial

Since the settlement of favela communities, residents have been victims of government-enforced evictions in addition to the complete lack of government facilities and resources in the communities. This pervasive social exclusion from social programs and the overall mentality of the residents of Rio de Janeiro is reflected in residents and their fatalistic view of the world outside the favela. Unable to get respectable jobs or earn solid incomes, the economic inequality of Rio de Janeiro's citizens becomes a point of contention between social classes throughout the city. When you ask residents of favelas their opinion on the State of Rio de Janeiro, many respond with "they forgot about us long ago." After the federal capital moved to Brasilia in 1960 and Brazil's heavy investment in industry shifted to São Paulo, Rio's economic stature began to wane as poverty and inequality increased in the city's favelas and jobs and economic growth slowed.

Since the election of Lula in 2002 and his successor Dilma Rousseff in 2010 and the rise of the Worker's Party, (*Partido Trabalhador – PT*) residents of favelas are more optimistic and growing to trust the government again. After decades of corruption and being taken advantage of, they are using their strength in numbers to create vibrant and active civil society groups. Despite these positive steps in active political participation and involvement, the communities still feel economically and socially marginalized. This marginalization is made extremely apparent in the physical location of many favelas. In the 1960s, the city government forcibly removed communities from south Rio or *Rio Sul* (Ipanema, Copacabana and other middle class neighborhoods) to government-built, planned housing in the western and northern zones of Rio. This physical distance

allowed the government to not only make room for urban development in the strategically placed south zone, but also created a literal and figurative distance between the middle-upper class neighborhoods and the low-income favela residents.

Beginning in the 1980s, this physical and social marginalization became a breeding ground for the city's vulnerable populations. As other Latin American countries began the creation, shipment and selling of drugs, Rio became one of the most strategic port cities in the supply demand chain. Lack of federal and municipal State intervention opened up Rio to become one of the largest exporters of drugs in the world. The economic, social and spatial exclusion allowed residents of favelas who were fed up with the State's neglect to begin profiting from the drug industry's major growth in the 1980s and 90s. As social safety nets and State involvement waned in Rio's favelas, economic opportunity began to reveal itself in more lucrative forms. It is no surprise due to lack of State intervention, economic and social neglect and political exploitation that residents of favelas were forced to turn to informal markets in order to provide for their families.

> *But the experience of suffering, it's often noted, is not effectively conveyed by statistics or graphs. In fact, the suffering of the world's poor intrudes only rarely in the consciousness of the affluent, even when our affluence may be shown to have a direct relation to their suffering. This is true even when spectacular human rights violations are at issue, and it is even more true when the topic at hand is the everyday violation of social and economic rights* (Farmer *Pathologies of Power*, 31).

Farmer's quote from *Pathologies of Power* concisely sums up the suffering from complete deprivation of freedoms – economic, social, cultural, political and civil – of the favela residents of Rio de Janeiro. This deprivation results in heavy loss of human dignity of favela residents. Consistently marginalized and pushed to the periphery, they are unable to realize their rights because of social and economic exclusion. In this way,

structural violence is something these communities experience in actions and public consciousness every day. It prevents them from obtaining dignified work or earning a fair wage. In response to this inward violence, an outward violence has erupted in these communities. In an effort to earn decent wages and respect in their community, young boys continue to join the enticing drug trade in hopes of high incomes.

Theories on Violence

As mentioned above, historical foundations heavily intertwine and affect the embedded violence of Rio de Janeiro and its favelas. Inequality (i), exclusion (ii) and violence (iii) each interrelate to control the fate of residents (Moser *Encounters with Violence*, Chapter 1). Various academics have analyzed Brazil, its history and social patterns through ethnographic research exploring one or all of these topics in individual attempts to identify and understand Brazil's past and future. Two of the most notable are Janice Perlman with her books *Myth of Marginality* and *Favela* (2000) and Nancy Scheper-Hughes's *Death Without Weeping* (1993). In each work, the authors establish the foundations of violence in Brazil and its social, economic and political development throughout the twentieth century. Because violence has played such an integral role in the developing landscape of Rio, it is important to understand the theory of structural violence favela residents have been subjected to for decades.

Systematically and deliberately, Brazil, its infrastructures and government have excluded those of African descent – people of favelas – from participating as active citizens, preventing them from realizing their full potential and exercising their freedoms. This structural violence that has pushed this population to the periphery of Rio served as the catalyst for the outward, street violence that erupted inside favelas beginning in the

1980s. Poor and desperate to feed families, drug traffickers and their lucrative earnings proliferated. After decades, the State is now attempting to quell drug violence – with UPP forces - and eventually eliminate the structural violence by implementing programs and infrastructures with the specific aim and label of "social inclusion."

Structural Violence

"Violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations."
-Johan Galtung

In "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research" (1969) Johan Galtung writes about the ideas of personal versus structural violence. Correlations and relationships of the two different types of violence are presented in varying examples establishing the idea that personal violence focuses on the physical – a direct effect on human beings. Compared to structural violence which exhibits indirect consequences on human beings through repressive structures (78). In the case of Rio, this would be the absence of State in providing social services like schools, health clinics or even recognizing people's land or home tenure to their homes in favelas. His analogy illustrates the distinction:

Personal violence represents change and dynamism - not only ripples on waves, but waves on otherwise tranquil waters. Structural violence is silent, it does not show - it is essentially static, it is the tranquil waters. In a static society, personal violence will be registered, whereas structural violence may be seen as about as natural as the air around us (173).

These tranquil waters are Rio de Janeiro. The middle and upper classes choose to completely ignore the existence of favelas and their residents – despite daily interactions between the groups. As presented in the historical background, structural violence is a part of the permanent makeup of Rio de Janeiro and Brazilian history. Discrimination and lack of agency on the part of the marginalized has created the idea that their

exploitation or even death can be seen as a normal sequence of events because the foundations of structural violence in their history. In Rio through the drug traffickers, police and residents the crossroads of personal and structural violence meet. Guns and artillery are affronts and have direct, physical forms of personal violence. While lack of State intervention in this violence, neglect of investment in physical infrastructure for schools and health clinics represent and the overall acceptance shows structural violence.

Galtung relates physical and psychological violence as distinct and equally forceful concepts as well. And again, the history of people in favelas combined with their place of living makes it easy for the State and other actors to impose physical and psychological violence. Through weapons and intimidation, the use of physical and psychological violence has eternal effects on favela residents and their sense of dignity. Even in now relatively calm, pacified communities, residents voice their fears of the State removing their funding and peacekeeping forces reverting the community back to the control of the drug traffickers and the fear of civil war. Built into the economic and social infrastructures of Rio, this deeply embedded structural violence will continue to permeate the memories and psyche of favela residents for years to come.

Violence in Brazil

Janice Perlman's research over the decades helped to identify through qualitative and quantitative research the effects of marginalization and poverty on Rio's favela residents. Within an urban context, Perlman's research shows how marginalized communities deal with being pushed to the periphery of Rio's wealthier neighborhoods. Perlman's stories and first hand observations conducted since the 1970s further establish the economic, social and political structural violence that favela residents fight to

overcome on a daily basis. Another author has also done extensive research on violence in Brazil. Approaching the subject from the rural perspective, Nancy Scheper-Hughes's *Death Without Weeping* illustrates the author's theory of *everyday violence* in the northeast region of Pernambuco. Studying maternal mortality in a rural village, Scheper-Hughes introduces the idea of expected violence through loss of child on a daily basis. This everyday violence then affects the expectations of mothers and families as they begin to expect and anticipate child deaths. The title of the book is emblematic of what Afro-Brazilian women are challenged with on a daily basis. Poverty and exclusion keeps the small community from necessary health care, food and dignified work. This same everyday violence that has shaped the mothers of Pernambuco can also be seen in the violence of Rio's favelas. Scheper-Hughes's interpretation of violence in Brazil's rural northeast offers another a different angle of structural violence and its effects on poor, marginalized Afro-Brazilian women.

Urban Violence

The establishment and control by drug traffickers in the communities has altered and controlled the psyche of Rio's entire population. In response to lack of State involvement, exclusion and lack of employment opportunities, violence has rooted itself in Rio's favelas. After decades, now, violence is not only born out of marginalization but has become a learned and taught activity (Moser and McIlwaine, *Encounters with Violence*, Chapter 1). Moser and McIlwaine explore the growth of violence in urban Latin America. Citing the structural precursors mentioned before, favela violence and drug traffic is born out of lack of access to education, dignified employment and other necessary social programming and outlets for at risk, vulnerable youth. Moser and

McIlwine elaborate on how youth in urban areas are at a higher risk to be involved with gangs, drugs or other activities associated with violence (*Encounters with Violence*, 7). The authors also point out the possible effects of neoliberal reform on already marginalized, impoverished communities,

> *Increased levels of violence have also been identified as closely associated with the two interrelated processes of globalization and neoliberalism. Thus, it is argued that not everyone has benefited from increasing global interconnectedness and greater global volumes of trade and capital mobility, with many losers now identified. As Castells argues, the ongoing processes of polarization and differentiation between those who are "connected," and those who are not, increasingly overlap with the spatial segregation and economic differentiation of disadvantaged groups, neighborhoods or even cities. Those excluded from 'connectivity' to the dynamic new sectors (through lack of education or infrastructure) are more likely to turn to crime, violence and a drugs culture* (14).

Macro-level economic policy implemented throughout Latin America, most notably the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, took heavy tolls on already poor populations. With the macro-level goal of decreasing external debts and internal expenditure, cutting social spending became one of the easiest policy implementations. And while this aided national budgets across the region, those already on the economic and social periphery were pushed further out. Thus, it is not accidental that neoliberal policies of the 1990s coincided with Rio's firm establishment and rise in violence.

Theories on violence determine differences in how it presents itself in varying urban settings. This can include violence inside the home versus on the street. In the street, drug traffickers are identified as *the perpetrator* and community residents as *the victim(s)*. Another interpretation of this would also consider police officers (Civil or Military Police) as the perpetrators as well. Perpetrators are those that cause or instigate the violence and community residents are those that suffer the consequences. This victimization not only puts residents lives at stake (and also takes the lives of innocent

people) but it completely deprives them of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. The powerlessness that violence renders favela residents, bereft of basic human rights, is shown in the citizens and their complete lack of agency. They, their choices and actions are at the discretion of the drug traffickers. Observing this through the lens of Sen and the capabilities approach, the capabilities of these citizens are completely arrested, stagnant and labeled *unfreedoms*. This stagnation not only affects these communities on a micro-level in regards to participation and involvement, but it also has affects Rio, Brazil and Latin America on a macrolevel.

How lack of agency, powerlessness and violence affects economic development

As Moser and McIlwine mention in their text, violence in individual communities can have greater effects on Latin America and its economic development. Other texts explore the idea of economic development and violence as well.[7] A recent report released by the World Bank in April 2011 regarding violence and drug trafficking in Central America states: "Crime and violence also drag down economic growth in significant ways. Aside from victims lost wages and labor, high crime rates harm investment climates and divert scarce government resources to strengthen law enforcement rather than promote economic activity." (World Bank Group, April 2011).

In the case of Rio, the combination of violence and marginalization presents itself in unprecedented direct and indirect economic costs. Direct costs of violence are defined as expenditures in the justice system (employing different types of military and civil police forces, prison systems, temporary incarceration) and health system (hospital visitations, emergency room, triage). Indirect costs of violence could be defined as an

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[7] *Los Desafíos Institucionales*, this text shows uses data to show how violence in Latin America has a direct effect on economic growth and output.

increase in morbidity and mortality rates (Moser and McIlwane). Violence takes a heavy

toll on a community's economic development and ultimately the country and region's

greater economic development and growth. In addition to this pervasive violence, Rio's

favelas have prevented the participation and exercising of freedoms by many residents

and heavily contributed to their social, economic, political and special exclusion.

Overview of Structural Violence in Rio

Powerlessness has invaded the lives of favela residents and their consciousness for

decades.   Lack of agency and denial of human rights are just two outcomes that a

favela's exclusion, inequality and violence create. As the history of Brazil and Rio de

Janeiro has demonstrated, structural violence has helped to define and draw the lines of

Rio de Janeiro and its growth of population and city. Socially, politically, economically

and spatially – structural violence has drawn the lines of Rio, differentiating between

favela and asfalto. Discrimination, fear and prejudice have colored the picture in.

> **Social:** schools, health clinics and other social spending has been historically
> nonexistent for decades in Rio's favelas; this is one of the international
> community's and local residents' biggest critiques and infuriation.
> **Political:** political leaders for decades have exploited the vote of favela residents;
> making promises and ultimately leaving communities with less than they had
> before; clientelism is one of Rio's rampant problems in favelas.[8]
> **Economic:** excluded from the formal job market, most favela residents found it
> hard to locate dignified work post industrialization and after the State capital was
> removed; many became involved in the informal market and many earn below the
> minimum wage.
> **Spatial:** due to lack of State intervention and ineffective policy, favelas and their
> residents quickly grew on hillsides and the outskirts of town throughout the
> twentieth century (and still today); resettlement programs of the 1960s and 1970s
> as well helped to divide the city between middle-class/wealthy and poor.

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[8] As Arias mentions in post military regime Brazil (1970s), "Elections once again sent politicians into
favelas in search of votes, and residents began to draw on old-style political networks for assistance. As in
the 1950s, most of these efforts were clientelist in nature, with politicians trying to set up an asymmetrical
relationship of dependence with residents in order to ensure votes over the course of many elections." p 27

Policy Analysis

A human rights based approach to security policy

As signatories to the ICCPR and ICESCR, the State of Brazil agrees to respect, protect

and fulfill and "progressively realize" the rights of all citizens.[9] This idea goes on to

incorporate the idea of non-retrogression in the sense that States must continue to move

forward in the progression of fully realizing rights. For instance, if the State of Rio de

Janeiro introduces an UPP unit in a favela community, thereby protecting the safety of its

citizens, they cannot then close it because of a surge in violence or lack of funds. They

must continue to realize the rights of their citizens by moving forward in maintaining safe

favela communities. Article II of the ICESCR also goes on to say, "the rights enunciated

in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind." This idea

of progressive realization and nondiscrimination play key roles in the role of the State in

respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of citizens. Using the guidelines of *respect*,

protect and *fulfill*, I will analyze where the State of Rio de Janeiro failed to uphold their

international obligations in implementing new security policy. The definitions from

which I will be working are:

> **The Obligation to Respect** entails that governments shall refrain from any action
> which infringes on rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, or which
> prevents persons from satisfying these rights for themselves when they are able to
> do so.

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[9] In 1988, Brazil ratified their federal constitution after almost twenty years of military dictatorship. Within
a human rights framework, the government created one of the most progressive legal documents in Brazil's
history. Despite the retrogressive period of military dictatorship, Brazil was one of the original signatories
on the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 with other partner countries. Following on its
initial path in 1948, within five years of writing and amending their own Constitution in 1988, the federal
government also signed and ratified multiple international treaties: The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights – ICCPR (1992); The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights -
ICESCR (1992); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) and other international covenants and
treaties. Their signatures recognize their obligations as duty-bearers to respect, protect and fulfill the rights
of their citizens. As a municipality of Brazil, the State of Rio de Janeiro, is held by international agreement
to uphold the treaties and covenants the State has signed and ratified.

The Obligation to Protect entails that governments must protect persons within their jurisdiction from violations of their human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, by non-State actors, including businesses and international financial institution. The obligation to protect is also immediate and is not subject to progressive realization.

The Obligation to Fulfill entails that governments must progressively realize the full enjoyment of all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, to persons within their jurisdiction. For example, governments must provide adequate and effective health care and continually strive to improve health care for all…. Some aspects of the obligation to fulfill are subject to progressive realization. Other aspects, however, are immediate, including the obligation to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures toward the full realization of these rights (Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *Amnesty International*).

International Attention

Since the 1990s, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other international and national NGOs have published a number of reports on police and other forms of security violence in Rio de Janeiro and greater Brazil.[10] The combination of these publications, media coverage and escalating violence attracted international attention and brought multiple visits (2008 and 2010) from Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. Alston's visits were in response to the growth of impunity inside Rio's police and military forces with respect to killing drug traffickers and innocent civilians in favelas. Because residents of favelas are regarded as "second-class citizens" they are therefore seen as dispensable - and sometimes the enemy - to poorly trained, poorly paid military and civil police officers. This section will briefly describe Rio's changing policy platform in regards to public safety in the favelas since

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[10] "Changing This Deadly Scenario: Demand Dignity in Brazil's Favelas." *Amnesty International*, May 2009; "Brazil: Violence in Rio de Janeiro – a Challenge for Change." Public Statement from *Amnesty International*, 9 November 2009; "Fighting Violence with Violence: Human Rights Abuse and Criminality in Rio de Janeiro"; *Human Rights Watch* Vol. 8, January 1996, "Police Brutality in Urban Brazil." *Human Rights Watch/Americas*, April 1997.

the 1990s. Each wave of security policy, or lack thereof, shows the State's continual neglect in respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of favela residents.

Stray Bullets and Collateral Damage

Efforts to thwart drug trafficking in the favelas was largely responded to by the State sporadically and violently starting in the 1990s. Reports on Rio's security from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International show the State's lack of tact in implementation and utter disregard for the rights of favela residents. Whether favela residents were shot point blank or hit by a stray bullet, most deaths – accidental or not – were viewed as a necessary step in the war on drug traffickers. Within this organized, government led, funded violence, at the heart were – and still are – innocent civilians caught in the middle of a civil war. Indifferent political leaders throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s in Rio have disregarded this violence by further funding military and civil teams with the necessary equipment to lead charges and invasions. These invasions go as: forces enter violently in order to "capture" drug traffickers or "drive them out." The invasions usually result in lost lives of both sides. The State's actions of the early 1990s through the 2000s are most noted for their military-like invasion tactics followed by quick removal. These short-lived invasions - while sometimes successful in capturing or killing drug traffickers – left intense collateral damage in their wake. Lives of women and children were lost and an even more vulnerable community remained after government forces left. International media has criticized Rio's violent police actions for decades, while local outlets – due to discrimination and prejudice - tend to disregard the events entirely.

These government funded, approved invasions into favela communities show the State of Rio de Janeiro's failure to ***respect*** and ***protect*** the rights of citizens. Responsible

for instigating the violence and its escalation, the actions of civil and military police forces put residents in the middle of dangerous situations. Various reports and media sources write about captured and killed drug traffickers in addition to the loss of innocent lives. The State's involvement in these poorly planned and executed invasions shows their failure in implementing a policy which would respect, protect and fulfill the rights and lives of local residents while also successfully capturing drug traffickers and preventing further violence. The State's actions directly infringe on the rights of citizens, thereby failing to respect their rights. And by only contributing to violence with the drug traffickers, the State is also failing to protect citizens from a third party – and from themselves.

Despite weak policy in regards to public security in favelas, some political leaders attempted to break tradition and implement new, human rights based security methods in favelas. Leonel Brizola (1983-1986; 1991-1994) and Anthony Garotinho (1999-2002) were two State governors who attempted to reform the police forces and establish the respect for rights of *all* citizens in congruence with the 1988 Brazilian Constitution and international treaties. With lack of internal support and heavy criticism from various internal actors, ultimately the governors failed in fulfilling their promises of establishing well trained, well funded military and civil police forces. And completely deviating from his original policy platform, during Garotinho's tenure as governor, a notorious new security method was introduced into Rio's favelas – the *caveirão* – arguably the most intense of security investments.

The Militarization of Security: Introduction of the "caveirão"

The *caveirão* – or big skull – is a military vehicle the State of Rio de Janeiro began

investing and implementing in the mid 2000s. In a report released by Amnesty

International in 2006, the NGO explained Rio's newest method in securitizing favelas

and fighting drug traffickers:

> *The caveirão is a security van that has been adapted into military-style assault*
> *vehicle. The word caveirão literally means "big skull" - a reference to the*
> *emblem of the Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE), which is*
> *prominently displayed on the side of the vehicle. Among the modifications made*
> *to the original security vans are a turret, able to rotate through 360 degrees, and*
> *rows of firing positions running along each side of the body of the van. The*
> *caveirão can carry up to 12, heavily-armed officers. Built to resist high-powered*
> *weapons and explosives, the caveirão has two layers of armoury, as well as a*
> *steel grill for protecting windows when under heavy fire. Its tyres are coated with*
> *a glutinous substance which prevents punctures. Its four doors lock automatically*
> *and cannot be opened from the outside – two escape hatches, one out of the turret*
> *and the other in the floor can be used in emergencies. Although it weighs around*
> *8 tons, the caveirão can reach speeds of up to 120km an hour. So far, the Rio*
> *authorities have bought 10 caveirões, at a cost of R$135,000 each (approx.*
> *US$62,000), to police Rio's shanty towns, with plans to increase the fleet in the*
> *coming years* ("We have come to take your souls," Amnesty International).

The piece further emphasizes the use of the caveirões as a method of intimidation and its

ultimate effects as an extremely dangerous security measure in vulnerable favela

communities. After multiple negative reports and heavy criticism from human rights

NGOs, the use of the caveirões has diminished over the last few years. However because

of the economic investment in the vehicles, Secretary of Public Security, José Mariano

Beltrame, stated that they would continue to be used in necessary situations and some

invasions. These investments in armored military vehicles show the State's ineptitude

and neglect of favela communities. Rather than investing in policy like more thorough

training for the field, increasing salaries and offering incentives for low-ranking officers

who are vulnerable to corruption, the State chose to approach security by militarizing it and making all favela residents feel like the enemy. By treating all residents like criminals in using this method of security, the State is only perpetuating the systematic isolation of favelas.

In an effort to fulfill the rights of citizens – investing in tank-like security measures – military forces not only failed to respect and protect the rights of citizens but further reinforced the physical distance between favela residents and the State. And amidst this failed policy transition, these machines only contributed to more civilian deaths – directly failing to respect the lives and rights of citizens. While the State claims investments in the caveirões were to increase security measures in favelas, the violence these machines rendered failed – once again – to respect and protect the rights of its citizens. Caveirões and their implementation reflect Rio's structural, systematic violence and further nurture government distrust inside these communities.

This violence in security reflects Rio's systematic structural violence towards people in favelas and further deepens the divide between residents and government employees. The anonymity that caveirões offer further adds to the State's propensity of corruption and violence because police officers inside the vehicles cannot be identified due to the heavy armor. This abuse of power is not the first of the State government's in recent years of favela public security. Since the mid-2000s, bribery and coercion have become a new method of "security" executed by self-appointed *milícias* (militias). Off duty police officers, firefighters and former military officers have begun to establish independent security forces in favelas plagued by drug and police violence.

Informal Security: the Emergence of Milícias

Charging residents taxes for "protection" from drug traffickers, police or both, *milícias* present another "power" to be dealt with by the State.[11] While milícias are not a formal policy move by the State of Rio de Janeiro, the subsequent effects of these groups further represent the State's need for serious security implementation in vulnerable favela communities. And because of the presence of milícias and their heavy infiltration into the local government through corruption, coercion and bribery, the State has now had to implement new policy in reaction to their creation and the violence they render. This shift of corrupt power and emergence of milícias is made possible because of the State's neglect in addressing police corruption and violence. Because the State continues to neglect favela communities the presence of militias is not only made possible, but is profitable and easy work for underpaid, neglected State employees. Residents consider the militias to be even more dangerous than drug traffickers in many instances because of their government paid positions and inclination to use violence to extract payments and "taxes" for the delivery or gas, water or electricity to the community. The vulnerability of favela residents to these groups is palpable in favela communities. The presence of milícias delegitimizes the central government and its quest to rid favelas of drug traffic and violence.

Within this policy measure, the State's obligation to respect, protect and fulfill the rights of its citizens can be seen as completely devoid. Because the State is not present in many violent favela communities, the void has been filled by drug traffickers and in newer cases, milícias. This neglect is a failure to deliver on the promises and obligations

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[11] For more information and human rights reports, see "Challenging Brazil's Milicias: Marcelo Freixo and members of the parliamentary commission of inquiry" *Amnesty International*, October 2008; "Report on Rio's milicias is only the first step," *Amnesty International* 21 November 2008

that bind Brazil and the State of Rio de Janeiro in various international treaties and covenants. Milícias directly undercut and delegitimize the State's presence with regards to security and protecting the lives of favela residents, making the idea and path of progressive realization even more distant than it was previously.

Accountability of Security Forces

Rio's challenges with security in favelas are plagued by police corruption and bribery. Low-ranking officers admit to also feeling vulnerable and disrespected in the communities they work in because of lack of training and equipment. In *Living in the Crossfire*, Alves and Evanson explain the deep-seeded roots in police corruption in regards to favela security citing that most officers themselves come from favela communities. Most low-ranking officers are poorly paid and forced to hide their occupation in fear of retaliation from their own community or local drug traffickers. In reforming Rio's security forces, as Alves and Evanson point out, the government must also take into account the challenges of the officers as well and the violence from which they are born and reside.

Alves and Evanson explore Rio's new investment in civil and military police reform. PRONASCI (National Program for Public Security and Citizenship) is currently funding programs like education scholarships for low-ranking officers who wish to grow in a professional capacity and investments in expanding recreation and health services to officers (128-129). Across the State of Rio de Janeiro in one day, 150,000 people enrolled in online public security training courses (128). These investments in officers and personnel show the State's commitment to altering the violence that has come to identify Rio's security forces.

In 2008, Philip Alston wrote in his report upon his first trip to Brazil:

States have an obligation to protect their citizens by preventing and punishing criminal violence. But this obligation goes together with the state's duty to ensure respect for the right to life of all citizens…. The people of Brazil did not struggle valiantly against 20 years of dictatorship, nor did they adopt a federal Constitution dedicated to restoring respect for human rights, only in order to make Brazil free for police officers to kill with impunity in the name of security (Mission to Brazil, 2)*.*

These communities experienced a surge in violence because of an effort to fight drug traffickers, but the police failed to respect and protect the communities they were entering. This federal and municipal negligence can be drawn back to the structural violence and discrimination that plagues favela communities. These citizens are labeled as second-class and therefore dispensable – collateral damage. These victims are seen as a necessary sacrifice in the fight against drug traffic. The federal and municipal levels of government are responsible to respect, protect and fulfill the rights of their citizens from unnecessary acts of violence committed by police and military. Civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights are inherently connected in living a dignified life. After decades of steady violence, Rio's newest policy implementation finally reflects the State's promise to respect, protect and fulfill the rights of its most marginalized citizens, thus making a needed push in the direction of social inclusion and breaking down the walls of established structural violence.

Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP): A new policy approach

After decades of failed policy that only increased morbidity and mortality rates, the State of Rio de Janeiro announced and implemented its inaugural program, *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (UPP). State Governor Sergio Cabral and Secretary of Public Security José Mariano Beltrame are working in tandem to change the face of public security in Rio

through an all new approach which centers around peace. The scenario goes as: if a favela community is being controlled by drug traffickers, first the BOPE enters (usually violently) with the intent of capturing as many drug traffickers as possible. These invasions can result in innocent deaths and drug traffickers escaping and taking refuge in other vulnerable favela communities. Nevertheless, once BOPE has done their part the UPP then establishes posts in different parts of the community to ensure no drug traffickers return.

Rio is the first city to implement what is being referred to as "peacekeeping" or "pacifying" efforts. Correlations and connections can be made to the United Nations and their peacekeeping programs. Brazil currently accounts for a large portion of U.N. peacekeeping troops, most notably its mission in Haiti, the third largest in the world with over 13,000 Brazilian men and women present since 2004 ("Brazil and Peacekeeping" *The Economist*, Sept 23, 2011). Soldiers for both the U.N. and UPP are trained side by side in a facility outside the city of Rio de Janeiro. This intense training and all together paradigm shift not only shows Brazil's changing policy and desire in establishing security at home, but also reflects their investment in security abroad.

The combination of BOPE and UPP has quelled the fears of the average middle class Carioca citizen, who hope that the new policy will eliminate the city's drug trade and violence. This new effort in combating drug traffic and violence is specific to Rio (no other city in Brazil or the world has established anything similar prior) and hopes to prepare the city of its upcoming international events while also permanently shifting the city's established and infamous violence of the last three decades. In the coming years, the international community can anticipate heavy policy analysis of Rio's program and

intense discourse on the positive and negative aspects of BOPE and UPP and their new presence in Rio's favelas. While some human rights NGOs have begun to analyze the situation, various media outlets have helped to build upon the popularity and notoriety of these BOPE and UPP soldiers.

The catalyst for this program can be identified in the cooperation between federal and municipal authorities throughout the mid-2000s. The Lula government worked closely with State Governor Cabral in selecting José Mariano Beltrame as Secretary of Public Security (Alves and Evanson, 126). Beltrame's twenty-six years experience with the federal police and the cooperation between Lula's central government and Governor Cabral mark a strong shift from various political angles in reforming public security in Rio de Janeiro. For the first time in decades Rio's UPP programs in vulnerable favelas show the State's (and central government's) commitment to improving and including these communities in the Rio landscape – socially, economically, politically and spatially.

The new methods, with a human rights based approach, also aim to respect, protect and fulfill the rights of citizens, thus the State is finally beginning to fulfill its international (ICCPR and ICESCR) and national obligations (Brazilian Constitution). With each pacification program implemented, the State closely follows with establishing health clinics, schools and other social safety nets in previously neglected areas thus progressively realizing the economic and social rights of citizens. The first favela pacified in 2008 was Santa Marta, a notoriously violent hillside favela located in the south zone of the city below the famous Christ statue and just above Botafogo, a highly populated, middle class neighborhood. City of God was the city's second choice in the pilot pacification program.

Santa Marta and City of God serve as original case studies in the State of Rio de Janeiro's pilot program in the peacekeeping process in favelas. The State's actions in Santa Marta and City of God show a shift in development policy with a human rights based approach. By establishing UPP units that use methods of peacekeeping rather than tanks and heavy artillery, the State is fulfilling its international obligations in respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of favela residents. In addition to peacekeeping units, the State is also responsible for implementing heavy economic and social investments in the communities post pacification. These actions show the State progressively realizing the rights of citizens while also building confidence in the once neglected communities.

While Santa Marta and City of God are referred to and labeled as "favela," a number of differences arise in each community's needs and circumstances. In order to better understand the nuances between Santa Marta and City of God, it is important to establish the social, urban, economic and political contexts of these two distinct favela communities and their respective level of State involvement.

Using Sen's five instrumental freedoms I will show how the role of the State is expanding the capabilities of favela residents with the new UPP programs and subsequent economic and social investments. The following case studies will highlight the State of Rio de Janeiro's investments and how past *unfreedoms* due to violence have been transformed into *freedoms*. This transformation marks a new era in Rio as communities and their residents (through government invested infrastructure and social inclusion programs) are transformed into active citizens and become a part of the country's greater economic development.

PART III

Santa Marta, City of God and expansion of "Freedoms"

"Development can be seen, it is argued here, as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy." – Amartya Sen

Since 2008, the State of Rio de Janeiro has become actively involved in formerly neglected, violent favela communities (as the first section established). The State's recent activities in development and human rights mark a new era for the role of State in Rio de Janeiro and the opportunity to erode centuries of structural violence. Using the theories of Amartya Sen as written about in *Development as Freedom* in 2000, I would like to look at the role of the State's UPP program and the subsequent social programming and economic investments made thereafter in Santa Marta and City of God.

Sen and Capabilities

Amartya Sen's approach to development is based on the idea of expanding freedoms and capabilities, meaning "evaluations and policies should focus on what people are able to do and be, on the quality of their life, and on removing obstacles in their lives so that they have more freedom to live the kind of life that, upon reflection, they have reason to value." (Robeyns, 94). Sen and his capabilities approach (and his collaborations) have been expanded upon by economists, philosophers and others.[12] He establishes that a person's freedom(s) comes not from doing, but from being able to *choose*. Sen's human rights based approach states that by empowering citizens

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[12] See Vizard, Fukuda-Parr and Elson, "Introduction: The capability approach and human rights," *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, February 2011; Fukuda-Parr, "The Metrics of Human Rights – Complementarities of the Human Development and Capabilities Approach," *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities* and Martha Nussbaum, "Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach," 2000 to name a few.

(economically, politically and socially) they will in turn have the ability to choose "beings" and "doings" – which will enhance freedoms. Sen distinguishes between means and ends and substantive freedoms (capabilities) and outcomes (achieved functionings). Robeyns writes:

> *Only the ends have intrinsic importance, whereas means are instrumental to reach the goal of increased well-being, justice and development. However, in concrete situations these distinctions often blur, since some ends are simultaneously also means to other ends (e.g. the capability of being in good health is an end in itself, but also a means to the capability to work)* (95).

When looking at Santa Marta and City of God and the State's growing role in development and human rights, its investments and projects can be seen as addressing and affecting *means* and *ends*.

Santa Marta, City of God and greater Rio de Janeiro

The marked transition in economic, social and security policy in the past few years shows the State of Rio de Janeiro (and Brazil) fulfilling its obligations as outlined in international and national human rights treaties and covenants. Simultaneously the State is taking an active role in the economic and social development of favela communities. Rather than destroying, removing or replacing the communities, the State is making investments in social programs and physical infrastructure. These investments directly address and enhance the freedoms of favela residents. Sen outlines five "instrumental" freedoms – or means - in his capabilities approach: (i) political freedoms, (ii) economic facilities, (iii) social opportunities, (iv) transparency guarantees and (v) protective security. Looking at these freedoms, I am going to analyze the role of the State in new development strategies and how they are enhancing and expanding freedoms of citizens in the communities of Santa Marta and City of God.

The UPP and the State's new presence in favela communities have many critics who are anxiously waiting to criticize, critique and break down the new policies. Despite these criticisms, economic growth, investment in infrastructure and social programs and increased agency among citizens has begun to shape new communities and citizens. A vibrant, outspoken youth is being nurtured and unknowingly are learning agency and participation in their communities – concepts previously denied to their parents and grandparents. As these communities experience changes first-hand in policy and State interaction and the expansion of their freedoms, Rio de Janeiro is playing an active role as facilitator in the fulfillment of human rights and investment in economic and social development.

Santa Marta

A History

Santa Marta, also referred to as Dona Marta, boasts visits from some of the world's most important figures, the political – Rudy Guiliani and President Lula – and the famous – Madonna made a visit once and Michael Jackson filmed a music video atop the community (with permission from the drug traffickers) in 1996 aptly titled "They don't really care about us." Many claim the community's namesake refers to the chapel at the


top of the hill. But others believe, as stated on the *Favela Tem Memoria* website, that the name originated after a priest, who lived in Botafogo, named the

hillside in honor of his mother (www.favelatemmemoria.com.br).[13] The community's population proliferated after work was offered to families from the northeast who were displaced after the 1929 coffee crisis in Paraíba – many former slaves and the rest of Afro-Brazilian descent. A local church began agricultural work in the area and offered employment to the displaced families and individuals. Displaced families and persons, as encouraged by the Church, started building homes nearby so as to have plenty of room for their growing, Catholic families. In an area and city without established land tenure

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[13] The website is community based and organized and collects and publishes data on the history of favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

processes, Santa Marta was one of many temporary housing areas that were built to house the influx of emigrants from the northeast. Important to recognize in understanding the spatial contexts of this particular favela is Santa Marta's location. Strategically located in Rio's middle class – and famous – south zone, members of Santa Marta have access to many amenities. Residents have a plethora of options when looking at access to social services like hospitals, transportation, schools and employment because of their close proximity to a growing, middle class neighborhood (as seen in the picture from *O Globo* above). Like many of the over 250 favelas that are dominated by drug traffickers, Santa Marta was famous for the hooded adolescents who guarded the community's main entrance with AK47s and intimidation throughout the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s (Interview, January 2011).

Rio's BOPE and UPP units entered Santa Marta in December of 2008. The between 5,000 and 7,000 residents of the community (and the greater population of Rio)

were never told why their community was the first to receive the inaugural program. Most theories revolve around its relative isolation to other favela communities (less chances of drug gang interactions), its small size and its strategic location in the south zone (*Daily Telegraph*, March 11, 2011). The article follows the UPP Chief Pricilla de Oliveira Azeredo on her walk through Santa Marta as she elaborates on past military and municipal police occupations in the neighborhood, and how the new UPP method intends to stay in the community to ensure

its growth and future security. According to *Movimento Rio de Combate ao Crime* (MovRio) and *Instituto Brasileiro de Combate ao Crime* (IBCC), two government branches established to document and analyze the government's program against crime, drug traffic in Santa Marta has decreased significantly since 2008 (see Figure above; a larger version can be found in the Appendix). The chart above, offered by MovRio and IBCC, documents the number of calls received by the State in 2008 and 2009 in turning in people and things associated with the drug trade in Santa Marta.

This UPP presence shows the State's involvement in ensuring the safety of a community thereby increasing freedoms of the 5,000-7,000 residents and specifically addressing the Sen's fifth freedom, protective security. In addition to the UPP, the State of Rio de Janeiro also created entirely new departments in the local government to answer complaints and reports of drug trafficking from local residents. A step like this helps to recognize the voice of local residents and encourage their participation in the community while also promoting transparency, another Sen's instrumental freedoms. The growing involvement and accountability of the State in Santa Marta shows progressive realization and the enhancement of capabilities. The State has involved itself in multiple levels of development in Santa Marta.

Role of the State in Development

The major difference between the State of Rio de Janeiro's current pacification programs from its past occupations in Santa Marta is the presence and investment of the State in other forms post pacification. Throughout the 1990s, Santa Marta received heavy investment from the State in an effort to urbanize the community. But it wasn't until the early 2000s and especially post 2008 that the community received a surge in State

investment in various forms of projects, infrastructure and programming. Almost

immediately after the UPP arrived, a health clinic was built at the community's entrance

for easy access to health care and doctors. Signs for State and municipal sponsored

daycares, schools and clinics scatter throughout the community. Government health care

workers, which can be identified by slogans on their shirts like "Como pode ajudar?" or

"How can I help?" wander the alleyways collecting epidemiological data. And speakers

throughout the community blast daily radio programs recorded live from Radio Santa

Marta with community updates and announcements.

> **Education:** The community has multiple public schools in Santa Marta and
> Botafogo. Also located in Botafogo are two the city's most elite private schools
> that work closely with Santa Marta and its students in an effort to bridge the
> communities through interaction and education. The community has a daycare.
> **Health services:** Because of Santa Marta's strategic location, citizens are close to
> multiple public clinics and hospitals located in Botafogo. As mentioned before,
> because of access to transportation they have access to private hospitals in
> Ipanema, Copacabana, Leme or the north zone. A maternity clinic located in
> Leme is located about a 15 minute bus ride from the bottom of the community. In
> addition to clinics and hospitals, the State of Rio de Janeiro has also implemented
> community health programs in Santa Marta. Weekly, community health workers
> collect data related to tuburculosis, dengue, HIV/AIDS and administer
> vaccinations. Activities like this are essential because many older residents living
> have a hard time climbing up/down the community's hill.
> **Transportation:** In 2006 the State of Rio de Janeiro built a cable car that begins
> at the bottom of the hill and goes all the way to the top (where the current UPP
> section headquarters are). Botafogo's metro station was built in the 1980s and
> currently has access to Rio's two lines in the city. The current construction of
> Rio's metro is being planned and implemented, a one-way ticket costs around 2
> *reais* (reals, Brazilian currency which is about $1usd). The city currently doesn't
> have weekly or monthly passes, but it does offer discounts to the elderly.
> **Technology:** Radio Santa Marta records daily programs that are available to the
> entire community with music, current events both in and outside the community.[14]
> Beginning in 2009, the entire community became wireless accessible. Also
> located in the center of the community is a computer lab (about 10-15 computers)
> that offers classes to individuals who wish to learn how to use the internet and

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[14] In January 2011, I attended a recording of one of the weekly shows hosted by the President of the
Residents Association, Ze Mario. He uses his regularly scheduled program to communicate with the
citizens about upcoming events at schools, clinics and other government run programs. He also talks about
locally organized events by citizens and NGOs.

Microsoft programs. The computers are also available for personal use as well. Internet cafes have begun to spring up in the community as well which offer access to scanners and printers.

Infrastructure: Most notable from the outside is the State government's investment in physical infrastructure projects. These projects, which are constantly expanding, are outlined in the city government's website (http://www.rio.rj.gov.br) beginning with street lighting (2010); the City announcing and labeling official public spaces including squares, lookouts and streets (April 2010). Once this happened, many residents for the first time had their first official, recognized address. Because the State had never before implemented city planning in Santa Marta most residents never even had an address or access to mail. The postal service was usually organized and delivered by the Residents Association. Now people have mail delivered and in some cases pick it up at the community center. Other services implemented are garbage pickup, water, sewage and electricity to homes. One of the first things organized by the State in 2008 once the favela was invaded and pacified was having refrigerators donated by Light (power company that supplies electricity to most of Rio) to every household. For the first time, many residents had their first refrigerator. Electricity, water, internet and other services were services once stolen by residents of favelas. Because the State had no presence, communities were forced to steal from their wealthier neighbors at the bottom of the hill. Tapping illegally into water and electricity, referred to as *um gato*, residents of Santa Marta spent decades not paying for many services.

Employment: Beginning in August of 2010, Santa Marta began another government pilot program, *Rio Top Tour* (http://www.rio.rj.gov.br). Organized by the Department of Tourism and Sports, the project labeled as "touristic and social inclusion," hires and trains residents of Santa Marta to act as guides to their community. For over a decade, tourists from all over the world have started to visit Rio's favelas. Unlike favela tours organized by drug traffickers in communities like Rocinha (which are the most famous), tourists are encouraged to explore the community of Santa Marta and are guided by locals in their walk up the steep hill in search of some of Rio's most beautiful lookout points. Printed, colorful guides and signs throughout the community offer tours by residents in English and Portuguese.[15] The government of Rio specifies this to be a pilot program with the hopes of implementing it in other favela communities with UPP forces present (http://www.rio.rj.gov.br).

Security: As stated before UPP has been in Santa Marta since December 2008. Their community headquarters are at the very top of the hill and offer a lookout over the entire community and can be arrived at by the incline. According to the UPP website, they currently have 123 officers present in the community (http://upprj.com). The UPP Chief is Priscilla de Oliveira Azevedo.

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[15] I spoke with community members who were hired by the government at both the entrance to the favela and on the incline. They were excited to talk with me about Santa Marta and seemed enthusiastic about the project and hope that its success would continue to bring tourists from all over the world. Also while doing my own tour, I encountered people visiting from Argentina and Manaus, Brazil.

These efforts in social and structural adjustment in Santa Marta mark a new period for favela development in Rio de Janeiro. For decades the State made investments but this is the first time that they have tackled the three separate, interlinked areas of security (i), infrastructure investment (ii) and social inclusion (iii).

Role of the State in Fulfilling Human Rights and Enhancing Freedoms

By driving out drug traffickers and establishing UPP units, the State is actively respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of their citizens. The State's investments and actions show a healthy path of progressive realization in Santa Marta as they continue to invest in infrastructure and social programs for the community that are enhancing economic and social rights. Labeling the *Rio Top Tour* as a form of *inclusão social* (social inclusion) shows the State's commitment to integrating favelas and their residents into the greater economic and social landscape of Rio de Janeiro. Also key in this integration is the State's interaction with local NGOs in Santa Marta. By allowing and encouraging NGO growth in Santa Marta, the State is enabling other groups with a further, deeper reach to address human rights in new, creative ways.

Santa Marta's New Freedoms

Sen's five instrumental freedoms are treated as interdependent and interrelated much like human rights theory in regards to civil and political rights with economic, social and cultural rights. As such, Sen's five freedoms are addressed in various ways through the State's actions in Santa Marta's development. With the foundation of calm, safe communities – like in the case of Santa Marta with the UPP – all freedoms are more accessible to residents and able to reinforce one another.

Political Freedoms

With the establishment of UPP forces, residents of Santa Marta and their political voice have been established and reaffirmed. When the community was ruled by drug factions, the local *Associação de Moradores* (AM - Residents Association) and those elected were under the control of the drug lords. With the presence of State now active with established security, residents again are able to represent themselves in various discussions inside and outside the community. Democracy and voice have returned to Santa Marta. Additionally, residents are also allowed and encouraged to speak out against the government and its actions and programs being implemented in the community. Civil society is vibrant in Santa Marta and also encourages the political freedoms of residents – young and old.

Economic Facilities

Santa Marta's streets are lined with clothing shops, internet cafes, juice shops and other forms of commerce. Also available are the shops and stores in Botafogo. This accessibility allows residents to choose where they would like to participate as economic stakeholders in their community. The market plays an integral role in development in Santa Marta and greater Brazil. Residents are able to freely exercise where they will spend their income, thereby contributing to the development of community and greater Brazil. Again, drug lords determined what remained open and available in Santa Marta. With the establishment of the State, this freedom has been enhanced because residents are able to start their own business or invest in improving their home with the proper documentation and paperwork. These capabilities are a direct exercise of economic participation.

Social Opportunities

Social opportunities, an integral freedom for residents of Santa Marta, allow residents to

seek education, health care, employment and other social investments the State has made

in the community. Because of Santa Marta's growth and as the pilot case study in

pacification, multiple programs have been adopted as a testing ground for social inclusion

and growth. Schools, health clinics, free wireless and Rio Top Tour employment are

investments the State has made in social programming that enhance the capabilities of

citizens. The State's investments in social, cultural and economic rights with these

programs show an aggressive path to progressive realization. It is arguable that Santa

Marta has received more attention in social programming than any other favela in Rio.

Favelas across the city are hopeful that if the programs prove successful in Santa Marta,

they will be carried out in other communities with present UPP forces. The enhancement

of these freedoms is key in creating active citizens in Santa Marta.

Transparency Guarantees

One strong example of the State's transparency in Santa Marta is the creation of

Movimento Rio de Combate ao Crime (MovRio) and *Instituto Brasileiro de Combate ao*

Crime (IBCC). As mentioned before these government departments were established to

record reports of crime and drug traffic in Santa Marta. The information is collected

throughout the year and then disseminated in graphs, charts and reports to the public.

Important in this process was the State's application of signs throughout the community

with the announcement "A Sua Comunidade Foi Pacificada, Ajude a manter a segurança,

Denuncie" (translated to "Your Community has been pacified, help maintain a safe

community by reporting any type of crime, drugs or guns"). This not only helped to

catch drug traffickers, but also helped community members become active participants in the pacification of their communities through a transparent method.

Protective Security

While all these freedoms interrelate and are interdependent, protective security in the case of Rio, and more specifically Santa Marta serves as the catalyst to help spur and push forward the other four fundamental freedoms. By providing active, present and well-received UPP forces, the State provides protective security to a formerly violent favela community. Since the 1980s, citizens of Santa Marta experienced deep deprivations of capabilities because of the violence of drug traffickers and later street wars between drug traffickers and police invasions. These former deprivations have now been turned into freedoms where residents are able to choose and exercise capabilities every day. In addition to public security, protective security includes social safety nets and the protection of vulnerable, poor populations. Santa Marta offers accessibility to public funded schools, employment programs and health clinics - overall enhancing capabilities and also offering safety nets to those most vulnerable.

Human Rights and Freedoms in Santa Marta

The State's approach to development in Santa Marta is human rights based and practiced – for the first time – within the language of their constitution and international human rights covenants and treaties. The State specifically refers to Santa Marta's new projects as *inclusão social* – social inclusion. These programs and investments are actively involving community members while fulfilling their human rights obligations – like the UPP with civil and political rights – and investment in employment and schools and health clinics with economic, social and cultural rights. As the State invests in one sector

in Santa Marta, other areas is directly and indirectly affected through linkages. Though favela residents in greater Rio fear the changes slowly being implemented throughout the city, the changes in Santa Marta represent positive actions taken by the State of Rio de Janeiro and federal government of Brazil in their fulfillment of international and national human rights obligations. In addition to these human rights obligations, the expansion of freedoms (as shown through the instrumental freedoms) for Santa Marta is assisting a community in living in dignity, well-being with the freedom to choose.

City of God

A History

In response to heavy urbanization and proliferation of favelas in the north and south zones of Rio de Janeiro, the government of Rio de Janeiro began "resettlement" programs in the 1960s. Because the squatter communities in the north and south zones did not have legal paperwork for their land or homes – or so argued the State authorities – they were forced into government built complexes labeled *conjuntos* (Perlman, *Favela* 34, 2010). Throughout the 1960s and 70s, Brazil and the State of Rio de Janeiro experienced multiple changes in power, policy and government departments in charge of urbanization

The Economist, June 2010

projects, housing policy and relocating programs. But as Alejandro Portes outlines in an early paper written on Rio's housing policy, federal and state authorities "were to have complementary functions – the former being subordinated to the latter – in practice, the drastically different orientations of the two agencies toward the favelas set them in opposition to each other" (11, 1979). The State's ambiguity on City of God and other

planned conjunto construction lie at the center of the community's violent past, current situation and future development.

Families and individuals located in Rio's more central area (north and south zones) with access to wealthy neighborhoods – thereby access to work and employment – were relocated kilometers out of town starting in the 1960s. This deliberate spatial separation defined the new social and physical landscape of Rio. As seen in the map above, City of God was placed in what is termed the west zone of Rio de Janeiro. Far removed from the presence of government, security or law enforcement, these planned neighborhoods became ripe breeding grounds for violence. Since the 1980s some of the most dangerous favelas in Rio are those that were planned and built by the government, purposefully located kilometers outside of town.

Dependent on income and family size, families were moved to the flat neighborhood hours outside of city center. Today City of God has over 50,000 residents, booming commercial centers with grocery stores, clothing outlets, crowded barber shops and ice cream stands throughout its sprawling grid-like streets. City of God's size, both in population and space, made it a perfect breeding ground for Rio's drug traffic. Enough boys with high aspirations for money and deprived of options in education or employment made the neighborhood their violent playground for years. Unlike Santa Marta, the layout of City of God provides for multiple entrances and exits which made it easy for traffickers to escape police invasions or raids.

The collective memory of this violence has not disappeared from City of God. While community members are optimistic about the future, even the children have recent memory of drug traffickers and admit to seeing drug activity on the outskirts of the

community where the UPP doesn't have as active a presence. City of God's size and location contrast greatly with Santa Marta. The favela's isolation causes an even larger rift between its citizens and the middle class neighborhoods of Rio including the closely located Barra da Tijuca.[16] The BOPE and UPP began its second invasion and pacification program in Rio de Janeiro in February of 2009, just a year after Santa Marta's program was inaugurated. Like Santa Marta, the community was unaware of why they were chosen, but many residents welcomed the much needed State presence and peace. According to the UPP website the community has 307 officers at various stations throughout the 35 kilometers of the community (http://upprj.com).

Role of State in Development

Like Santa Marta, the State has taken an active role in development in City of God since pacification in 2009. Its challenges remain more reticent and visceral for the very large, isolated community. Its population, more than four times the size of Santa Marta, and sprawling space present a need for a much higher budget and even more concentrated attention to citizens that have very limited access to social services. City of God's isolation determines the livelihoods of citizens and their accessibility to all social services. To the outsider, the community appears to be largely self sufficient – and commercially speaking it is. However infrastructure and social services are well beyond the control of the community. Luckily, the new presence of State is drastically changing accessibility of services while also altering the expectations of the community's residents.

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[16] Barra da Tijuca is where many middle and upper class citizens of Rio have migrated in an effort to escape the violence of favelas in Rio Sul in the 1990s and 2000s. Its structure, commercial development and gated communities reflect the landscape of the United States. It is also one of the main areas of development for the World Cup and Olympics.

The community's isolation has aided its commercial growth and independence, from toilet seats to stylish clothes, stores and vendors line the streets with deals remarkably cheaper than south zone favelas. State run schools, clinics and youth centers are also scattered throughout the dry, flat landscape. Unlike views of Ipanema beach and Cristo the Redentor, which make Santa Marta famous – mounds of trash pile the unpaved streets of City of God. The streets are packed with groups of laughing kids and young and old families. Closely following the laughter are the roaming UPP vehicles with men clad in uniform and heavy artillery and guns purposely protruding from inside blue painted UPP vehicles. And while the State and UPP forces increase their presence in this growing community and invest in infrastructure and social programs, City of God's physical distance from the rest of Rio dictates the opportunities and amenities available to its residents.

> **Education:** The community has multiple public schools (primary and secondary) in the community. In 2010 the Secretary of Education began building *O Espaço de Desenvolvimento Infantil* (translated to Infant Development Space or nursery/preschool). Depending on a family's income, in some cases, children go to an *escola particular*, or private school. But because most people in the community do not have access to cars, children must take a bus that might require multiple transfers depending on a school's location. The community also has *Centro de Referência da Juventude* (CRJ) sponsored by the State that offers classes to youth in the community in art, jujitsu and capoeira. The center also has a beauty salon, kitchen and computer lab where they hold courses for young adults and adolescents weekly.
>
> **Health Services:** The community has multiple State sponsored and run clinics. With an investment of R$4 million, *Unidade de Pronto Atendimento* (UPA; 24Hour Emergency Clinic) opened in May of 2010 ("Prefeito, Governador e Presidente Inauguram UPA," Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro). In multiple interviews, parents in the community stated their happiness to have the UPA clinic but emphasized the need for pediatricians saying that only general practitioners were available. Also mentioned was the lack of supplies (gauze and other miscellaneous items) in some clinics. If someone were to sustain a more serious injury beyond the availability of skills and resources of the clinics, arrival to the nearest public hospital could take up to 2 hours and require 2 bus transfers. A few private clinics are also available and run by independent doctors and

nurses. In an effort to prevent disease, various events are held in the community by different departments of the State to teach people about health issues like Dengue Fever, Tuberculosis and other diseases that are present in the community ("Ações de combate à dengue", Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro).

Transportation: City of God's isolated location will likely never have access to the metro being built. Most workers must make at least two transfers to arrive to their daily jobs. The average bus or van ride costs from $2-3 reais (equivalent of $1-2usd). Cost varies based on air conditioning and the newness of the vehicles. If a person makes one transfer in coming and going to work, on average they are paying $10Reals a day. In some cases transportation costs can almost double. Considering that most people get paid below minimum wage, it can be assumed that these rides can add up quickly for a family that has multiple members commuting. In some instances, individuals choose to sleep in the streets or rent rooms near their place of work only returning on the weekends to their homes in order to save on transportation costs (Alves and Evanson, 28, 2011). A commute can take 1-2 hours. One step that will be implemented to alleviate this burden is "extending integrated inter-municipal single fare transport" (*World Bank Group*, Brazil: Better and Safe Housing, 2011). While only a small change, something like this could make a huge difference to City of God and other favela residents who live hours away from work.

Technology: the CRJ and other government centers offer classes in computer science and instruction; the Centers in the community have wireless capabilities.

Infrastructure: The State website emphasizes investments in lighting and trash collection (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro) but the community's streets and river are still filled with waste. Some streets in the community are paved while others remain dirt roads. Because the community was government built, it was established with street names and recognized public spaces.

Employment: Currently the State has invested in employment by hiring community members to work in State run facilities like the UPA clinic and CRJ community center. Because the neighborhood is famed for its name perhaps investment in tourism could occur (like in Santa Marta) but it seems unlikely because of the community's location.

Security: As of January 2011, the original structure of the UPP has been expanded upon. Originally the UPP had one centrally located headquarters and various postings in different parts of the community. Now the community is divided into three major areas with the goal of increased dialogue and presence in the community ("Cidade de Deus tera nova estrutura," UPP Reporter). They are also receiving an increase of 35 Policia Militar (military police) units.

City of God's transformation over the last few years is changing the social and economic landscape for once deprived, neglected citizens. Media continues to increase in the international community's favorite pacification case study. This combined with the

State's role in economic and social development are combining to push the community

forward in its integration into the greater community of Rio de Janeiro.

Role of the State in Fulfilling Human Rights and Enhancing Freedoms

Like in Santa Marta the State's active presence in City of God shows their fulfillment of

their international and national obligations to respect, protect and fulfill the rights of its

citizens. The installation of the UPP units in 2009 was an immediate mechanism in

protecting citizens' rights from the violence of the drug traffickers. By investing in

infrastructure and programs, the State of Rio de Janeiro is fulfilling the rights of the

residents of City of God through progressive realization. While many residents remain

skeptical of the State's current presence - actions and investments are responsible for

beginning a dialogue in the still divided community. No official projects with the label

social inclusion have been implemented in City of God but the State Secretary on Human

Rights has an active presence in the community. In April 2011, they along with local

UPP officers held an event in the middle of the community that welcomed adults and

children and offered workshops on music, capoeira, beauty classes and environmental

education (Zanelli). Actions like this recognize the community's cultural rights while

also expanding the freedoms and choices of local residents.

City of God's New Freedoms

Despite what critics say, City of God and its citizens are experiencing a heavy expansion

of freedoms as they become active participants in their local community. Sen's five

instrumental freedoms – like in Santa Marta – are interrelated and interdependent in order

to reinforce one another. The strength of these freedoms combines to enhance the

capabilities and freedoms of the residents of City of God. Physically and mentally

marginalized for over four decades, the State's active participation in the local economy and fulfillment of human rights obligations in City of God can be seen in various actions and investments throughout the community which all work together to expand the choices of local residents.

Political Freedoms

Political voice and participation has increased in the community since the established presence of UPP in 2009. Drug traffickers controlled the *Associação de Moradores* (AM - Residents Association) and determined what officials were elected through purposefully aimed campaigns of violence. With ability to vote in local, municipal and State elections community members are able to exercise their political freedom through agency and voice. City of God has an active civil society that encourages community members to participate in elections, community events and by participating online as well. Whether critical or boastful, many blogs have been created in the community as a reaction to the State's presence since 2009. However, because the community's size and still present drug trade, many citizens still fear for their safety and refuse to speak out against what happens on the outskirts of town.

Economic Facilities

City of God's sheer size allows for residents to invest and spend their income on a weekly basis in the community's many economic centers. The availability of these resources post pacification allows residents the opportunity to choose and exercise their capability of consumption and be active economic citizens. Because a majority of stores, shops and restaurants are located within the center of the community, the still present drug traffickers do not affect people's economic activities. One challenge facing City of

God is the amount workers are forced to spend on their monthly transportation costs. While the money spent cycles through the economy and empowers citizens, it is money that could be spent in other ways to improve lives and families.

Social Opportunities

The State has made significant investment in schools and health clinics in City of God. However investment in employment or any type of training relating to employment is scarce compared to Santa Marta. The enhancement of health and education help the community and its individuals to enhance their capabilities and freedoms and sustain and work dignified lives. But again, City of God's isolation prevents many residents from participating in social events and opportunities – thus the enhancement of social opportunities or freedoms is further from reach than Santa Marta.

Transparency Guarantees

Movimento Rio de Combate ao Crime (MovRio), *Instituto Brasileiro de Combate ao Crime* (IBCC) and their research were also used in City of God and their reporting of crime in the community. The State government is trying to establish transparent development patterns in City of God. So far their investments and willingness to work closely with the community show they are trying to prevent corruption that could break confidence between community members and the State. Corruption, historically, has been one of the biggest challenges for the State and greater Brazil.

Protective Security

Again, the center and enhancement of each of these freedoms hinges upon the State's investment in public security that protects the livelihoods of citizens. City of God's new UPP forces have drastically affected the formerly violent landscape of the community.

However dialogue between UPP officers and residents is very limited due to fear and discrimination on both sides. Many community members are still hesitant to trust the officers who insist on heavy armor and the constant exhibition of firearms. And as the opening story of Tony Barros shows, UPP officers and their human rights based training still shows room for improvement. But it is undeniable that the presence of the UPP has expanded the freedoms of the residents of the City of God and allows them to live in dignity despite the community's violent past.

Human Rights and Freedoms in City of God

While State funded social and economic investment in City of God is not as aggressive as their Zona Sul counterpart, Santa Marta, the community has experienced increased government spending and presence since the UPP's occupation in 2009. In the establishment of UPP units and heavy social programming investments, the State is actively respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of its citizens in City of God. The State's actions in social and economic investment and development directly affect the freedoms of residents. With the expansion of these interrelated and interdependent freedoms, comes the freedom to choose beings and doings and participate in the local community. These choices – these freedoms - were denied for decades to City of God and its residents. The UPP and social programs mark a new era for the famous favela and its residents on who are on a new path to living dignified, fulfilling lives.

Human Rights, Freedoms and Development in Rio's Favelas

The State's programs and investments in Santa Marta and City of God actively involve community members while respecting, protecting and fulfilling their obligations in human rights treaties. Sen's theory – like human rights – treats all freedoms as interrelated and interdependent. The State's investment in one favela has direct and indirect economic and social effects that can be seen and felt inside and outside the community. Though favela residents in greater Rio fear the changes being implemented in the city's favelas, the evolving role of the State and its investments and attention are having positive social, economic and political outcomes. Santa Marta and City of God show the positive obligations taken by both municipal and federal levels of government.

Investments and progressive realization in Santa Marta and City of God show the State of Rio de Janeiro actively fulfilling their obligations as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its subsequent covenants and treaties. The State's investments in security and social policy show their active role in respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of their citizens. Their actions also show the State's involvement in economic development that is inclusive all citizens. This economic development with the foundation of human rights and social inclusion is expanding and enhancing the freedoms of favela residents. Unlike past ventures and policy, economic investment is placing favelas at the center of policy rather than the periphery. With each new investment and through the fulfillment of rights, a dignified, strong citizenry is being created and established in Brazil. These investments and fulfillment of human rights

obligations contribute to the betterment of Rio and the overall social and economic growth of Brazil.

PART IV

The implementation of UPP has been written about in media outlets across the world. Governments from the United States and Germany visit Rio's UPP headquarters in search of identifying successes and failures – challenges and accomplishments. Its inception and scope has evolved from decades of violent policing and security measures in Rio's

favelas. Discrimination, a direct outcome of the city's deeply embedded structural violence, controls the mentalities of both citizens desiring peace and the officers wishing to implement it. Santa Marta and City of God are just two of over a dozen favelas (and many more to come) experiencing the presence of a once very absent State. With renewed security and heavy infrastructure and social investment, these marginalized communities are witnessing a change in the State's involvement in social and economic development and in its adherence to its human rights obligations. If the State can sustain these security methods and successfully implement them in the city's 250+ favela communities controlled by drug traffickers, then perhaps for the first time in Rio's history, structural violence and the discrimination that stems from it will be altered while empowering formerly socially/economically excluded classes.

Human Rights and Development

Most residents of favelas, if asked, will criticize the State, UPP and new securitization methods. No matter their dissatisfaction, the role of the State has evolved to address development and is actively fulfilling human rights obligations in these pacified communities. After decades of neglect, the State is fulfilling its international and national obligations of respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of *all* citizens. Investment in Santa Marta and City of God are just two examples of how the State's new policy and progressive action are combating the city's violence and inequality. By providing safe communities, citizens are experiencing increased capabilities and freedoms and able to play a role in the State's economic, political and social development. These interdependent, interconnected freedoms and rights are establishing a new, optimistic and young citizenry.

Challenges

Despite all the State's accomplishments in recent years, its actions and employees seem to contradict its hard work and investments at times. In 2009, the State began building a wall around the northernmost point of Santa Marta. Stating it was an "ecowall" built to preserve the forest, favela residents across the city rose in protest at what they felt to be a direct affront to the community's place and respect. Meanwhile on the other side of town, talk of relocation of some west zone favelas has begun to take root. Ironically, communities removed to the purposefully isolated west zone area are now being considered to be removed again as the city plans to build a major highway connecting Barra da Tijuca and Zona Sul – the two key, future development areas for the World Cup and Olympics.

The State of Rio de Janeiro and federal government of Brazil have made serious strides in the past ten years in regards to development and human rights in the city's favelas but actions such as these directly contradict their accomplishments and more importantly – their promises to these communities. If the State wants to remain on a progressive path to development while also realizing the rights of its citizens – they must remember who is at the heart of these decisions and changes. Centuries of structural violence has left favela communities as the most economically and socially vulnerable. If the State of Rio de Janeiro wants to close social barriers, decrease the gini coefficient and host two of the world's most important events – then they must recognize favela residents as human beings with rights and once and for all eliminate the idea and reality of "second-class citizens."

In April of 2011, *The Economist*, wrote an article titled "Wild Horses: A soaring currency is complicating the battle against inflation" about Brazil's current monetary policy challenges. In it the author writes that some think it would be best to "let the real rise where it will and cut public spending to eliminate the expansionary fiscal deficit." A cut in public spending is a policy that will be felt in ripple effects throughout the country. But in Rio's favelas, the most economically vulnerable, a decrease in investments in their community could shape their development and stunt their progression for years to come. As Dilma and Brazil face the country's burgeoning influence in the global community, they must remember the country's marginalized must be a main priority amidst changing international fiscal and monetary policy in addition to the already established social policy.

Conclusion

Rio's UPP units and successive social investments are changing the expectations and confidence of Cariocas across the city. In just under four years, once violently, impenetrable areas have transitioned to safe communities for residents and even outside visitors to visit. If this is what the State of Rio de Janeiro can accomplish in under four years, ten or twenty years from now could show the transformation of a new city. It is no coincidence that these changes took a firm hold once the State implemented programs and policy with a human rights based approach. If the State continues to hold citizens' economic, social, cultural, political and civil rights as a focal point in the city's development, then it will continue in the upward direction of development, fulfillment of its human rights obligations and expansion of freedoms for all citizens. Rio is quickly changing and while critics and naysayers remain, the city's growing optimism and new-

established peace are sweeping through and permanently altering Cariocas and their

perception of place and city.

Appendix

Article 1.1
In Rough Slum, Brazil's Police Try Soft Touch
By ALEXEI BARRIONUEVO
The New York Times
10 October 2010

Brazilian police officers with a new community relations unit visited a day care center in the City of God slum in Rio de Janeiro.

RIO DE JANEIRO — Leonardo Bento longed for vengeance after a policeman killed his brother five years ago. So when he heard that the new "peace police" force in the City of God slum was offering free karate classes, Mr. Bento signed up, hoping he would at least get to beat up the karate instructor.

But the unexpected happened. Eduardo da Silva, the police instructor, won him over with humor and a handshake. "I began to realize that the policeman in front of me was just a human being and not the monster I had imagined in my head," Mr. Bento, 22, said.

Years of hate and mistrust are thawing in some of Rio's most violent slums. Pushed to alleviate security concerns before the city's double-billing on the international stage — the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games — Rio officials have embarked on an ambitious plan to wrest control of the slums, or favelas, from ruthless drug gangs who ruled for years with big guns and abject terror.

The peace officers are central to that effort, flooding in after the military police clear the streets in gun battles that can last weeks. Their job is part traditional policing, part social work. They devote themselves to winning over residents scarred by decades of violence — some at the hands of the police. And the tips fed to them from those who support their efforts, officers say, help them keep the relative peace.

For decades, City of God — whose brutal past was immortalized in a 2002 film — was one of the city's most fearsome neighborhoods, so dangerous that even the police rarely dared to enter.

Those days seem long gone. Drug dealing remains, and in at least one area, outsiders can enter only with permission from local youths who patrol the streets.

Still, the men with the big guns are gone, or at least have been driven underground. And life is returning to the streets.

Children now play outside without fear of stray bullets. They skip rope and play table tennis with paddles made from floor tiles. Soccer matches, formerly violent affairs, have become more civil, with officers sometimes joining in the games.

But almost two years after the new police units first arrived, many residents in this community of 120,000 people still struggle to accept that the 315 police officers working 12-hour shifts around them are no longer the enemy. Others welcome the calm but distrust it, worrying that the police force — formally called "police pacification units" — will leave once the Olympics end.

"Nobody likes us here," Officer Luis Pizarro said during a recent night patrol. "It can be frustrating sometimes."

Officer Pizarro and two others patrolled along a narrow river choked with garbage and reeking of human and animal waste. Families gathered around makeshift fires. Women danced the samba as men drank cachaça, the Brazilian sugarcane liquor. Almost no one waved at or greeted the officers, who walked through an alleyway littered with multicolored paper used to package crack and cocaine.

"There goes the Elite Squad," said one man from a doorway, chuckling as the three officers passed by.

The hostility is not hard to understand. For decades, government officials refused to take responsibility for the slums, and as drug gangs built caches of weapons it became harder for the police to enter without a firefight. Residents resented the police for abandoning them, and reviled them for the brutality that marked their bloody raids.

Without a daily police presence, city services suffered, and doctors and other professionals began to shun the slums for safety reasons. Drug gang leaders became judge and jury.

"People did not have the courage" to retake the slums, said José Mariano Beltrame, who took over as Rio's secretary of public security in 2007. "People preferred to throw the dust under the carpet to avoid facing the problem."

The favelas have rarely surrendered without a fight. At least eight people died in City of God in 2008 in the initial raids by the police. Such battles are expected to become more widespread as the police move into new neighborhoods. So far, they have installed 12 pacification units, covering 35 communities. But Mr. Beltrame plans to establish units in

160 communities by 2014, including in favelas like Rocinha and Complexo do Alemão, which are larger than City of God.

On a recent Sunday night, a few dozen young men walked freely in Rocinha with rifles and machine guns. One carried a small rocket launcher.

Many gang leaders from slums where the police have taken over are fleeing to Complexo do Alemão, the police said. Mr. Beltrame said he probably did not have the manpower to occupy either slum this year, calling it a "complex operation." He said he could not guarantee that people would not die.

Men played billiards in City of God. Since Rio officials deployed "peace police" units, life has returned to the streets and children play without fear of stray bullets.

The new units have not forsaken their enforcement duties in the effort to combat gangs, but they are trying new approaches.

Even with violent challenges ahead, many Rio residents are rooting for the program. Dilma Rousseff, the leading candidate to be Brazil's next president, has proposed expanding the model to other cities. Millions of dollars in donations from companies like Coca-Cola and a billionaire businessman, Eike Batista, are also pouring in, paying for things like police equipment.

Mr. Beltrame said his main goal was to rid the streets of "weapons of war," not necessarily to end drug dealing. He is also working, he said, to diminish police corruption. Many of the peace officers are purposely recruited right out of the police academy, before they are tempted to accept drug money to supplement relatively low wages.

In City of God, drug gang leaders have been arrested, killed or fled, but some of their family members remain, waiting for the police to leave. In Carate, the part of the slum patrolled by youths involved in the drug trade, residents say they feel caught between the police and the gangs.

"I am scared even to say 'good afternoon' to the police here," said Beatriz Soares, who fears that drug traffickers might be watching.

But her family fears the police as well. When a policeman came to her door one day, she said her 3-year-old son "asked him if he was going to kill him."

Still, it is clear that the police presence has changed lives for the better throughout City of God. School attendance has increased, with one high school showing a 90 percent rise in attendance since the community police arrived, a school official said. Earth-moving trucks are dredging the narrow, sewage-filled river, and garbage trucks pass through three times a week.

The police have also made more than 200 arrests since they retook City of God, and crime has fallen: 6 homicides last year compared with 34 in 2008.
Residents are mainly grateful, though some say something intangible has been lost, a certain edgy free-spiritedness.

In the past, gang members often subsidized drug-fueled funk parties to recruit dealers. The police are now strictly controlling the dances — limiting alcohol consumption among minors and censoring misogynistic lyrics that glorify drug gangs.

Mr. Beltrame said the peace police program is guaranteed only through 2014, but that its success would make it hard for future politicians to dismantle.

Capt. José Luiz de Medeiros, who leads the police unit in City of God, said he was building a force for the long term, and working hard to win the residents' trust. About a dozen officers recently visited a new day care center, spinning pacifiers around their fingers while children played with their radios and clambered around their legs and holstered guns.

Some of the officers have been pulled off patrol duty to teach guitar and piano classes and English. Officer da Silva, the karate instructor, is one of those who now teaches full-time.

Mr. Bento, who joined the class after his brother died, said he had considered going into drug trafficking to gain access to guns. But since meeting Officer da Silva, he has changed his mind and now tries to help other residents conquer their fear of the police. Officer da Silva said he understood the people's wariness. "It is impossible for them to forget their past," he said. "All I can do is make sure I am open to them."

To make his point, he comes to City of God unarmed and without a bulletproof vest. "Force does not bring about peace," he said. "It can instill respect, but not trust."

Article 1.2
Brazil Military Says It Cornered Rio Drug Gangs
By MYRNA DOMIT
The New York Times
26 November 2010

While a child played, members of Brazil's military patrolled a street in Vila Cruzeiro slum of Rio de Janeiro. Forces entered the slum on Thursday.

RIO DE JANEIRO — Police and Brazilian Army soldiers, struggling to take control of a second huge slum complex here, were fired on by drug gangs on Friday, but by nightfall they had managed to trap the traffickers inside, a military spokesman said.

Armed gang members aimed their weapons at Brazilian forces in the Alemao complex of shantytowns in Rio de Janeiro on Friday.

People in the city fled as gun battles broke out between the gangs and the Brazilian Army and police forces.

Friday's activity, at the Alemão complex of shantytowns, which is home to about 400,000 residents and considered by many to be the most violent of the city's slums, is a response to the latest eruption of gang violence, which began Sunday, as well as an effort by the Brazilian authorities to show that they can secure the city well in advance of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games.

Rio's secretary of public security, José Mariano Beltrame, told Brazilian news media that the latest violence was "retaliation" by gang members against an ambitious government program to control violence and "pacify" 13 of the more violent slums by invading, rooting out drug traffickers and installing a special community police force.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil sent 800 army soldiers to the Alemão complex early Friday after police outposts in the city had come under fire from drug gang members. The death toll from the violence climbed to 41 on Friday, the police said, with

nearly 100 cars and buses burned on major roadways, their passengers robbed and sometimes shot.

The deployment of soldiers indicated the government's concern about the latest violence, analysts said, as well as its determination that Rio's notorious gangs would not be allowed to prevail.

"It is not humanly possible that 99 percent continue to suffer in the hands of criminals," Mr. da Silva said Friday at a news conference during a visit to Guiana. "Rio can be sure that the government will give all the help necessary."

On Thursday, armored vehicles carrying police officers with assault rifles rolled over burning tires during an operation at Vila Cruzeiro, another gang-infested slum in the northern part of Rio. On Friday, the police declared they had "dominated" Vila Cruzeiro, although there were widespread reports that more than 100 gang members had escaped from the slum, prompting the deployment of the army troops.

Vila Cruzeiro residents were left in the dark after electrical wires were destroyed during Thursday's police activity, and many, fearing future violence, refused to go home. Bullet holes scarred walls and homes, and Special Police Operations Battalion officers searched cars and pedestrians at entrances and exits.

"I have never seen an operation like this one before and I am scared and am going to leave this community with my mom and sister," said Henrique Gonçalves, 18. "I can't continue living like this." A hospital near Vila Cruzeiro resembled a war zone clinic mobilized to treat victims wounded during the police operation. Among the victims was a 2-year-old girl shot in the arm by a stray bullet.

But panic has also affected residents throughout the city, and 132 schools have shut down, according to the city's secretary of education. At the Alemão complex, residents said they feared "bloodshed" from an expected invasion by the police and soldiers in the coming days, but remained hopeful that living conditions would improve as a result.

"This is the largest operation I have seen in Complexo do Alemão," said Rosineide Rodrigues de Lima, 39, a telephone operator. "I fear for my life and my daughter, who is in there right now, but this is the price we have to pay to have a better life in the long term."

Rio's governor, Sérgio Cabral, said during a news conference on Friday that the police and soldiers were in position to invade but were waiting for a "strategic moment to act."

Article 1.3
Brazil's 'City of God' embraces Obama
By Taylor Barnes, Correspondent / March 20, 2011
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Symbolizing his desire to connect with everyday Brazilians and support this nation's efforts to tackle crime and drug trafficking, President Obama spent an afternoon in Brazil's notorious City of God shantytown.

On a dirty rooftop littered with soda bottles, Anderlucia Nogueira began to complain, loudly, about Barack Obama, despite the fact that a handful of snipers were staked out on the roof next door to guard the US president.
Skip to next paragraph

Under a cloud of secrecy, Mr. Obama was visiting her favela (shantytown), the once crime-ridden City of God made famous in a 2002 film of the same name. His two-day visit to Brazil, part of his first presidential trip to South America that will also include stops in Chile and El Salvador, began Saturday in Brasília when he met his counterpart before flying on to Rio de Janeiro with his wife and daughters.

Symbolizing his desire to connect with everyday Brazilians and support this nation's efforts to tackle crime and drug trafficking, he visited the City of God with a Unit of Pacifying Police (UPP), a two-year-old security program that places high concentrations of police in select favela communities to root out armed drug traffickers.

Think you know South America? Take our geography quiz.

"Obama! Where are you? I came here just to see you!" Ms. Nogueira and her friends sang in a mixture of glee and frustration as the Brazilian Army snipers looked on.

But despite rumors that he might walk around the block or mingle with locals, the presidential motorcade entered into a high-walled school complex and its occupants exited their vehicles behind a white curtain. From her rooftop perch, Nogueira could hear Mr. Obama playing soccer with young children (see a video here) and then being entertained by a samba and capoeira (Brazilian martial arts) show.

Then the school's thick black gates opened and Obama, in green khaki pants and a blue oxford dress shirt, stepped out into the favela and waved only 30 feet away from Nogueira.

"He's very good-looking, man!" her neighbor, Rosângela, yelled down to Obama. She later added that it was the worth the hassle of having eight snipers perched on her rooftop. "It's an immense pleasure to receive him here."
Tight security, UPP program criticized

Unfortunately, she was one of the few to catch a glimpse. Army barricades prevented most residents from getting close. And to some, the secrecy surrounding the event and the limited ability of residents to see the president sent the wrong message.

Celso Athayde, coordinator of a prominent City of God non-governmental organization Central Única das Favelas, criticized the secrecy surrounding Obama's visit and the strict

security rules imposed on residents. "[Obama is] going to be simply reinforcing that these areas [are ones] he can't even walk in. He's reinforcing a stigma," says Mr. Athayde.

Moreover, the UPP program itself is controversial. Critics note the program's limited scope and Rio's still sky-high crime rates. The current 16 UPPs cover only 55 of Rio de Janeiro's approximately 1,000 shantytowns.

But supporters say installing permanent community police – rather than simply confronting drug traffickers in occasional shootouts – and ushering in public services wins the hearts and minds of favela residents.

"[The visit] is going to help to deconstruct to the world the image of violence [from the 2002 film]... to show a new context, of City of God and of Rio de Janeiro," says Col. Robson Rodrigues, who commands a policing unit here.
'I never imagined it'

But even given the brief and controlled nature of the Sunday favela visit, residents who swarmed the street afterward to chat with one another were still abuzz with excitement – even if they didn't see anyone from the president's party.

"In spite of having been quick, just to have touched the sidewalk is valuable," says Luciana Santana Mendes, a resident who was behind an army barrier with a friend and her wheelchair-bound son.

Marinette dos Santos Barrozo, who only glimpsed Obama's motorcade from behind the Brazilian Army's barrier, says waiting in the muggy heat was well worth it. "I felt privileged for him to come to the City of God," she says. "I never imagined that."

Article 1.4
Eco-wall or segregation: Rio plan stirs debate
December 09, 2009|By Shasta Darlington, CNN

Rio is spending $17 million on walls like this to keep shanty towns from spreading into rainforests.

Cement-block walls are being built around the shantytowns of Rio de Janeiro. Authorities say it's to save rainforests. The city's poorest residents say it's an attempt to shut them out.

When Francisco de Moraes looks at the wall, it angers him. He has one of the best views of Rio, overlooking the city, its shimmering beaches and Sugarloaf Mountain jutting from the sea.

"We don't have the right to have our opinion heard," he said.

He speaks during a break from a soccer game on a makeshift cement field that's wedged in by the wall. The "eco-wall," as officials call it, runs up next to his house and around most of the Santa Marta shantytown where he and about 7,000 others live.

"The state government walled us in, so more houses wouldn't be built in the forest," de Moraes said. "But people felt imprisoned, like they were setting borders and limiting when we could come and go."

The state of Rio de Janeiro began building the wall around Santa Marta in March, and it plans to spend $17 million on similar walls around the shantytowns.

There are nearly 1,000 such favelas -- cramped poor communities built around the city. The squalid homes tilt from their shaky foundations, some built on top of others. Many are carved into the humid rainforest that cling to the hillsides.

It's estimated about 20 percent of Rio's 6 million people live in the shantytowns.

Icaro Moreno, director of Rio state's public works, says the walls are necessary because the favelas have continued to expand by 7 percent over the last decade, making them one of the biggest causes of deforestation in the state.

"The limits used to be virtual and now they're physical," he told reporters at a news conference. "The government is saying, 'If you cross them or break them, you will be violating public property.' "

Some residents feel officials are keen to rein in the expansion of Rio's chaotic slums ahead of the 2016 Olympics. The naked cement and brick homes of the shantytowns can be spotted from beaches. Locals feel the city's elite are trying to wall off an eyesore.

"They treat the people here like children who need to be corralled in," said Eliane Lopes, who runs her own party-organizing business in Santa Marta. "We can respect limits as well as the rich people. We don't need a wall."

Article 1.5
A magic moment for the city of God
Jun 10th 2010 | RIO DE JANEIRO | from the print edition The Economist

Proper policing, better government and a stronger economy are starting to make a difference in the more violent and squalid districts of Brazil's former capital

THANKS to a film ("City of God") made in 2002, Cidade de Deus, a rundown housing project in the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro, became an internationally known symbol of the lawless urban squalor that has blighted Brazil's most glamorous city for decades. The Comando Vermelho, a heavily armed gang of drug traffickers, dominated the lives of the 60,000 or so residents of Cidade de Deus and its surrounding favelas (the Brazilian term for the tightly packed self-built slums of the poor). The gangsters, some of them

teenagers, could impose their reign of terror thanks to the brutal incompetence of the police and the venal indifference of the authorities.

Some of these problems are repeated across Brazil's cities. But they are particularly acute in Rio de Janeiro, which has suffered chronic misgovernment and decline since the capital moved to Brasília in 1960. Ahead of Rio's bagging of the 2016 Olympic games last autumn, rivals muttered about its criminal violence. In the week before the Olympic committee's decision, the New Yorker magazine ran a chilling account of a Rio drug lord and his fief.

But Rio is undergoing a renaissance, one which even holds out hope for the 1m of the city's 6m residents who live in favelas. Last year the police took control of Cidade de Deus—this time for keeps, they say. A force of 318 officers, backed by 25 patrol cars, is based in a new community-police station in a side street between two fetid, litter-strewn drainage channels. The result has been dramatic. In 2008 there were 29 murders in Cidade de Deus. So far this year there has been just one, and it involved a beating rather than a firearm, says José Beltrame, the security secretary in the Rio state government who is in charge of policing in the city. Other crime has fallen too.

Many residents are appreciative. "It was horror before," says Jeanne Barbosa, who runs a small bar on the ground floor of her house. "Bodies would be thrown out of passing cars, and there were kids with revolvers." Her niece was killed as she walked home, by a stray bullet from a firefight between the police and traffickers. "Now the children can play in the street." A dreadlocked unemployed welder who gives his name as Sérgio is more sceptical. He says the police commit abuses. His friend, who has the blank stare of a crack addict, adds with deranged precision: "89% of them are corrupt."

The police station in Cidade de Deus is one of eight, known as UPPs or Pacifying Police Units, set up in Rio's favelas since late 2008. They are part of an ambitious strategy by Mr Beltrame to restore law and order. This starts with better intelligence work. To minimise abuses, the police who staff the UPPs are newly recruited and specially trained. He has assigned targets to the whole force. By getting the city and federal governments to chip in with bonuses, he has managed to double the salaries of front-line policemen.

The police's objective is not so much to abolish the drug trade as to drive the armed gangs from the streets, and thus to open the way for other branches of the state. The gangs condemn favela residents to a life outside the law: electricity and satellite television are pirated; few residents have property deeds; and their jobs are in the informal economy, as are the minibuses that take them to work. The authorities are trying to consolidate security with legality and infrastructure. On May 31st Cidade de Deus gained its first health clinic. Next door, the city government is building a subsidised restaurant. Nearby, two young women are signing up residents for the electricity company, which offers new fridges and energy-saving light bulbs as an incentive to submit to higher bills.

So far the plan is little more than an experiment, albeit a promising one. The UPPs cover only around 140,000 people. The traffickers are lying low and have hidden their weapons, but they have not disappeared. The police must still overcome the mistrust of the community, says Tião Santos of Viva Rio, an NGO. The police in both Rio and São Paulo are still too trigger-happy: Human Rights Watch, a campaign group, recently noted that between them they kill more than 1,000 civilians a year.

City of the unholy trinity

Most of Rio's 1,000-odd favelas are still more or less controlled by three trafficking gangs or by criminal militias set up by rogue police and firemen. But even in some of these places there is hope. Take Vigário Geral, a small favela where 21 people were massacred by a police death-squad in 1993. On a recent visit, the footbridge over the railway that leads there was guarded by two young men, one with a bulky revolver tucked ostentatiously into the top pocket of his jacket. But back in the 1990s there were a dozen youths with rifles guarding the bridge, says José Júnior of AfroReggae, an NGO which has just opened a large cultural centre in Vigário Geral, financed by government and private companies.

Boosted by falling crime rates (see chart), Mr Beltrame, a former federal police chief, plans to install 40 UPPs covering 500,000 people over the next four years. By then he hopes Rio's murder rate will be similar to that of São Paulo, which reformed its police in the 1990s.

If he has a good chance of achieving this, it is because Rio is enjoying "a magic moment [in which] everything is conspiring in its favour," says André Urani, an economist who studies the city. The economy is growing strongly and creating jobs. Rio is the hub for Brazil's offshore oil, but it is also attracting new industries. After decades of populism and political conflict, public management in the state is being transformed. Sérgio Cabral, the state governor, and Eduardo Paes, the mayor, are both allies of Brazil's president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (all three turned up to open the clinic in Cidade de Deus). So federal money is pouring into the city. The state government, having cleaned up its chaotic finances, has room to borrow.

The extra funds will pay for an upgrade of the city's transport system for the 2014 World Cup (the final will be played in Rio's Maracanã stadium) and for the Olympics. Having secured the games with a conservative bid that put most of the events in well-heeled Barra and Copacabana, the authorities are now tweaking the plan. Mr Paes wants to revamp the seedy port area by getting private developers to build accommodation there for the 20,000 journalists who will cover the games. Some of the new money is also going on installing the paving, lighting and sewerage that turn favelas into neighbourhoods.

There is still much to do. Complexo do Alemão, an agglomeration of favelas spread over hillsides in the north of the city, is dotted with new housing projects and the concrete pillars of a 5km (3 mile) cable car that by later this year should link it to the suburban

railway network. One of its muddy streets of small shops boasts a branch of Banco Santander, opened last month—the first bank inside a Rio favela. Guilherme Nicolas, the branch manager, hopes to sign up 10,000 customers. But he says most residents earn less than 1,000 reais ($600) a month, and some want loans to buy food. Insecurity and poverty have gone hand in hand in Rio. A safer city has a better chance of becoming a less socially divided one.

Figure 1.0

Fonte: Disque-Denúncia, Heróis Anônimos - UPPs - A visão da favela, 2010

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